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1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The advent of digital technologies and the amount of data produced and shared through 
and within digital media has shaped already existing social practices and led to the emer-
gence of new social phenomena with dynamics of their own. This includes those practices 
and phenomena concerning the ways humans deal with death and mourn the deaths of 
others. Thanatechnologies (Sofka, 1997; Sofka et al., 2012; Sofka et al., 2017) – the var-
ious technological mechanisms brought about by digitalisation and their use in situations 
involving mortality, loss, grief and tragedy – have garnered interest from academia (Swan 
and Howard, 2012; Bassett, 2015; Meese et al., 2015; Ahmad, 2016; Bassett, 2018; Gi-
axoglou and Döveling, 2018), businesses (Newton, 2016; Eter9, 2017; Lifenaut, 2017; 
Eternime, 2019), single persons (Vlahos, 2017; Wray, 2020) and social groups such as 
gaming communities (Bainbridge, 2013) during the last decade for their potential within 
the topic of digital immortality: an attempted transcendence of death enabled by digitali-
sation, data producing practices and the internet.  
The idea of endurance after physical death by digital means raises interesting tech-
nical, ethical questions, political, economic, sociological and cultural questions (Sher-
lock, 2013; Jacobsen, 2017a; Öhman and Floridi, 2017; Savin-Baden et al., 2017), and 
thus demands an interdisciplinary exploration not only of the role digital technologies 
play in how human beings come to terms with death and loss, but also of the foundational 
forces that provide meaning to the visible and tangible social dynamics. Currently, than-
atechnologies are more concerned with giving the living access to the digital traces of the 
dead than with offering personally and culturally appropriate ways of maintaining a sym-
bolic relationship with them. In cases where interactive forms of thanatechnologies are 
adopted, they lack sophisticated algorithms which both respond to their users’ prompts 
and incorporate the individual’s beliefs and value systems concerning death into their 
design (Carvalho Pereira and Maciel, 2013; Newton, 2016; Vlahos, 2017).  
The limitations of current digital technologies in creating compelling pathways for 
digital immortality, as well as the conflicting opinions on the social use and impact of 
thanatechnologies (at least in mainstream discourse), present challenges in examining the 
magnitude of the effects that specific thanatechnologies can have for the acceptance of 
death and for mourning. For this reason, an approach that offers the interdisciplinary study 
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of social phenomena and is able to outline with greater detail the potential of thanatech-
nologies in their embeddedness in social practices is required. 
1.2 Research problem and scope of the thesis 
The field of Futures Studies, with its natural inclination of looking at the future, can bridge 
this gap by granting access to detail about the effect and integration of thanatechnologies 
in social life that is non-existent in the present, but which could become a feature of the 
future. This thesis adopts a Futures Studies approach to critically examine the different 
futures of human interaction with the Virtual Deceased Individual (VDI), a technological 
artifact that aims to replicate a deceased individual’s mannerisms, speech patterns and 
personality traits as expressed in interaction with the living, in the time horizon of 2040. 
The VDI, which represents an instance of thanatechnology, would have all the necessary 
information associated to the original individual that would allow it to faithfully imitate 
him or her in an interactive situation, and when prompted by its intended human interloc-
utor, would answer in a way that mimics the way the original individual would have an-
swered. This critical exploration of the futures is done firstly by constructing four con-
trasting ideal types of images of the future that describe the social practices focused on 
Human-VDI interaction, and then by engaging in a layered analysis of each ideal type, 
moving from the superficial levels of reality to its foundations in the form of a Causal 
Layered Analysis (CLA) (Inayatullah, 1998).  
The scope of this thesis is mostly exploratory, insofar as it does not attempt to provide 
a causal path for how different futures might emerge and does not attempt to identify 
causal links between the elements explored. Although the scope of the thesis is mostly 
exploratory, first identifying what the different ideal types might be and then describing 
how humans relate to death and go through mourning by engaging (or rejecting engage-
ment) with the VDI, the argument is made in this thesis that, under certain circumstances, 
an encounter between a person and a VDI is an instance of social interaction and should 
be examined based on insights from microsociology. Whether this is the case or not would 
depend both on the degree of sophistication of the technology involved and on the mean-
ing attributed to the VDI.  
While being exploratory, the thesis also adopts a critical stance, both in how social 
reality is approached and in the characterisation of the ideal types of the images of the 
future. Against an understanding of reality as being constituted only by its visible and 
quantifiable elements, a fundamental assumption in this thesis is that social phenomena 
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and practices are structured by and derive their meaning from deeper truths that are only 
accessible by qualitative methods which involve problematisation and deconstruction. 
This aspect is visible in the theoretical stance adopted, one of Critical Futures Studies, 
and in the Futures Research method of CLA. Similarly, although not explicitly phrased 
in normative terms, the ideal types of images of the future portray both restrictive and 
emancipatory approaches to how they orient subjects in facing death and in mourning the 
deaths of others. This is done by describing how the social practices in an ideal type of 
the images of the future facilitate or hinder subjects’ ability to confront mortality and 
undergo mourning.  
This thesis belongs to the research paradigm of social constructionism, which focuses 
on how social processes are central to the creation of meaning. Therefore, the scope of 
this thesis does not aim to forecast and guide the creation of advanced forms of the VDI 
in their technological dimension, nor does it discuss its potential for business models in 
the digital economy, among other potential research interests concerning the VDI. By 
implication, issues related to future-oriented technology analysis, technology roadmaps 
and strategic foresight are beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, the aim is to look for 
greater insight into how it could become integrated into social practices and the role it 
performs in dealing with death and mourning. Social constructionism, as argued by Ted 
Fuller and Krista Loogma (2009), is an appropriate research paradigm for Futures Studies 
because foresight is a social process that intends to construct meaning. Similarly, social 
constructionism is compatible with the CLA method and the assumption of deeper, intan-
gible truths, with discourse – a phenomenon that structures social reality – featuring 
prominently in this thesis and in the CLA method itself.  
Situating the thesis within a social constructionist paradigm and adopting an explor-
atory and critical stance has important implications for this research project. Against an 
understanding of social practices of Human-VDI interaction as being comprehensible 
only by the description of their future unfolding and analysis thereof, the paradigmatic 
perspective demands a conceptualisation of the social phenomenon by detailing its theo-
retical foundations. Generating a conceptual outline of the object of study allows the di-
rect microsocial phenomenon to be located within a macrosocial field where other social 
practices, discourses and cultural metaphors influence the meaning subjects imbue to their 
envisioned interaction with a VDI. As a result, a critical examination of the phenomenon 
can be conducted, as the researcher is aware not only of the direct meaning subjects assign 
to potentially encountering a VDI in 2040, but also of its significance for the broader 
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social context within which these encounters between people and VDIs take place. For 
this reason, it can be stated that theory in this thesis is used both to position the research 
project and to develop new theory for conducting a more sophisticated study.  
1.3 Research questions 
The research problem of this thesis is divided into three research questions, which are 
outlined below: 
1. How can a social practice that focuses on Human-VDI interaction be con-
ceptualised?  
This first research question focuses on developing a conceptual framework that al-
lows for a detailed description of how a VDI can be integrated into social life. This re-
quires first a review process of the different fields of research that are relevant for the 
research problem, and then arriving at a sensitising scheme that situates the specific mi-
crosocial phenomenon of Human-VDI interaction within a broader social context that is 
envisioned as occurring inside an image of the future. By doing so, not only can the im-
ages of the future acquire a greater level of detail, but the theoretical underpinnings of the 
phenomenon can be recognised in the empirical section of the thesis even when they are 
not explicitly referenced.  
2. What ideal types of images of the future can be constructed concerning 
the interaction between VDIs and living persons in 2040 based on the 
perspective of potential human interlocutors? 
This second research question is specifically related to the futures of the social prac-
tices of the interaction between the VDIs and living persons. It aims to uncover different 
ideal types, based on common elements that emerge in the interviews, of images of the 
future of the research problem. The ideal types have categories that allow for meaningful 
contrasts to be drawn between among them. It is important to emphasise that while there 
is no attempt to construct universal ideal types that cover the spectrum of social practices 
where the VDI is a feature of the social world, the ideal types in this thesis can be con-
sidered diverse, as people of different nationalities, ages and educational and professional 
backgrounds were interviewed so that the ideal types could portray different ways of 
dealing with issues of death and mourning in a societal context where Human-VDI is, to 
greater or lesser extent, an feature of social life.  
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3. What can the images of the future concerning Human-VDI interaction 
reveal about the way social practices involving the VDI affect how hu-
mans relate to mortality and experience mourning? 
This research question concerns the way the envisioned social practices of Human-
VDI interaction might shape the way subjects confront matters related to mortality and to 
the loss of others. A core assumption of this question is that by examining the perspectives 
on death and technology, emotions, material components, expected degree of integration 
of the VDI into everyday life, and the meanings associated to Human-VDI interaction 
that interviewees express, not only are their personal stances on the topic revealed, but 
deeper meaning-creating forces become identifiable. As a result, their influence on the 
manner social practices of Human-VDI interaction emerge and unfold can be critically 
explored.  
1.4 Statement of originality and relevance 
This thesis introduces the concept of the Virtual Deceased Individual, a specific form of 
thanatechnology which has been discussed within the digital immortality discourse, but 
which has lacked a specific name until now. Similarly, the conceptualisation of social 
practices focused on Human-VDI interaction represents a first step in outlining what the 
different elements involved are and how they can be studied, as anecdotal evidence, tech-
nocentric approaches and abstract discussions of this phenomenon have been around for 
years but research into its sociotechnical dimension has lacked systematicity and tangi-
bility.1 Additionally, the interdisciplinary approach of this thesis grants it a relevance to 
the different fields that are involved in conceptualising and critically examining the ideal 
types of the futures focused on the social practices of Human-VDI interaction. Although 
it offers interesting insights for these fields, it generates particularly meaningful contri-
butions to the field of Futures Studies and to the field of Death Studies.  
Concerning sociology of technology and sociotechnical change, this thesis offers in-
sights on the discourses and foundational metaphors that encourage some forms of than-
atechnology to be developed. What the interviewees reveal about the expectations regard-
ing their interaction with the VDI and how they envision such a technology may introduce 
some questions regarding how this and other similar technologies are developed now and 
                                                     
1  This is referring specifically to social practices that involve both human beings and current forms of 
the VDI. Systematic research of other instances of thanatechnology and their use is extensive.  
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in the coming decades. Despite not being the main focus, the subject matter of the thesis 
and the resulting images of the future might prompt discussion on the appropriate para-
digmatic perspectives to adopt in the development of thanatechnologies, whether they are 
more functionality-driven (i.e. problem-solving as their primary concern) or more care-
driven (i.e. to ensure that the users feel comfortable in their presence and ethical concerns 
have been meticulously discussed before their widespread development and use).  
Conceptualising Human-VDI interaction as social interaction puts forward a perhaps 
controversial, but nonetheless interesting notion: the idea that some forms of technology, 
despite lacking self-awareness, can be designed to behave in a convincingly humanlike 
manner and consequently provide meaningful encounters that can be considered instances 
of social interaction. Undoubtedly, there might be some contention in this regard, but an 
exploration of how encounters between people and VDIs can become social interactions 
is offered as part of the interdisciplinary literature review. The argument is made that, if 
both technological features and context are appropriate, Human-VDI interaction can in-
deed be regarded as social interaction and thus become integrated into broader social 
practices that deal with issues of death and mourning.  
For Futures Studies, this thesis constitutes one of the first detailed research projects 
that incorporates death and mourning as main themes. Despite the recognition that death 
and tragedy are important topics to be addressed when thinking about the future (Masini, 
2006, p. 1167), work in the field that focuses on such subject matters is rare (McDermott, 
1987; El-Bizri, 2019). While there is a brief theoretical overview of how death and 
mourning can be considered relevant themes to be explored within Futures Studies, the 
substantive contribution resides in examining them from an interdisciplinary perspective 
and in raising the question of how future developments in technology and social practices 
might guide human beings towards adopting specific stances regarding mortality and the 
loss of others. Similarly, the thesis considers the influence of current viewpoints about 
technology, death and personhood on envisioning specific kinds of futures with the VDI. 
As elaborated in the rest of this thesis, death and mourning have a constitutive role for 
social and cultural life, and some possible future social practices, in this case those centred 
on Human-VDI interaction, might make their role in everyday rituals and activities more 
visible than it currently is.  
For Death Studies, this research offers novel insights about how a specific thanatech-
nology, the VDI, does not necessarily have only one main effect, but its influence and 
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relevance for the mourning process is dependent on how it is integrated into social prac-
tices. Specifically, it asks to consider some conditions under which the VDI could facili-
tate or hinder subjects’ acknowledgement of the implications of a death event and either 
guide people towards successful mourning or complicate their process. The Critical Fu-
tures Studies approach is also important, as it reveals that deeper assumptions on death 
and personhood are constitutive of more visible social practices. Moreover, this approach 
highlights the significance of thinking about death and mourning as events awaiting in 
the future, for their consideration might empower subjects in the present by increasing 
their awareness of their own position regarding these themes and their manifestation in 
social practices. For this reason, the research subject of this thesis can be argued to foster 
a pedagogy of death – that is, to reacquaint people to issues of mortality and mourning 
and help them navigate them, as modern societies often insulate experiences of mortality 
and relegate confrontations with loss to the background instead of enabling thoughtful 
contemplation of these themes (Affifi and Christie, 2019).  
Because death and mourning are fundamental themes of human life, the subject mat-
ter of this thesis also offers grounds to consider potential societal implications of social 
practices that involve the VDI, should they come to pass. For example, would integrating 
the VDI into social and cultural life give rise to societies where the dead continue to have 
agency in the social world and affect the unfolding of events in the lives of others? If so, 
such integration could drive the emergence of a new societal paradigm where death again 
becomes familiar to the living, resulting in novel institutions and practices that locate 
death at the centre of everyday life instead of being relegated to an issue to be managed 
in the background. Additionally, incorporating the VDI into social practices might foster 
the recognition – either by interacting with it or by avoiding it altogether – of the com-
plexity of human relationships, revealing the way fellow human beings are important not 
only as individuals themselves but are also deeply integrated into the sense of self of their 
loved ones, constituting material, emotional and identificatory supports that are not al-
ways acknowledged.  
Of course, thinking of social practices of Human-VDI interaction in terms of the fu-
ture also carries an important ethical implication: having knowledge about the possible 
futures involves assuming the responsibility of orienting human action towards human 
welfare. The diverse images of the future in this thesis display both emancipatory and 
restrictive attributes of the social practices of Human-VDI interaction. This thesis, there-
fore, encourages critical thought on the collective duty to ensure that these practices foster 
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human freedom and agency so that the VDI does not become a confining feature of future 
societies that complicates death acceptance and mourning.  
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is composed of several sections, but broadly speaking can be separated 
into two parts. The first one, comprising chapters 2 to 4, is a predominantly theoretical 
one, focusing on the theoretical elements for an interdisciplinary literature review and for 
outlining the conceptualisation of the phenomenon being studied. Chapter 2 covers the 
Futures Studies literature and establishes how death and mourning are relevant research 
topics for the field. Chapter 3 presents an interdisciplinary literature review of Death 
Studies, Interaction Studies and Social practice theory. This interdisciplinary literature 
review outlines the theoretical concepts and insights which reappear, to greater or lesser 
extent,  in the empirical part; regardless of their explicit appearance in the empirical sec-
tion, it is important to review them first and keep them in mind, as the complexity of the 
phenomenon – the social practices of Human-VDI interaction in the time horizon of 2040 
– can be better grasped by having knowledge of the constitutive force of death for social 
and cultural life, comprehending mourning, having a clear idea of the phenomenon of 
social interaction and understanding the interplay between social forces and technology 
for social practices. Chapter 3 concludes by laying out a sensitising scheme that depicts 
how a social practice focused on Human-VDI interaction would be performed. Chapter 4 
is a mostly descriptive chapter, which defines the VDI and situates it within the digital 
immortality discourse, delineates its technical features and its process of creation, and 
gives an account of emergent practices of Human-VDI interaction. 
The second part of the thesis is a theoretically informed analysis of the empirical 
material and comprises chapters 5 to 7. Chapter 5 describes the research material, outlines 
the methodology, and identifies the methodological limitations of the thesis. Chapter 6 
presents the four ideal types – Ambivalence, Restoration, Concealment and Autonomy – 
of the images of the future that depict social practices of Human-VDI interaction in 2040. 
First, it outlines the different ideal types in relation to one another, and then each ideal 
type is examined in its general features and by resorting to the CLA method. Chapter 7 
concludes the thesis by characterising the ideal types in relation to their restrictive or 
emancipatory potential and by situating the thesis as a potential contribution to the peda-
gogy of death and to the integration of death and mourning as themes for Futures Re-
search.  
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2 FUTURES STUDIES FOR THE STUDY OF FUTURE 
PRACTICES OF DEATH AND MOURNING 
The Futures Studies field offers several theoretical insights and methodological ap-
proaches that open new possibilities for the study of human ways of relating to death and 
to mourning, as looking into the future allows to explore developments and social prac-
tices that are either absent (in a tangible, material sense) from the present or not visible 
enough to be considered as part of the present. Artifacts such as the VDI might be much 
more developed in the future social world of 2040, which means that their integration into 
social dynamics might increase. Thinking about the future, and adopting a critical per-
spective on the future, is therefore suitable to bring texture and depth to the social phe-
nomena that one might encounter, included the integration of new technologies for deal-
ing with mortality and loss.  
2.1 Ontology of the images of the future 
The scope of the research problem and its position within Futures Studies requires a brief 
overview of what images of the future are and their characterisation as a human creation. 
This, in turn, facilitates understanding why death and mourning, and how they are ad-
dressed by interacting with a VDI and integrating it into social dynamics, are appropriate 
themes to be studied in their integration into images of the future.  
A central concept of the Futures Studies field is that of the image of the future, which 
according to Wendell Bell, enables research to be carried out (Bell, 1997, p. 81-82). Be-
yond being a concept that allows for the systematicity of research, images of the future 
can also be considered phenomena that arise from the cognitive, imaginative and creative 
capacities of the human being. The specific nature of these phenomena and their content, 
however, is still subject of debate within the field. Discussion of the ontological nature of 
images of the future has seen increased interest in the 21st century (Adam and Groves, 
2007; Walton, 2008; Malaska and Masini, 2009; Poli, 2011; Staley, 2017), which makes 
reviewing different conceptualisations of them necessary to facilitate the adoption of a 
working definition for this thesis.  
Bertrand de Jouvenel (1967) presented the dichotomy of facta and futura, the former 
being events from which data can be collected and be thought of as facts, and the latter 
being cognitive constructs about events that are still to happen, if they happen at all, and 
that take the form of ideas, expectations, hopes and fears. A problem with de Jouvenel’s 
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distinction, in Poli’s (2011) view, is that by making a stark distinction between facts and 
cognitive constructs, he does not completely recognise that futura can also have some 
basis in reality, albeit one that does not possess the same degree of visibility and tangibil-
ity as what is understood as “facts”.  
In contrast, Frederik Polak’s seminal work, The image of the future (1973), acknowl-
edges that the historical process occurs by the interaction between completed and non-
completed time. Hence, an image of the future, which resides in the latter temporal di-
mension, does have a factual foundation, for the move towards an image of the future 
requires completed time for it to be realised. For an image of the future to eventually 
become real, in Polak’s view, it would require the completion of the preceding logically 
coherent and material events, which are guided in a specific direction by the allure of an 
image. For this reason, Polak states, “Social change will be viewed as a push-pull process 
in which society is at once pulled forward by its own magnetic images of an idealised 
future and pushed from behind by its realised past” (Polak, 1973, p. 1). The scope of 
images of the future for Polak is societal, which means that culture plays a central role in 
the creation and magnetic pull of the images. A limitation in Polak’s characterisation of 
the image of the future, however, arises from his propensity to treat this cultural force as 
something abstract that is then assimilated and processed by societies, instead of being 
routinely performed in everyday social practices. This raises the question of how the im-
ages of the future originally emerged in Polak’s account, wherein they operate more as 
already existing imaginaries which pull societies in their direction. The consequence of 
this limitation is that Polak’s description of images of the future does not settle on any 
specific ontological characterisation: at points they seem to be culturally shared abstrac-
tions, while at others they seem to be a feature of the interconnectedness of time. Of 
course, it is possible for both readings to work within Polak’s conceptualisation, but pre-
cisely how is left unclear.  
Wendell Bell and James A. Mau (1971) also support the idea that the future goes 
beyond mere cognitive constructs. They identify two related aspects in which the future 
is real. First, due to the fact that the foundations for the future are laid out in the present, 
the future is real insofar as human action can bring it about, something which echoes 
Polak’s view on the interaction between completed and non-completed time. Second, im-
ages of the future are real as abstract phenomena, existing inter-temporally, and they 
guide human behaviour and social action by presenting insights on the alternative futures 
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that can be realised by present action. Hence, they state: “there are no future facts. How-
ever real our conceptions of it, our actions that will produce it, and the certainty of its 
coming, the future is open. The present possibilities for the future are real” (Bell and Mau, 
1971, p. 10). A crucial implication of this conceptualisation of the future and its images 
is that it grants agency to the social actors in a given setting. As a result, images of the 
future are not pure idealisations nor are they only “pulling” societies towards them, but 
they require social action to be realised.  
Bell later introduced the notion of dispositions to give the possible futures their real 
foundations (1997, p. 76). Dispositions can be understood as the ontological attributes of 
an image of the future that can be activated under specific circumstances, usually by so-
cial action. In other words, dispositions are the properties that can make the potential 
inherent in an image of the future to eventually become actual.2 For Roberto Poli (2011), 
“the dispositions most relevant to futures studies are those connected to the capacity of 
individuals, groups and entire societies to change, to become different” (p. 70). In Poli’s 
conceptualisation, dispositions are the simplest instance of what he calls latents, the con-
stitutive components of reality that cannot be grasped only by looking at its surface. Poli 
emphasises the existence of latents because he proposes a view of the present as structured 
by levels of reality, something which he argues the future shares with the present (Poli, 
2011, p. 68). Of relevance here is that both dispositions and latents signal underlying, 
invisible structures at work in images of the future (and, more generally, in reality) which 
shape the unfolding of events so that some futures become more or less likely, depending 
on their influence on the social actors in a given setting. This raises the question of how 
images of the future might influence human action and, conversely, how the creation of 
meaning influences the realisation of images of the future. 
Anita Rubin (2013) argues that for human beings to be able to function in the world, 
mental models need to be continuously constructed based on assumptions and assess-
ments on what the future will be like, a process which is partly intentional but also in-
volves some subconscious elements (p. 540). Her characterisation of images of the future 
                                                     
2  It is important to stress that Bell’s original conceptualisation of dispositions is made from a critical 
realist paradigm. Theoretical compatibility between critical realism and social constructionism not-
withstanding (for more details, see Fuller and Loogma, 2009), the point to be made here is that there 
are material foundations of an image of the future that can be realised, though their realisation is not 
only affected by tangible developments but also by the role of social agency and bottom-up creation 
of meaning. For this reason, Poli’s (2011) comparison between dispositions and latents, and how both 
refer to underlying levels of reality, is relevant in this section. Rubin (2013) also addresses these latter 
issues.  
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focuses on the constellation of human elements that constitute and shape them: assimi-
lated and reconstructed information on the past, perceptions on the present, beliefs, values 
and knowledge assimilated from the cultural and social context, personal preferences, 
fears, hopes, needs and so on. For this reason, Rubin asserts that images of the future have 
a strong impact on human motivation, with people trying to materialise the desired future 
and avoid the feared or negatively valued one. Consequently, “these images of the future 
have the ability to affect our life and fate. They are held and developed by individuals, 
groups and institutions – i.e. by all the different actors and on all levels within society” 
(Rubin, 2013, p. 540). Here, human agency is again at the centre, with the actions taken 
by different social actors bringing forth some future over others. They are motivated by 
belief systems, values, understanding of the interconnectedness of time, and oriented by 
the cultural and social context they inhabit. Linking this insight with that of Bell (1997) 
and Poli (2011), it can be said that these actions activate the dispositions and latents of 
specific images of the future, bringing the present one step closer towards the future(s) 
whose underlying structures are being mobilised.  
There is a tendency in the Futures Studies field to portray images of the future of the 
macro-social level – i.e. the trends and structural forces that shape a given societal setting. 
However, as Rubin (2013) highlights, there are elements that relate to the level of indi-
viduals that are also at work in materialising the desired futures. To counter the macro-
social tendency, recent research in the field has tried to bring greater attention to the lived 
experience of images of the future, that is, to emphasise the micro-social level which is 
nonetheless embedded in meso and macro structures and settings. This research trend 
within the field is termed Experiential Futures, which aims to situate “an individual inside 
their own fictitious world to directly engage with its unfolding” (Burdick, 2019, p. 79). 
This approach to Futures Studies research accentuates the perception of the world through 
the social actors’ eyes and facilitates the navigation of the future world setting by intro-
ducing situations which can become commonplace in the envisioned future but which 
lack texture and detail if seen only from the macro-social level (Candy and Dunagan, 
2017). For this reason, it could be said that Experiential Futures fosters the depiction of 
the emotional and desired worlds of the subjects involved in visioning processes, some-
thing which is not readily available, or must be abstracted, from the macro-social level 
images of the future that are common in the Futures Studies field.  
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This review of the conceptualisations of images of the future and their central features 
enables a working characterisation to be reached for the purposes of this thesis. The im-
ages of the future that are the result of this project can be characterised as cognitive con-
structs of the interviewees that, nonetheless, exhibit dispositions about their personal lives 
and the external world that can become real by 2040. These dispositions relate to the 
broader social world (i.e. the cultural, economic, political, social and technological fea-
tures of a given context) and to the constitution of the subjects’ psyche, personality and 
identity. They can be considered latent attributes of the present which may or may not be 
triggered, but which could unfold in different ways as the year 2040 gets closer. The 
interplay between these two groups of dispositions would result in subjects being willing 
to engage in interaction with a VDI to greater or lesser extent. Additionally, the images 
of the future in this thesis focus on the micro-social level and display fears, hopes, reser-
vations and desires in more explicit terms than would those wherein the emphasis was on 
the macro-social level. This is the result of the subjects’ envisioned lived experience and 
potential interaction with the VDI, which evokes emotional reactions as a result of being 
a reminder of the death of a person in their network of contacts. For this reason, the on-
tological status of these images can be said to have some foundations in reality and are 
themselves phenomena to be critically examined for their repercussions in orienting the 
behaviour of those who imagine them. Their realisation, however, will depend on the 
activation of the two groups of dispositions (those related to the broader social world and 
those concerning the subjects’ inner world) deriving from developments at the macro-
social and micro-social levels that affect the subjects’ lives.  
2.2 Critical Futures Studies and the depth of reality  
This thesis can be situated within Critical Futures Studies (CFS) due to the author’s con-
viction of deeper layers of reality than what is immediately visible affecting the observa-
ble social dynamics. Poli’s (2011) theorisation of latents already offered an initial ap-
proach to invisible, deeper dimensions that cannot be grasped if the researcher is only 
looking at surface-level facts. Reviewing the stance of CFS regarding ontology, episte-
mology, methodology and the role of subjects in envisioning the future is thus necessary 
to establish how adopting a critical approach to constructing and examining images of the 
future allows for the identification of limiting and emancipatory versions of social prac-
tices centred on Human-VDI interaction.  
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In terms of processes and goals, CFS “envisages and accomplishes social foresight 
in a democratic way by linking individual foresight into the full process of institutional–
social foresight and by making the full development of a participative view and processes 
the principal task of futurists” (Hideg, 2002, p. 288). This contrasts with more problem-
oriented approaches in the field, where the issues are analysed from a systemic perspec-
tive and the interconnection between variables is sought to envision their potential evo-
lution. Though valuable for their contributions to dealing with uncertainty in organisa-
tional settings, these problem-oriented approaches remain in the realm of the tangible and 
visible. The study of how people confront issues of mortality and think about future 
mourning processes, however, demands a methodology which acknowledges hidden re-
alities that can only be revealed through interpretation and metaphors.  
CFS is suitable for the study of these topics, as integrating discourse and worldviews 
into an interpretative exploration of images of the future is the strength of different meth-
ods emerging from this paradigm. Unlike more technocratic and positivist research about 
the future, which view the future as something in the external world to be eventually 
reached, CFS recognises the existence of futures in the present, within people’s thoughts, 
and embodying their hopes, fears, and expectations. Additionally, CFS can be considered 
“depth-based”, with an explicit aim of exposing power relations in the construction of 
human societies and systems (Amer et al., 2013). Because of these features – the aware-
ness of the future existing in the present, and the commitment to reveal the operation of 
power in human societies – adopting the critical stance fostered by CFS can strengthen 
people’s and institutions’ ability to make decisions by helping in the development of fu-
tures thinking. The role of critique, specifically, is to allow access to “a range of view-
points and depth understandings that permit the fuller realisation of the human potential 
for dealing with the future” (Hideg, 2002, p. 288). The images of the future deriving from 
a CFS method would aid in the emergence of marginalised alternatives that are invisible 
under conventional and dominant discourses.  
Integral Futures and Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) are two methodological ap-
proaches which offer insights of the deeper levels of reality within an image of the future. 
Richard Slaughter, one of the main scholars of the Integral Futures approach, has made 
calls for “transcending flatland” (1998), or going beneath the surface of the visible and 
tangible world often found in depictions of the future influenced by bureaucratic thinking 
and popular culture. Poli (2011) describes Slaughter’s approach to the analysis of reality 
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as epistemological in nature, with superficial or deep interpretations of the world emerg-
ing from the theories or perspectives being used. Sohail Inayatullah (1998), in turn, con-
siders reality itself as layered: conventional discourse on a topic is the simplistic under-
standing of the relationship between systemic variables, these variables themselves ac-
quiring meaning through worldviews and discourse, and having at the deepest layer the 
cultural unconscious only accessible through myths or metaphors. Poli considers Ina-
yatullah’s approach ontological, as “it is reality itself that is articulated between more 
superficial and short- lived phenomena and deep and long-lived phenomena” (Poli, 2011, 
p. 71).  
This thesis takes an ontological approach to the constitution of social reality, insofar 
as it considers Human-VDI interaction and its integration into social practices to be 
shaped by deeper discourses and metaphors. Death and mourning, as subsequently de-
scribed, are sources of anxiety for human beings, and might drive the desire for immor-
tality. At the same time, however, they are sources of meaning for the events of a human 
life and its relations with others. Therefore, the exploration of the depth of the images of 
the future uses the CLA method developed by Inayatullah (1998), as its layered under-
standing of reality is compatible with this author’s view of deeper structures – cultural, 
linguistic, existential – operating underneath the visible dynamics of Human-VDI inter-
action.  
2.3 Death and mourning as research topics for Futures Studies 
Death and mourning as phenomena possess some attributes that make their study from 
within the field of Futures Studies particularly interesting, as their meaning and experi-
ence are closely intertwined with futures thinking, even if it is not carried out in a sys-
tematic or methodical manner by non-scholars. Two approaches can be considered rele-
vant for studying death and mourning within Futures Studies. The first is describing how 
death and mourning shape the way people think about the future, in terms of affecting the 
meaning they imbue to potential future events. The second is thinking about future events 
of death and mourning affecting subjects’ stance on both themes for the present and for 
the future, which helps them identify their own assumptions and clarify their perspective 
on how to deal with mortality in social life. Both approaches are described: while the first 
one can be regarded as a motivation for the creation of the VDI in the first place and its 
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subsequent incorporation into social practices, in the second one, thinking about the pres-
ence of the VDI in the social world of 2040 reveals subjects perspectives on death and 
mourning.  
Thinking about death and one’s own mortality can be interpreted as a specific way 
of thinking about the future due to the fact that, as living and conscious beings, humans 
understand that mortality is an inevitable consequence of being alive. Death is, in other 
words, the future for all living beings.3 On a basic survival level, death as a known desti-
nation in the future demands that thought be directed to it, because the difference between 
continuing to live and dying at any given moment resides in navigating the world and 
successfully meeting a living being’s needs. For human beings, thinking about death also 
implies thinking about life choices and the consequences they carry, as those choices can 
be life-sustaining or bring a person closer to death. Thinking about their own deaths im-
plies thinking about their own future and the different ways it can unfold. Additionally, 
death as a known future for human beings orients attention, to greater or lesser extent, to 
the consideration of the dying process, a future event which happens under presently un-
known circumstances. Crucially, however, thinking about death is not only something 
which affects the personal domain of life, but also social and cultural life: “Thinking about 
death impacts our sense of the passage of time, and how this underpins the meanings we 
associate with history, or with civic narratives we articulate around the life of a people, 
or the lines of successions of sovereigns and their heirs in a commonwealth” (El-Bizri, 
2019, p. 67). Hence, thinking about death asks people to think about their own futures 
and the futures that might emerge beyond their lifetime. They might not live to see any 
of these futures, but their actions might have an effect on their world even in their absence.  
Thinking about mourning has similar effects to thinking about death but directs at-
tention to the death of others and asks subjects to contemplate the impact of these deaths 
on them. At a basic level, mourning demands that subjects think about how they will 
continue living and the many possible futures without a significant other. When one is in 
mourning, thinking about the future requires the recognition of the impossibilities ahead 
– specifically, the reappearance of a dead person in everyday life. Of course, mourning 
does not have to be tied to death events, with other instances of loss also reconfiguring 
                                                     
3  There are some who would argue this is not the case, that death in a phenomenological sense can be 
overcome, such as some scholars within the transhumanism and posthumanism movements. Though 
their arguments should be considered, for the purposes of this thesis, death is considered a known fact 
about the future of living beings, as no one has (yet) discovered a way to be immortal.  
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perspectives on the future for a person. The loss of income, the loss of certain freedoms, 
the loss of a familiar environment – the different losses a person can experience entails a 
reckoning with lost futures that can no longer be realised. Some futures might eventually 
be similar to the ones envisioned, but a significant loss would necessitate some adjust-
ments to be made to that vision. In sum, the thought process in mourning finds subjects 
thinking about the future and the impossibilities in it.  
Having described how thinking about death and mourning connects to thinking about 
the future, the two aforementioned approaches for the study of death and mourning within 
Futures Studies can be outlined. The first one – how thoughts on death and mourning 
shape how people think about the future – is associated to the expansion of spatial and 
temporal boundaries for one’s own being and sustaining life. According to Zygmunt Bau-
man (1992), this is the result of being embedded in Western social and cultural systems, 
in which transcendence is a central concern. These systems foster strategies for survival 
(extending the life-span and increasing life expectation), wherein the focus is delaying 
death indefinitely, as well as strategies for immortality, which focus on assigning immor-
tal, life-transcending value to certain human acts (Bauman, 1992, p. 5-6). Mortality is 
thus recognised as an inevitability which does not have to mean a complete disappear-
ance, for culture provides opportunities for symbolic survival. Thinking about death, then, 
becomes also an endeavour of thinking and devising strategies that allow people to pro-
long life or to escape the complete nothingness that death entails.  
Adopting a future orientation to the study of death and mourning can give researchers 
access to the multiple meanings assigned to future strategies for dealing with death and 
mourning. Future events, seen through the lens of death and mourning, can be depicted 
as more joyful or more sombre according to the amount of success of certain strategies 
for transcending mortal boundaries. For example, if examining possible future develop-
ments in health-related practices and techniques, the different images of the future might 
be portrayed as life-sustaining, if the extension of life has been achieved by performing 
these practices, or life-threatening, if prolonging life becomes elusive or a sequence of 
events occurs which might shorten expected life-spans. In this sense, the content and tone 
of the images of the future of a specific issue can be said to be influenced by how prom-
inent and successful the survival and immortality strategies are, with the elements within 
these images being placed together according to the specific meanings produced by their 
different combinations. Some images might not feature any particularly relevant strategy 
for survival or immortality, and their description could be presented in relatively neutral 
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terms. But those that do have some relevant strategies at their centre, whether concerning 
the macro-social level or the micro-social level, might be described in more portentous 
language if these strategies fail or in more promising language if these strategies succeed.  
The second approach is arguably more compatible with the CFS perspective of the 
existence of the future in the present and the depths of reality. By thinking about their 
own mortality, people are simultaneously becoming aware of their own viewpoints and 
opinions on the matter. At times, they may recognise fear, anxiety and anger as emotions 
that arise when the subject of their own deaths dominates their thought processes, but 
they might also feel surprised if acceptance or serenity are the reactions they experience. 
This awareness means subjects’ thoughts on their future deaths are not relevant only for 
those future events themselves, but for their present lives and their constitution as subjects 
as well. By bringing the future into the present and facing the content of those images, 
hidden personal assumptions and cultural worldviews might be revealed to them, empow-
ering them to modify the content of their envisioned images of the future. Something 
similar occurs in the case of mourning, as thinking about how they will deal with the 
deaths and the absence of significant others – that is, how they will mourn them – enables 
subjects to bring into consciousness the importance of those others and the roles they play 
in their lives. They might find these images of the future – those without their loved ones 
– unsettling, but they might also understand them as something they will have to endure, 
should they come to pass, which could instil a sense of resilience in them. 
The depths of reality also occupy a more central place in this second approach, as 
strategies for immortality and survival are not only assessed based on their prominence 
and degree of success, but also on the deeper discourses driving their emergence or lim-
iting their expansion. This implies acknowledging their existence and questioning their 
stance on human agency, personhood and what is considered valuable in a given soci-
ocultural setting. Additionally, metaphors about the most distinctive features of human 
beings, and what constitutes an entity as a person, might become more apparent under 
this second approach, as any given strategy will highlight some aspects of personhood 
and de-emphasise others. Adopting this approach would therefore entail discovering what 
are the deeper levels of reality that favour some strategies about dealing with death and 
deter others, while carefully examining the way the levels of reality in an image of the 
future promote or constrain human welfare when confronting mortality-related issues.  
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The two approaches regarding death and mourning as topics of research for Futures 
Studies outlined here are not incompatible – on the contrary, they can be considered com-
plementary. The first asks the researcher to envision future strategies for dealing with 
mortality and loss, while the second calls for the acknowledgement of the existence of 
the multiple images of the future of death and mourning that exist in the present, shaped 
by hidden but meaningful aspects of reality that are not easily identified in the first ap-
proach, and the effect they have on people’s present perspectives on both themes.  
Although implicit in the above discussion, a final theme worth emphasising is that 
Futures Studies can be helpful for cultivating a pedagogy of death (Affifi and Christie, 
2019) by bringing detail to the different possibilities involved in dying and in mourning. 
Thinking about future death events and mourning processes brings into the present what 
may seem nebulous and vague in the future. Moreover, in contrast to other forms of in-
creasing familiarity with mortality which are of the impersonal kind, Futures Studies can 
orient subjects to consider with greater detail the circumstances and consequences of their 
own deaths, as well as the deaths of their loved ones and its impact on others. By doing 
so, people become reacquainted with these themes and can think about their possible ac-
tions in their own futures and how they want to live in the present so that death is treated 
not as something to be feared but as something to be accepted.  
2.4 Conclusion: Social practices of Human-VDI interaction as images of the future 
The contents of this chapter were helpful in providing the knowledge of the Futures Stud-
ies field for the characterisation of the images of the future of this thesis. The images of 
the future can be characterised as the interviewees’ mental constructs about their personal 
future in a setting wherein Human-VDI interaction is a feature of the broader social land-
scape. Their content, tone, and the combinations of elements are influenced by hidden 
aspects of reality, such as discourse and metaphors. They cannot, however, be reduced to 
cognitive constructions, as they are grounded in reality and exhibit two groups of dispo-
sitions – those of the social world in 2040 and those of their psyche, personality and 
identity as expressed in their envisioned personal life. These dispositions could be acti-
vated under certain circumstances. As the overview on death and mourning suggests, new 
strategies for transcendence in a symbolic form immortality, such as the creation of the 
VDI for the purposes of interacting with it, can emerge from some dispositions being 
triggered. But the materialisation of the images of the future in this thesis would not de-
pend solely on the presence of the VDI in the social world of 2040, but also on people’s 
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stance on how to deal with death and mourning. Their realisation would, in other words, 
also be affected by subjects’ evolving thoughts on death and on mourning. 
Images of the future focusing on social practices of Human-VDI interaction would 
have the capacity to orient subjects to thinking not only about the practices themselves, 
but also about their mortality and that of their loved ones, with their eventual deaths bound 
to happen. People, as living beings, are inherently mortal. Images of the future where 
death and mourning are the main themes can thus be said to possess dispositions concern-
ing human beings’ mortality, although the circumstances of their activation are unknown. 
By bringing into focus Human-VDI interaction and encouraging subjects to consider liv-
ing in a world where a person of importance in their lives is gone, they (to varying de-
grees) become aware of their thoughts on death and mourning. This awareness, in turn, 
enables the identification of the hidden depths of reality and empowers them in coming 
to terms with their own mortality and that of others.  
33 
 
3 CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL PRACTICES OF HUMAN-VDI 
INTERACTION: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
The previous chapter grounded this research project within the Futures Studies field. This 
chapter highlights the interdisciplinarity of this research by locating the phenomenon as 
part of the Death Studies field and the Interaction Studies field, with social practice theory 
being used as a framework that outlines the technical and social dimensions of integrating 
the VDI into social life. This chapter constitutes the conceptual core of this thesis, pre-
senting theoretical foundations for the creation of sensitising scheme that conceptualises 
the social practices of Human-VDI interaction. By doing so, the empirical material used 
to construct the images of the future in this thesis can be explored with depth and critically 
examined, focusing on how the specific thanatechnology of the VDI, by becoming part 
of a social practice, might advance or complicate the acceptance of death and successful 
mourning in the social world of 2040. 
This interdisciplinary literature review provides insights on the potential purposes 
and motives of the interviewees regarding their use of the VDI, both at a personal level 
and as part of a broader network of social relationships. This is because engagement with 
the VDI in the form of interaction does not take place in a vacuum, where the only rele-
vant factors would be those related to an individual’s experience. Instead, such an inter-
action is also shaped by questions of culture and social structures.  
The review of the field of Death Studies is intended to establish how death is consti-
tutive of human experience and social and cultural life, as well as the centrality of mourn-
ing for making sense of losses, particularly the deaths of meaningful others. In turn, the 
Interaction Studies offer the theoretical foundations to argue that Human-VDI interaction 
can be considered social interaction, if some conditions are met. Finally, the review of 
social practice theory is meant to provide the theoretical concepts that can be addressed 
when discussing how Human-VDI interaction can be integrated into everyday life and 
become a social practice.  
3.1 Death Studies: Understanding humans’ relationship to death and mourning 
The thematic field of academic inquiry commonly referred to as Death Studies encom-
passes a large number of disciplines and sciences. This probably reflects the fact of death 
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as a universal experience for living entities and its importance for human beings, as they 
are both a highly intelligent animal species and are aware of their own mortality. This 
awareness of mortality for the human animal is seen in both the challenges it presents for 
the life experience of human beings and for the social and cultural practices, systems and 
structures that result from the need of humans to deal with the fact of their mortality.  
The concept of the Virtual Deceased Individual embodies a very human fantasy – 
that of immortality. As death, life and immortality are all terms that are closely linked, 
each imbuing the other with meaning and in turn being shaped by them, it is important to 
consider important aspects to associated to them, and how the VDI raises some questions 
that might alter humans’ relationship to those three terms. Similarly, humans’ understand-
ings of death, life and immortality influence the expectations, motivations and structural 
pressures that go into the creation and use of the VDI. As such, reviewing concepts, the-
ories and issues from a number of fields involved in the study of death is necessary if one 
is to explore the different possibilities of how people might interact with them in the fu-
ture.  
This sub-section identifies concepts, theories, insights and questions related to the 
study of death and mourning which are useful for the study of Human-VDI interaction 
and discusses their relevance. It looks into the philosophical, anthropological, sociologi-
cal and discourse-theoretical aspects underpinning human beings’ approach to facing 
death and the dying process in themselves or in others. Similarly, it describes the socio-
logical, psychological and psychoanalytic, and discourse-theoretical aspects of mourning. 
The disciplinary approaches mentioned within the Death Studies thematic field are con-
sidered by this author the most directly related to the study of Human-VDI interaction, in 
both its present manifestations and in its potential future ones. This overview is relevant 
if one aims to understand 1) why subjects would be willing to engage in interaction with 
a Virtual Deceased Individual, 2) how the VDI relates to the desire for immortality, and 
3) what ideological/discursive stance they adopt when engaging with the VDI.  
3.1.1 Death 
3.1.1.1 Philosophical insights 
Given that death is such a fundamental theme for human life, inextricably bound to it 
when it is being defined, described and studied, an overview into the topic of death should 
start by addressing it from a philosophical perspective. A philosophical inquiry into death 
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reveals some basic questions about how human beings live in the face of death, why death 
is important for them, and how the topic of immortality might be conceptualised. Ad-
dressing these issues, in turn, facilitates understanding the nature of human endeavours 
about coming to terms with mortality, one of which is the creation and interaction of the 
VDI.  
As a problem for philosophy, death is a central subject because, at least until now, it 
is an inescapable moment of the human experience, and every single human being has to 
face it eventually4. The claim has been made that philosophical explorations on the sub-
ject of death lead to the conclusion that mortality and awareness of it are the defining 
factors that create meaning in the human species. This then motivates humans in its civi-
lisation-building objectives (Jacobsen, 2017a). On a similar note, philosopher Todd May 
reasons that the fact that human beings die is their most important fact, and nothing carries 
more weight than this fact, despite acknowledging that other facets of life such as being 
in love, having friendships, embarking in life-long projects are still important aspects of 
living. He elaborates: 
“Why is this? Because it [dying] is the end of every other fact about us. It 
is the end of our friendships, our projects, every one of our involvements 
in the world. Although death is not the only important fact about us, it has 
the capacity, in a way that no other aspect of us does, to absorb every other 
fact, to bring every other aspect of our lives under its sway” (May, 2009, 
p. 4).   
May seems to imply that death has a structuring force in the lives of human beings, 
being able to encompass all other facts that are constitutive of their life experience and 
putting an end to them. This feature of death is crucial because it raises other fundamental 
philosophical questions regarding life and immortality, and whether the VDI, as concep-
tualised in this thesis, can be understood as a continuation of a deceased individual or is 
an entirely different entity from the original individual.5  
                                                     
4  There are some thinkers that adhere to the idea that death is a problem for human beings, that it is 
imperative to solve it and are convinced that it can be overcome. In general, they can be named “The 
Immortalists” (Jacobsen, 2017a), as they believe human beings can eventually achieve immortality.  
5  It is important to acknowledge that the analytic philosophy tradition to approaches to death is bound 
by linguistic aspects, which simultaneously give clarity to thought and restrict what can be thought 
and articulated. For this reason, in the analytic philosophy tradition it is very important to distinguish 
between real objects and nominal objects (that is, expressing in the form of a noun something that is 
in reality an action and should be expressed as a verb, or colloquially referring to an entity when what 
is actually being discussed is a separate entity), as well as between properties of objects and linguistic 
appearances (which create the confusion that a physical entity has a property that is inherent to it, 
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The most agreed upon philosophical definition about death is that it is the end of life 
(Rosenberg, 1998; Scarre, 2007; May, 2009; Luper, 2009). Of course, going by defini-
tional logic, one would need to understand what life is in order to understand what death 
is. For human beings, the most important definitions centre on two semantic fields: on the 
one hand, that of organic, biological life, and on the other, that of the phenomenological 
experience of being alive. Although these two domains of meaning are related, the second 
one is arguably more important for the human being, as it is the one that is directly expe-
rienced by the fact of being alive and self-aware. In this sense, it is possible to question 
what constitutes the phenomenological experience of a life. For Rosenberg (1998), one 
way this can be understood is as the continuous, uninterrupted sequence of events (a per-
son’s “history”) from the perspective of a human being who is aware of him/herself. For 
both May (2009) and Luper (2009), a life can be said to be constituted by the ongoing 
relationships, personal projects, sequences of experiences, and material and emotional 
investments of a human being in the world. These understandings of life are by no means 
an exhaustive account of what a life is, but are sufficient for the definitional purposes of 
this text.6 
Because death is an end to this phenomenological experience of life, human beings 
have identified it as a problem that needs a solution. As such, a desire for immortality, in 
some way or form, has become an underlying and sometimes subconscious motivation 
for activities in society. But the desire for immortality presents philosophical challenges 
and even logical contradictions. From the perspective of analytic philosophy, none of the 
conceivable, even hypothetical accounts of immortality, understood either as life after 
death or as the continuation in some form or presence of a person’s history, make sense 
(Rosenberg, 1998). In the first case, this is because it is definitionally impossible to con-
tinue life after the end of life. For if it continues, life has not ended. Alternatives repre-
sentative of the second definition, such as mind-body dualism wherein a part of oneself 
goes on to another realm and the idea of downloading one’s mind into a technological 
                                                     
when in reality it is a manner of speaking). This thesis does not follow an analytic philosophy route, 
and as such these linguistic imprecisions might arise in the writing. Nonetheless, it is important to 
consider these if one decides to go into philosophical inquiries on death. For a more thorough expla-
nation on these linguistic aspects, please see chapter 0: Some methodological preliminaries, of Jay F. 
Ronsenberg’s Thinking clearly about Death (1998).  
6  There are two large schools of thought about what a (not only a human) being is, which are those of 
ontological monism (an entity is singular and all its properties derive from its singularity) and onto-
logical dualism (an entity is dual by having a material existence and also an immaterial essence). For 
questions of what life is for a human being and questions regarding persistence conditions, please see 
Luper’s (2009) account animal essentialism, person essentialism and mind essentialism.  
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device, present logical inconsistencies in terms of other philosophical criteria - criteria 
like tracing the history of single physical entity across time and the possibility to account 
for “a mind” or “a soul” in terms the physical properties of living organisms or of ma-
chines (Rosenberg, 1998). In other words, from the perspective of a living human being, 
it is logically impossible to aspire to immortality.  
Even if the definitional and logical contributions of analytic philosophy to the issue 
of immortality are dismissed, a more substantive approach to the desire for immortality 
presents its own problems if considered, again, from the phenomenological perspective 
of life experiences. It has been argued by May (2009) that immortality is no solution for 
the real problem that death presents human beings with: that of meaninglessness. Death 
threatens to make the lives of human beings meaningless by threatening them with in-
completion of all the personal projects and the permanent severance of all relationships. 
Immortality, for its part, threatens to make the lives of human beings meaningless by 
stretching them across infinity, with the resulting effect being that of a shapeless sequence 
of events throughout time where any emotional attachment to personal projects and rela-
tionships is nullified by the fact that they can be experienced again and again endlessly. 
Passion in any endeavour and any importance attached to personal commitments would 
disappear, since infinite time means infinite opportunities for trying something. Death, 
for as much as it presents human beings with the threat of meaninglessness by incomple-
tion and sudden severance of any attachment, actually generates meaning by making hu-
mans focus on deciding how they wish to spend their limited time. This acknowledge-
ment, and the decision to pursue projects and relationships, to live in the present and to 
make commitments with others even if death could come at any time, is an embrace of 
the fragile life (May, 2009).   
Although these philosophical insights on death, life and immortality can initially ap-
pear as too abstract for research purposes, in my view they are crucial to understanding 
the nature of the VDI and some motivations behind the decision to interact with one. For 
one, a VDI is not and cannot ever be a way to actual (that is, not symbolic) immortality 
if life and immortality are understood in the way they were previously described. This is 
because there is no continuation from one being, the original individual who is now de-
ceased, to the VDI. The VDI would only be an imitation, to varying degrees of faithful-
ness, of the actions enabled by the physical properties and personal history of the original 
individual in relation to the VDI’s human interlocutor or interactant audience. It follows 
from this that the VDI, in the way it is being defined in this thesis, cannot be considered 
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a human being, as it possesses no self-awareness and, in turn, no phenomenological ex-
perience of life. In contrast to a human being, who is alive and thus has attachments to 
the world in the form of relationships, desires and personal projects, the VDI possesses 
no attachments and no personal project, for it is a non-living entity. 
The philosophical insights on death, life and immortality also provide clues as to why 
the idea of the VDI might be appealing to some people. For one, from the perspective of 
the living human interlocutor, it might be an attempt to renew a relationship which had 
been severed by death. Similarly, it might give the human interlocutor the opportunity to 
continue, in a different (although not necessarily diminished) way, a personal project that 
was left without conclusion by the death of the original individual that the VDI simulates 
being. These aspects, those more specifically related to the human interlocutor, are elab-
orated upon in the following pages from other disciplinary and scientific perspectives.  
3.1.1.2 Anthropological insights 
The anthropological perspectives on death are valuable because they bring into focus 
some cultural practices related to death and dying and contextualise them. Similarly, they 
are able to identify symbolic dimensions and their effect on the cultural fabric which 
might otherwise go unnoticed because they are not necessarily tangible. Some predomi-
nant areas of inquiry from the anthropological research on death are the study of rituals 
as a way to investigate cultural beliefs, cultural conceptions of death, attitudes towards 
the corpse, attitudes towards mourning, how property is handled after the death of its 
owner, and the cults towards the dead (De Coppet, 1981; Palgi and Abramovitch, 1984; 
Bendann, 2010).  
The anthropological perspectives on death are relevant for the study of Human-VDI 
interaction inasmuch as they point to the social construction of death, its symbolic aspects, 
and the meaning of specific practices. They are also valuable because they raise the issue 
of cultural universality or cultural variability in social practices related to death. This, in 
turn, would be helpful in assessing issues regarding the desire for immortality and in what 
(symbolic) forms this can be achieved.  
Antonius C.G.M. Robben (2004) considers that anthropological research on death 
has been influenced by perspectives from psychology and psychoanalysis, and this is re-
flected in anthropological thought of the 20th century that identifies a tension between the 
inevitability of death, on the one hand, and the belief in spiritual immortality, on the other. 
For instance, Bronislaw Malinowski (1948) suggests that the belief in immortality is a 
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necessary complement for a universal fear of death. Simultaneously, these two attitudes 
manifest themselves as ambivalent attachments to the living and the dead. This is why 
mortuary rituals are central in many cultures – as long as death is seen as an end to life, 
and human beings view this fact in negative terms, mortuary rituals are necessary because 
they ease the transition of those who were once living into the world of the dead. This, in 
turn, helps restore the group fabric that had been damaged by death. But because this 
transition also represents the end of an active presence of the deceased in the world of the 
living, people cling to some idea of immortality as a way to deny the finality of death. 
Ernest Becker (1973) would later support this notion of a universal fear of death, arguing 
that the fear of death is a fundamental inner drive of human beings, with a socially con-
structed repression of this fear being explained by a universal, natural fear of death innate 
in living conscious beings.  
Mortuary rituals are probably the most studied subject from the anthropology of 
death and dying. Robert Hertz (1960) states in A Contribution to the Collective Represen-
tation of Death that human beings do not conceive of death only in terms of biological 
events, nor is mourning confined to the individual sorrow of the bereaved relatives of the 
deceased. Instead, death, as an event occurring in a network of social relations, is associ-
ated to moral and cultural obligations that manifest themselves in culturally shaped fu-
neral practices. Although his analysis restricts itself to tribal societies in Southeast Asia, 
his findings do carry cross-cultural significance (Robben, 2004). 
Anthropology is also useful when examining the ways humans address the issue of 
immortality. Robert Jay Lifton’s and Eric Olson’s (1974) framework of symbolic immor-
tality introduces different approaches which human beings have taken in their aim to 
achieve some form of immortality, in the absence of an experiential one. Like Malinow-
ski, they view the human fantasy of immortality to be universal in response to the equally 
universal fear of death. Because actual immortality, where the phenomenological experi-
ence of life is continuous and uninterrupted, is not possible, the different forms of sym-
bolic immortality are human beings’ attempts to overcome their fear of death. They iden-
tify five forms of expression: biological, theological, creative, through nature, and by ex-
periential transcendence. Biological immortality refers to the extension of life through 
genes generationally passed down via one’s offspring, but it includes a social component 
as well which expresses itself in the attachment to group formations, be they family, tribe, 
organisation or nation. Theological immortality refers to supernatural conceptualisations 
of immortality combined with core doctrinal beliefs, such as the persistence of a soul in 
40 
 
the afterlife or reincarnation. Creative immortality finds its expression in lasting works, 
such as artistic, literature and knowledge contributions. Natural immortality refers to peo-
ple understanding themselves as part of a larger universe and immersed in endless natural 
cycles. Finally, experiential immortality, although it might appear to refer to the actual 
immortality previously discussed, refers instead to altered states of consciousness, in 
which the psychic states give the illusion of the disappearance of time and death.  
If seen through the lens of contemporary possibilities of symbolic immortality, it is 
possible to include some other forms that, perhaps because of the time in which Lifton’s 
and Olson’s text was written, were not seen as a possibility. Symbolic immortality 
through technology is the most relevant one that, in my view, should be included in an 
updated model. It is debatable to what extent this form of immortality should be charac-
terised as distinct from the others, but it is possible to identify some differences. Biolog-
ical and creative immortality only represented an indirect form of symbolic immortality, 
in the sense that other social actors or objects incorporated biological or artistic elements 
of the deceased, but nothing in which their personality and mannerisms remained. They 
would be only passively immortal. The exception to this would be some forms of theo-
logical immortality, but those require some form of religious belief in an afterlife. Tech-
nological immortality, in contrast, would be able to maintain a physical resemblance of 
the deceased as well as their active presence in the form of personality traits and manner-
isms through technological devices. It would contrast with biological and creative im-
mortality in that the deceased would continue to have (limited) agency in this world but 
would differ from theological immortality insofar as the existence of the original individ-
ual would have come to an end with death. Hence, technological immortality provides 
the deceased no possibility to continue life after death (that would be actual immortality), 
but the possibility for an active presence in the world of the living through a replication 
of their mannerisms and physical and personality traits by technological means.  
With this overview of the anthropological insights on death and immortality, it is 
possible to see their relevance for the study of Human-VDI interaction. For instance, the 
creation and use of the VDI could be interpreted as a cultural practice that attempts to 
mitigate the fear of death by aiming at repairing the disruption of the fabric that binds the 
group (a family, a group of friends, co-workers, an formal institution, and so on) that 
results from the death of one of its members. Similarly, the VDI could, in some contexts, 
materialise the transition of the deceased from its previous status (whatever it might have 
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been) to that of an ancestor, which would result in interactions focused on seeking guid-
ance from the VDI by members of the group unit affected by its absence. Even from a 
secular perspective, Human-VDI interaction could be seen as equivalent to the interaction 
with ancestors insofar as they intend to keep them permanently, interacting with them 
when in need of advice, and the group unit accumulating them over time as a way of 
having the younger members know of their elder relatives who have since died. The cul-
tural variability in practices related to death is also relevant, given that the specific sig-
nificance attached to interacting with the VDI might change according to the cultural 
context. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the VDI can be conceptualised as a 
mechanism which allows a form of symbolic immortality. At the outset, it is not clear if 
the VDI fits into any of the forms of expression by Lifton and Olson (1974), or if it rep-
resents a new form of expression altogether, which could be named technological immor-
tality and is distinct from the others. Nevertheless, it is clear that it can be understood as 
an attempt to mitigate the fear of death via technological means.  
3.1.1.3 Sociological insights 
Sociological approaches to the study of death and dying reveal aspects about how death 
is managed by social structures and according to historical eras, how the circumstances 
of death change according to social group, the practices of people who are dying, how 
role-taking is affected by the circumstances of the dying process, and the way society 
continuously arranges social practices and structures so that it is able to integrate death 
into its processes and the social bond among its members is strengthened. The main 
strength of the sociological approach to the study of death is that it stresses that the way 
individuals face death, dying and bereavement is largely influenced by the social context 
(Bauman, 1992; Seale, 1998; Thompson et al., 2016; Kastenbaum and Moreman, 2018).  
Sociological insights on death are relevant because they identify the structural rea-
sons of why some social groups might be willing to engage with the VDI. Similarly, they 
provide some ideas on what function the appearance of the VDI in society would fulfil in 
relation to the underlying motivational forces of society (if both the VDI and society are 
understood from a functionalist perspective). Its overview of historical changes in the 
way Western societies have dealt with death also sheds light about possible future 
changes.  
Similar to the philosophical and anthropological perspectives, which have argued 
that death has a central place for human life, the fundamental insight from a sociological 
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perspective is that death has a constitutive effect for society. Clive Seale (1998) has ar-
gued that turning away from death’s inevitability and moving towards life is a fundamen-
tal part of social and cultural life. In Seale’s theory of society and its relation to death, 
death’s inevitability also presents the threat of meaninglessness; hence, participation in 
social and cultural life is threatened as well. Death’s inevitability has a constitutive effect 
on society because, simultaneously, it also offers a basic motivation for social and cultural 
activity, which involves a continual defence against death. The social and cultural prac-
tices involved in doing this (“attempting to overcome the problem of death”) vary greatly 
across cultures, but most cultures can be said to have some social structures and mecha-
nisms which defend their members from feeling meaningless in the face of death. In this 
sense, any society can be interpreted as a Death-constituted society.  
Although death can be said to have a constitutive effect for society, the specific ways 
it manifests itself in social practices, rituals and institutions vary considerably not only 
according to geographical location, but also according to the historical era. This is best 
exemplified by Philippe Ariès’ (1981) proposal of five models of society’s relationship 
with death in Western Europe in the last millennium. The first model was the tame death 
model, in which death was considered a social affair where the family and members of 
the community were present in the deathbed, wake and funeral, where mortuary rituals 
framing death within religious doctrines that helped repairing the broken social bonds left 
by a member of the community. The second model, the death of self model, emerged after 
the eleventh century among the elite as a result of people beginning to understand them-
selves more as individuals than as part of their communities. With this model, a dualist 
notion of a person (that is, a being with body and soul) became popular, as well as the 
belief of the immortal soul in the afterlife. A third model, the remote and imminent death 
model, which became dominant between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, resulted 
from a shift in perspectives on nature’s role in life and death, and was accompanied by 
funerary and burial practices which reflected a fear in being buried alive and a fear in the 
hostility of natural processes. The universal fear of death conceptualised by some anthro-
pological perspectives emerged in this period, according to Ariès. The fourth model, the 
death of the other model, rose between the eighteenth and twentieth century, in which the 
fear of death was channelled from the self towards the loved ones with the shift being 
driven by Romanticism. The final model, the invisible death model, emerged in the twen-
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tieth century and focused on the medicalisation of death and its management within insti-
tutions such as hospitals or nursing homes, with individualism ruling and social solidarity 
becoming ever weaker.  
These last two models, as well as the underlying forces that led to their emergence, 
can also be said to occur within the larger project of modernity, and in the case of the last 
model also in modernity’s advanced stages of late modernity and postmodernity (Gid-
dens, 1991; Bauman, 1992; Beck, 2000). Modernity was driven by a human aspiration of 
mastery over nature, including life and death, with life and its ambition, vitality and hope 
in need to be freed from the oppression of the finality and meaninglessness of death. This 
eventually led to death being fought in all fronts, with numerous institutions and social 
practices (i.e. the rise of specific professions and institutional mechanisms) resulting in a 
sequestration of death that shifted the place of action behind the scenes and away from 
public attention (Bauman, 1992; Seale, 1998; Elias, 2001; Jacobsen, 2017b). Perhaps 
most importantly, modernity and its advanced stages were increasingly concerned with 
the individual as the element of worship, with the aspiration of immortalisation arising 
again as a mean to achieve mastery over death. This is reflected in specific practices, such 
as memorialisation of individuals via effigies or the aspiration to leave some lasting im-
pact as ways to achieve symbolic immortality, or more advanced notions of cryogenics 
or genetic editing for achieving actual immortality.  
Seale (1998) suggests that the attention given to the self in late modernity and in 
postmodernity or liquid modernity (Bauman, 1992; Bauman, 2000) also gives rise to in-
creased practices of generativity. The term generativity refers to the investment of people 
in guiding the following generation, and it is an attribute of the self once it reaches the 
adult stage of human development (Erikson, 1977; Slater, 2003). Seale (1998) reasons 
that generativity can become codified into social practices related to death. For instance, 
generativity is present as an ongoing intergenerational project when examining parents 
and their relationship with their children, with the former possibly understanding the latter 
as a form of biological and psychological immortality.  
The argument that death has a constitutive effect for society is supported by looking 
at everyday rituals and how these relate to death and dying. Erving Goffman’s ideas on 
microsocial practices of interaction (1956; 1967) are relevant here because they suggest 
that participants in an interaction draw on social structural resources, and the perfor-
mances in an interaction are crucial to maintaining some sense of self-identity. During an 
interaction, these social structural resources can orient the interactants either towards life 
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or towards death. In most situations, performances in an interaction incorporate talk, 
which as conceptualised by Scheff (1990) is a form of ritual which uses symbols to affirm 
group membership and allows individuals to understand themselves within a larger inter-
pretive framework. Additionally, Scheff argues that talk and bodily communication to-
gether generate pride in intact social bonds and shame in broken social bonds. This way, 
individuals are compelled to act in such a way that social bonds remain intact, a process 
which involves finding meaning in these and, consequently, taking part in activities that 
are life-sustaining. Simultaneously, in ensuring the maintenance of the social bonds, the 
threat of meaninglessness generated by the prospect of death slides into the unconscious. 
In contrast, when social bonds are broken, a disruption is experienced – a disruption 
which may manifest as a loss, bringing into conscious thought other notions and concepts 
related to loss, death being one of them. For this reason, interactions and other everyday 
rituals which sustain social bonds guide their interactants and performers to invest them-
selves in life and turn away from death.  
Scheff’s ideas are useful in seeing more clearly the ways in which society’s activities 
are constitutively affected by death, insofar as they orient its members towards life. The 
implication of Scheff’s ideas on talk and bodily communication in light of Bauman’s 
(1992) exploration of the strategies for immortality is that these elements can be combined 
with institutional power and manipulate symbols to affirm membership of individuals as 
part of a social group which attempts to gain mastery over death, which in late modernity 
could be the medical community and groups labelled as “healthy individuals”. In the case 
of the latter, healthy individuals are not healthy by default or only in the absence of phys-
ical ailments, but engage in a variety of practices (exercise, eating the right foods, clean-
ing their surroundings, and so on) that characterise them as healthy. In contrast, institu-
tional power and symbols can also be combined with talk and bodily communication to 
exclude someone from these privileged groups (by labelling them as “dirty”, “messy”, 
“lazy”, and expressing disapproval and avoidance). In some case, this can both margin-
alise them and, if a justification for their behaviour is found and validated by institutional 
power, it may allow them to enter into the dying role.  
For Seale (1998), the implication of Scheff’s ideas on talk and bodily communication 
as ritual is that society is continually structured around everyday moments which orient 
the living towards life rather than towards death. Cultural symbols associated to life and 
death are sometimes used strategically and appropriated by social actors in particular sit-
uations, which can range from explicitly death-related formal rituals to the possibility of 
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commemorating a special occasion with meaningful others. Moreover, he contends that 
emotions are felt and transmitted as a result of humans’ nature as embodied beings, fuel-
ling their motivation to participate in common membership of imagined communities, a 
notion he borrowed from Benedict Anderson (1983), although he reformulates it to mean 
any community of anonymous individuals which can generate an affective investment in 
it. Hence, membership in an imagined community, as well as participation in social and 
cultural events, whether formal large-scale rituals or microsocial everyday interactions, 
is fundamentally motivated by the human social bond. Taken together, an individual’s 
lasting contributions towards these communities, no matter how big or small, can repre-
sent a form of symbolic immortality (Lifton and Olson, 1974).  
These sociological insights offer some clues as to the underlying structural forces 
associated to the emergence of the Virtual Deceased Individual. For one, the argument of 
death being constitutive of society by offering the motivation for social and cultural life 
suggests that the VDI might be an instance of a mechanism which defends its members 
from the existential threat of the meaninglessness of death. It would do so by allowing 
the living to continue engaging in everyday rituals with the deceased using the VDI as 
proxy, thus giving a sense of stability to the living. Similarly, Ariès’ (1981) historical 
models of death in Western Europe point to a potential shift in some cultural contexts of 
humans’ relationship to death. In this case, it could be speculated that such a shift would 
be characterised by ambivalence: on the one hand, there could be a continuation of the 
invisible death model, where death issues are managed by institutions and professionals 
behind the scenes; on the other hand, death would be more present than ever with the 
VDIs, as these technological devices would allow the dead to have a more active presence 
in the lives of the living than they currently have. Such a shift could signal the emergence 
of a new death model, even if it is not universal and is applicable only in certain contexts.  
The notions of practices of generativity and talk and bodily communication as ritual 
also point to the potential ways in which interacting with a VDI (both in its creation and 
in its use) would be appealing. The creation of the VDI could be considered a practice of 
generativity inasmuch as it allows the previous generations to leave some trace of them-
selves behind to guide the newer generations. Although this is already done in writings, 
in different forms of audio-visual media and via the internet, as well as in different objects 
that represent something about the deceased to the living, the VDI could be designed in 
such a way that it would be capable of giving insights the original person would have if 
asked for advice. The fact that the VDI is designed to simulate some form of interaction 
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with the deceased (from text-based, limited forms of interaction to highly complex and 
advanced forms) means that some forms of talk, and possibly bodily communication, 
could take place. These forms of interaction with the VDI could, in turn, be used to main-
tain the social bond, and to orient the living towards life. One could speculate that in 
institutional settings, the use of the VDI could affirm the membership of the living in the 
imagined community of which the VDI is (and, by implication, the original individual 
was) also a part. Alternatively, leaving a VDI behind in an institutional setting could be 
seen as the equivalent of ensuring a symbolic form of immortality within an imagined 
community, with the living members in such a setting being able to consult with the VDI 
on issues that the original individual was an expert in. It thus would enable the deceased 
to have some form of agency in the imagined community even after their deaths.  
3.1.1.4 Discourse theoretical insights 
Discourse theoretical insights on death and dying point to the way death is socially con-
structed, to the dominant signifiers and meanings when referring to both of those terms, 
and to the different discursive articulations that can be identified. In addition, if one goes 
beyond the analysis of discursive constructions and shifts the focus to how particular in-
dividuals adhere or challenge dominant discourses, it is possible to visualise its contingent 
nature and the possibility for new discourses to emerge.  
Insights from discourse theory are relevant because they would enable researchers to 
identify what the dominant discourses regarding the VDI and its relationship to death 
would be, as well as alternative discourses that challenge the mainstream ones. Similarly, 
they would allow for a more precise contextualisation by characterising societies who use 
the VDI not as homogeneous entities, but as societies marked by conflict and disputes 
over the meaning of certain practices and technological devices.  
Before going further, it is necessary to establish that there are many different varia-
tions of discourse theoretical approaches, and each has their own purpose and set of the-
oretical premises. For this reason, specifying which discourse theoretical approach a re-
searcher is following is required, as this clarifies expectations regarding the analytical 
insights one might expect from the analysis of discourse. In the case of this thesis, the 
specific approach is that of Post-Marxist discourse theory, as developed originally by 
Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (2014), and later by their students in the Essex School 
of Ideology and Discourse Analysis (Howarth et al., 2000; Howarth, 2000; Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007; Glynos et al., 2009; Howarth, 2010; Howarth et al., 2016). Discourse in 
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Post-Marxist discourse theory does not refer only to text and linguistic forms, the explicit 
attention paid to these notwithstanding. Instead, it encompasses groups, social practices, 
institutions and objects, though it argues that these have no inherent meaning, with mean-
ings being the result of a social and political (in the sense that power, not immediately 
visible, is exercised) construction. This theoretical perspective asserts that the meanings 
of the elements of a symbolic system do not exist independently of the specific context 
of meanings that are being mediated between the social actors of the system.  
There are three fundamental concepts that emerge from this framework and which 
are relevant for this thesis. The first one is articulation, a practice which links heteroge-
neous elements/signifiers in a symbolic system together and transforms their identity and 
meaning in the process. The second one is radical contingency, which refers to the im-
possibility of a discourse to permanently fix its meaning because the infinitude of the field 
of discursivity implies that there are always external elements which perform a constitu-
tive effect on the symbolic system of reference and could eventually be incorporated into 
discourse, thus allowing for the disintegration of discourse and its re-articulation. Dis-
course, in this sense, is always radically contingent, vulnerable to new signifiers that gen-
erate new meanings by way of new articulatory practices. The final one is hegemony, an 
inherently political logic which exercises power by privileging one element in the sym-
bolic system, a nodal point, and partially empties it from its meaning, rendering it a par-
tially empty signifier which can then be imbued with additional meanings that were not 
previously associated with it. Privileging the nodal point and other elements in the sym-
bolic system means the necessary exclusion of other elements, an act which is also 
achieved through the exercise of power. The nodal point is linked to other elements by 
means of articulation. When this happens, a discourse is formed.   
With this understanding of discourse, and specifically focusing on the idea that dis-
courses are radically contingent and can change by way of new articulations, it is im-
portant to explain how this change might take place. Post-Marxist discourse theory has 
developed the Logics of Critical Explanation (LCE) methodological approach to explain 
discursive hegemony and transformation (Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Glynos and 
Howarth, 2008). Hegemony naturalises discourses, and discourses lead to discursive so-
cial practices, networks of activities which social actors perform routinely without criti-
cally examining them. These discursive practices are governed by social logics, the 
norms, rules and behavioural patterns of the actors which respond to a hegemonic dis-
course and shape discursive social practices by imbuing them with meaning and naming 
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them according to signifiers linked in a chain of articulation to the nodal point . Political 
logics govern discursive practices that challenge the hegemonic discourse, lead to the 
naturalisation of a discourse, defend hegemonic discourses from challenges, or transform 
a hegemonic discourse by disarticulating its chains associated to a nodal point and recon-
figuring the symbolic system, its signifiers and its meanings.  
Antagonism emerges as a result of the collision of the political logics of competing 
discourses, because political logics lead to the emergence of practices (such as collective 
mobilisation, protests, production of defiant cultural texts, and so on) that, on one side, 
challenge the hegemonic discourse and, on the other side, defend it. This process of an-
tagonistic collision is resolved once one discourse comes to dominate, which may have 
been the hegemonic discourse at the time of conflict or might have been an alternative, 
previously marginalised one, with the new one gradually becoming hegemonic (Jorgen-
sen and Phillips, 2002; Glynos and Howarth, 2007).   
The successful defence or transformation of discourse hinges not only on the capacity 
of each hegemonic bloc to defend its respective articulation of signifiers and nodal points 
and disarticulate the opposing discourse, but also on the affective investment that subjects 
have in each discourse. This affective investment is governed by the Logic of Fantasy and 
fantasmatic logics, terms which Post-Marxist discourse theory borrows from the field of 
psychoanalysis, specifically its Lacanian branch. Simplifying quite considerably, a prem-
ise of Lacanian psychoanalysis is that human subjectivity is constituted by a fundamental 
lack7, and is sustained by a desire to fill that lack. The Logic of Fantasy refers to a narra-
tive structure which moves the subject towards an idealised setting which promises one 
of two outcomes: a “beatific” one delivering imaginary fullness (that is, it promises to fill 
the lack of the subject), or a “horrific” one bringing disaster (which leaves the lack but 
may also expand it). The narrative structure in the Logic of Fantasy is variable according 
to the context, but its crucial characteristic is that an obstacle impedes the human subject 
from fulfilling its desire (Glynos, 2001; Glynos, 2008).  
Fantasmatic logics are logics that support the social logics to which discursive social 
practices respond to and reinforce the stability of discourse by concealing its radical con-
tingency and the vulnerability of its naturalised arrangement of social relations. Hence, 
                                                     
7  This is similar to how discourse is conceptualised as having a constitutive outside, those elements in 
the field of discursivity which are not articulated within discourse, but which nonetheless shape it.  
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fantasmatic logics explain why discourses are resistant to change, insofar as human sub-
jects have an affective investment in discourse because of its promise to fill their lack. 
Similarly, fantasmatic logics explain why some alternative discourses that challenge the 
hegemonic one gain enough support, as these mobilise subjects’ affect and generate in 
them new affective investments (Glynos and Howarth 2007; Glynos and Howarth 2008).  
This detour on Post-Marxist discourse theory was needed to showcase the different 
discursive articulations on death. Carpentier and Van Brussel (2012) argue that death, 
despite its apparent material nature, is embedded in discursive practices and social rela-
tions. As such, it can reconcile its material aspect with its discursive one, as the biological 
experiences related to death are given meaning and understood within specific cultural 
and social processes. They identify four discursive articulations: 1) the first is a concep-
tualisation of death in relation to “living” terms, with signifiers related to life linked in 
death discourse to the body, to the personality and/or to the consciousness, in which these 
components fail, cease to exist, terminate or suffer deterioration beyond repair; the nodal 
signifiers in this articulation is that of “the end of life”, reflecting a pure void of meaning 
when trying to express what death consists of from a phenomenological perspective; 2) a 
second cluster of signifiers is that in which death is characterised in a temporal dimension 
as being irreversible, inescapable, permanent; 3) a third articulation of death relates to its 
perception as a threat, permanent and omnipresent, which is related to human frailty; 4) 
the final articulation is that of death’s undesirability, which places death as an opposition 
to the desirability of life in Western culture.  
Both Carpentier and Van Brussel (2012) consider Ariès’ (1981) historical account of 
the evolution in the way Western European societies have related to death useful to signal 
that discourses related to death have changed, despite death’s apparent materiality, and 
thus a more detailed study of the radically contingent character of death discourses is 
needed. However, instead of characterising the contemporary era as one in which death 
is managed behind the scenes as claimed by Ariès’ invisible death model, they contend 
that there are two discourses vying for hegemony. The first one emerged during the mod-
ern era and is known as the medical-rationalist discourse. Dying, in this discourse, is seen 
from a technical and impersonal perspective and localized in the processes of the body, 
deprived of significance at an existential and personal level. Death, in consequence, was 
the result of a subject who had become carrier of disease and was incompetent in carrying 
out successful practices to avoid it. Medical-rationalist discourse is most compatible with 
Ariès’ invisible death model and suggests that death is better kept a secret from those who 
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are dying to avoid distress and allow continuity of some routine practices. The second 
one, the medical-revivalist discourse, emerged in late modernity and, in contrast to the 
medical-rationalist discourse, insists on death becoming familiar for all involved and 
openly talked about. It incorporates a dimension of reflexive and conscious planning, 
which is an important element for the self-identity of the dying person (Seale, 1998; Car-
pentier and Van Brussel, 2012; Van Brussel, 2014).  
These discourses can be recast in terms of the LCE methodological approach outlined 
above. To provide an example, within medical-rationalist discourse, a set of social logics 
– let us call these logics of bio-localisation – govern social practices such as medical 
diagnoses, institutional procedures for death management (such as autopsies and embalm-
ment), and death-avoidance techniques, such as seeking medical or alternative8 treatments 
that aim to prolong life as long as possible. Another set of social logics – let us call these 
logics of death-denial – involve social practices such as relatives and doctors concealing 
information about death to the dying, as well as a focus on the continuity of routine ac-
tivities that orient both the living and the dying towards life, such as doing physical exer-
cises or participating in family or community events. These sets of social logics are sup-
ported by a set of fantasmatic logics – let us call these logics of medicalised hope-mainte-
nance – wherein the dying person’s life force is sustained by the hope that whatever life-
threatening condition they are experiencing can be overcome by medicine and medically 
supported lifestyle choices. Political logics of death awareness might challenge medical-
rationalist discourse, emphasising that it leads to unnecessary pain and conceals necessary 
information from the dying individual. These political logics would be promoting medi-
cal-revivalist discourse, with its own sets of social logics and fantasmatic logics to support 
them.  
The latter and more contemporary death discourse of medical-revivalism offers some 
interesting insights with respect to how subjects assimilate discourses. This, in turn, al-
lows for discovering its nodal points and other signifiers linked to them. Seale (1998), 
referring to medical-revivalist discourse as a cultural script, states that subjects engage in 
practices and activities that, even if they are dying, orient them and the social actors in 
their network of social relations towards life and away from death. This is done by par-
taking in activities that protect the social bond, such as having a nutritious meal together 
                                                     
8  Alternative in relation to medical discourse, which is hegemonic in modernity and in the West. How-
ever, on political principle, it should be called simply a different discourse.  
51 
 
even if the dying person is feeling unwell, and that facilitate the lives of loved ones in the 
absence of the deceased, for example by having legal and funeral arrangements made 
beforehand. Meaningful talk which acknowledges the imminent death of one of the par-
ties involved is another mechanism which allows to maintain social bonds, even facilitat-
ing the restoration of previously broken social bonds. However, as Seale suggests, even 
acts that lead to death, such as fasting to death, can also reflect medical-revivalism be-
cause they enable the persons who choose to do so to plan for their demise and assert their 
independence (Seale, 1998).  
These examples of the assimilation of medical-revivalist discourse provide some 
clues as to the nodal points around which other signifiers converge. Carpentier and Van 
Brussel (2012; Van Brussel, 2014) find two groups of nodal points of medical-revivalist 
discourse. Although they belong to the same discourse, the emphasis is different, and as 
such it can be said that there are two different articulations within this discourse. The first 
is constructed around the signifiers of control, autonomy and dignity, in which dying sub-
jects should be in control their own death, without detaching it from the medical context. 
Of special interest is giving the subject decision-making power and depriving this power 
from the subjects is a violation of the social norm under this discourse. In late-modern 
Western societies, this notion of control over one’s death has been articulated with dig-
nity, which acquires the connotation of independence and autonomy. The second group 
of nodal points is constructed around awareness and heroism, where awareness allows 
the dying subject to have open communication with others involved (family, medical spe-
cialists, carers), to make end-of-life decisions and to reconcile with loved ones and recon-
struct their biographies.  
Taking into consideration these insights, it is possible to see how they are relevant 
for the study of images of the future of Human-VDI interaction. For one, the VDI can be 
considered a discursive element which has as its origin the death of someone, and so 
should be articulated around specific nodal points regarding death and mortality, or life 
and the aspiration of achieving immortality. From a Futures Studies perspective, this is 
relevant because the images themselves are products of discourse, with the researcher’s 
duty being to identify the different articulations within these future images of the VDI in 
relation to death. Further, because Human-VDI interaction does not occur in a vacuum 
but is embedded in social relations, it is important to consider what hegemonic discourses 
might prevent the emergence and common use of the VDI. Alternatively, it is also possi-
ble to consider, from a Futures Studies approach, what is the hegemonic discourse that 
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may constrain how VDIs are created and how they are used. A third possibility offered 
by combining a discourse theoretical perspective with a Futures Studies orientation would 
be to consider Human-VDI interaction and its embeddedness within some discourse as 
hegemonic, with alternative discourses being less prominent or marginal.  
The Futures Studies approach, with its emphasis on the plurality of images of the 
future, is also suited for a discourse theoretical analysis, as this latter perspective favours 
the characterisation of societies as conflictive, and thus facilitates identifying intra-dis-
cursive and inter-discursive tensions and resolutions. Specifically, instead of considering 
the images of the future as mutually exclusive, discourse theoretical insights on the fu-
tures of Human-VDI interaction might characterise the resulting images as different dis-
courses within a single social reality, some being hegemonic, and some being marginal. 
As with the opposing contemporary discourses of medical-rationalism and medical-re-
vivalism, discourses within which contrasting forms of Human-VDI interaction are em-
bedded might instead find themselves colliding in a struggle for hegemony. Preliminarily, 
it can be stated that two discourses related to Human-VDI interaction might be directed 
towards an antagonistic clash: the first being that of the mastery over death, which Jacob-
sen (2017a) describes as emerging within a Post-Mortal society and which derives from 
the aspirations of modernity to overcome human limitations and dominate nature; the 
second, in contrast, would encourage symbiosis with death, recognising it as a part of 
existence and as a source of meaning.  
3.1.2 Mourning 
3.1.2.1 Sociological insights 
Sociological insights on mourning in the digital age are relevant for the images of the 
future involving the VDI and human beings’ interaction with it. Digital social media have 
enabled new forms of mourning which require deeper examination. These insights are 
relevant insofar as a future VDI’s affordances could “contribute to a technosocial context 
where the boundary between the living and the dead become increasingly indistinguisha-
ble” (Meese et al., 2015, p. 11).  
The internet and digital social media enable new sites, new mechanisms and new 
artifacts that facilitate mourning which do not have to be physical spaces or objects. Ac-
cording to Jessa Lingel (2013), social networking sites (SNS) enable users to simultane-
ously interpret their grief and share it with others in an open venue where hierarchies are 
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temporarily weakened and social and cultural obligations are not as rigid as one would 
expect in physical settings such as cemeteries or funeral homes. This occurs because in 
online interaction, the community that forms around the deceased is free from some 
bounds that are in place in formal mortuary rituals. As an example, she mentions the 
online presence of a beloved icon facilitates the mourning process by creating alternate 
sites where fans can work through their grief, instead of being denied their chance to 
mourn as a result of their likely exclusion from formal mortuary rituals. What this exam-
ple implies is a resistance to institutional control over appropriate mourning practices 
(Lingel, 2013).  
Tony Walter (2015) instead finds some tensions that result from the internet and SNS 
changing mourning practices. While his position shows coincidences with Lingel’s inso-
far as he views online mourning as carrying out a de-sequestration of death and resisting 
institutional power, he also considers that the unclear and shifting norms in relation to 
mourning may generate tensions in the online community of mourners, partly as a result 
of the flattening of hierarchies and partly because expectations of public displays of grief 
are not met. Crucially, though, he also finds that SNS allows for a public address to the 
dead, contrasting it with the previous practices of mourning where the dead were talked 
to in private. This new practice, in turn, allows for the maintenance of some form of re-
lationship with the deceased, even if it is unilateral.  
However, unilateral relationships with the dead, as those considered by Walter 
(2015), need not be the case. As Meese et al. (2015) point out, the internet’s and SNS’s 
affordances produce key sites for “distributed personhood”, with new software allowing 
the dead to continue influencing current events and have some form of interaction with 
the living. In addition, there are online services which use algorithm to offer a “re-enliv-
ened” version of the deceased. Although this re-enlivened version of the deceased is ex-
plored more thoroughly in the next section, for now it is important to highlight the concept 
of distributed personhood. According to Meese et al., some theories of personhood high-
light the relational aspect personhood. As such, while bodies may die and a human be-
ing’s conscience dies with them, human beings leave some traces of their personhood 
behind – the traces that derive from their relational dimension as persons. Based on this, 
the authors argue, their personas (that is, the relational component of personhood) mate-
rialise in new ways when combined with the internet’s and SNS’s affordances. In the 
cases of posthumous interaction that involve these personas of the deceased, this interac-
tion is ontologically different from how the living might “interact” with a gravestone or 
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a public memorial. This is because these latter are instances of representative objects, 
while digital personas are generated by the relational component of each human being’s 
personhood and emerge in virtual settings (Meese et al., 2015). Digital personas can fa-
cilitate the continuation of a relationship with the deceased, and they could be considered 
other forms of memorialisation. Even though more research is needed, preliminarily it 
can be stated that these digital personas of the deceased, inasmuch as they might register 
the death of someone as a loss, might facilitate mourning as well.   
These insights from the sociological perspective on mourning are relevant because 
the VDI, as conceptualised in this thesis, has a specifically digital/virtual component. 
Displaying the relational component of the deceased in virtual form might fulfil the same 
function as gravestones or public memorials, insofar as they help in the mobilisation of 
affect. The concept of distributed personhood and its relation to the relational component 
of people as manifested via digital personas (Meese et al., 2015) also raises an interesting 
issue: what does it mean for the mourning process that at least the relational component 
of the person still exists as an external entity? In other words, even if some form of rela-
tionship can continue because of the existence of digital personas of the deceased (and in 
the case of this thesis, the VDI), can the death of the original individual still be registered 
as a loss given that the relational component of the deceased continues embedded in the 
network of social relations? 
3.1.2.2 Psychological insights 
Psychological literature on how people deal with the loss of important others in their lives 
focuses on the manifestations of grief, death anxiety, mourning and anticipatory mourn-
ing, and the nature of continuing bonds. It is this last concept which is the most relevant 
for this thesis (mourning is covered as an insight of a similar but ultimately different 
discipline: psychoanalysis). Continuing bonds are the ongoing inner relationships by the 
bereaved with the deceased individual, and the concept has been influenced by the ideas 
of Freud on the concept of mourning, even if they are usually opposed (Klass et al., 1996; 
Stroebe and Schut, 2005). This definition points to its relevance within the context of 
studying the images of the future of Human-VDI interaction: it focuses on maintaining a 
relationship in some way. As is also the case with expected Human-VDI interaction, the 
manifestations of continuing bonds and their ontological nature vary widely depending 
on the context and features of the experience of such a relationship.  
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 The literature on continuing bonds suggests that these may be experienced either 
passively, for instance, by engaging in memory recollection or by looking at objects that 
are associated with the deceased in some way, or actively, in which the continuing bond 
is experienced as an interaction or a direct communication between the bereaved and the 
dead. The research conducted on the subject considers continuing bonds as a relatively 
normal component of bereavement, but findings on its effects (whether adaptive or mal-
adaptive) are inconsistent and sometimes contradictory (Klass et al., 1996; Marwit and 
Klass, 1996; Normand et al., 1996; Tyson-Rawson, 1996; Field et al., 1999; Schut et al., 
2006; Foster et al., 2011; Root and Exline, 2014).  
Root and Exline (2014) find, by doing a literature review on the subject, that the 
definitional issues surrounding the concept of continuing bonds are a key source of this 
inconsistency. This is because the number of behaviours and the nature of the continuing 
bonds has been considerably broad, and research on this subject has not often narrowed 
the concept to operationalise it and facilitate its use in psychological research. They sug-
gest five dimensions which further research must pay attention to if the effects of contin-
uing bonds on coping with the loss of a loved one are to be found. The first one is speci-
ficity, which refers to the tangibility or intangibility of the bond, as well as how defined 
or amorphous it is. The second one is proximity, referring to how the connection is felt 
and whether it manifests as an influence or as an ongoing interaction. The third one is 
whether it is a past bond (because death implies that the relationship is in the past and is 
static) or a present bond (in which the relationship can change). The fourth one is the 
locus of the bond, whether it is internal (in the psyche of the bereaved) or external (by 
using visual, tactile or auditory systems). The final dimension relates to the initiating 
agent, that is, whether the bond is experienced passively or actively. Taken together, these 
five dimensions are likely to yield more specific findings in research on the subject.  
Further lines of inquiry in the subject should consider, in addition to the five dimen-
sions of specificity outlined above, the following themes: the bereaved’s perception of 
the quality of the continuing bond (whether it was positive or negative), the nature of the 
relationship before the death of the loved one, and beliefs in the afterlife (Root and Exline, 
2014). It is interesting, however, that the dimensions and themes of research do not con-
sider other technical possibilities that allow a bond to continue in a tangible way: some 
are suggested by the transhumanist movement, which would include mind-downloads to 
machines, or the recreation or simulation of the personality of the deceased via software 
and algorithms, as implied by the concept of the VDI. In other words, while supernatural 
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possibilities for continuing bonds have been examined and put forward, technical possi-
bilities are not an explicit focus in current research. This is not surprising, as empirical 
research on technical possibilities of continuing bonds would need to have users of these 
technological devices which, so far, are very rare.  
It is easy to see how the literature on continuing bonds may be relevant to the study 
of images of the future of Human-VDI interaction. A VDI could be considered an instance 
of a continuing bond, one which, in the context of Root and Exline’s (2014) framework, 
would be tangible, presents an ongoing relationship, alternates between the past and the 
present and at least partially external. Questions concerning the initiating agent would 
vary according to the technical capabilities of a particular VDI, which would range from 
only the bereaved initiating the interaction in cases where the VDI is confined to a tech-
nological artifact or virtual environment only accessed upon will to a mostly autonomous 
physical VDI that can interact not only with its human interlocutor but also with physical 
objects in the real world.  
Although a VDI could be considered a continuing bond with these features, it raises 
some interesting issues in light of the sociological insights (discussed above) and psycho-
analytic insights (discussed below). One is the fact that the notion of the digital persona 
is itself a component of a person that materialises in the form of the VDI which, given the 
fact that it is now separated from the original individual, would give it an autonomous 
ontological status on its own, one in which there is an interaction but such an interaction 
is between a “full” person and a materialised digital persona (meaning, a partial person), 
one which has some agential capacities of its own. Another issue is the fact that the con-
tinuing bond, despite being ongoing, would remain static insofar as it is focused only on 
Human-VDI interaction. This is because, as opposed to a person, the VDI cannot experi-
ence personal growth or change in values, something which its human interlocutor still 
can. Hence, any variation in the relationship would only occur because the human inter-
locutor changes, as the VDI would remain a snapshot of the original (now deceased) in-
dividual. These and other potential issues would be worth studying in more detail as the 
development of VDIs and their use continues.  
3.1.2.3 Psychoanalytic insights 
Sigmund Freud’s work Mourning and Melancholia (1957) is perhaps the most influential 
text written on the subject of mourning for the modern era. It offers an exploration on 
what mourning is and how it differs from melancholia, with Freud valuing positively the 
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former and viewing the latter as a pathological distortion of the former. Freud’s psycho-
analytic insights on mourning and melancholia are relevant because they offer the most 
complete and nuanced framework for interpreting how subjects deal with the death of a 
loved one and, more generally, how they face circumstances of loss. Although several 
psychoanalysts and authors from other fields offer new takes on mourning and melancho-
lia and expanded the scope of Freud’s theses (Kristeva, 1989; Abraham, 1994; Klein, 
1994; Neimeyer et al., 2002; Butler, 2006; Leader, 2009; Glynos, 2014; Hurtado, 2016), 
Freud’s insights provide the foundations to understand how human beings (at least in the 
Western, developed world, although a case could be made for the cross-cultural applica-
bility of Freud’s ideas) have to make a conscious effort to work through the loss of their 
loved ones and how this loss affects their attitudes towards life and death. 
Before delving deeper into Freud’s theory of mourning and melancholia, an im-
portant distinction should be made: grief and mourning are not the same phenomena, alt-
hough they are related. Leader (2009) states that grief is the natural reaction to experienc-
ing a loss, while mourning is the work that goes into processing that loss. Mourning, in 
other words, does not come naturally, which is a crucial aspect of Freud’s psychoanalytic 
ideas on the subject.  
Mourning and melancholia are both responses that result from facing a loss, usually 
in the form of the death of a person but it also includes the loss of abstractions. Initially, 
both responses show similar symptoms: “cessation of interest in the outside world, loss 
of the capacity to love, inhibition of all activity” (Freud, 1957, p. 244). For Freud, the 
first important distinction between mourning and melancholia is that mourning is a nor-
mal process which human subjects must go through after a loss to renew the interest in 
the outside world and find new attachments, while melancholia shows an additional 
symptom: “a lowering of the self-regarding feelings to a degree that finds utterance in 
self-reproaches and self-revilings, and culminates in a delusional expectation of punish-
ment” (Freud, 1957, p. 244). This additional symptom marks a crucial distinction between 
the two concepts: mourning is a process that orients the person towards life, while mel-
ancholia orients them towards death. Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia can be read as 
a text wherein a battle is laid out: that between life and death, propelled by the permanent 
departure of the loved one. When considering this battle in light of Seale’s (1998) theory 
on social and cultural life as a defence against death, the Death-constituted society can be 
interpreted as providing additional mechanisms that guide the individual towards life, 
although the victory of life over death is never assured.  
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Mourning can be characterised as a process similar to a personal metaphorical jour-
ney: an inciting incident (the death of a loved one) sets the mourner on a path of personal 
recollection and analysis wherein they have to continuously face painful moments – mo-
ments that detach the mourner from life – so they regain the ability to invest themselves 
in new life experiences. The one who mourns starts comparing the memories of the lost 
other with the reality being faced, acknowledging the loved one’s permanent disappear-
ance. In mourning, “each memory and expectation linked to the person we have lost must 
be revived and be met with the judgement that they are gone for ever. This is the difficult 
and terrible time when our thoughts perpetually return to the one we have lost” (Leader, 
2009, p. 26). During the mourning process, the lost other’s existence is resurrected in the 
psyche as a way to deal with their actual absence. Each time the comparison of the mem-
ories to actual experience is made, however, the intensity of the pain of recollection di-
minishes. Mourning will end when the survivor has acknowledged that there is no more 
future to be experienced with the lost loved one, detaches his/her emotional tie with the 
deceased, and reattaches himself/herself to new objects of affection (Freud, 1957; 
Clewell, 2004; Leader, 2009).  
Melancholia, as a pathological form of mourning for Freud, presents complications 
for the process to be successfully resolved or, following from the previous metaphor, for 
the journey to end. Firstly, although the mourner might be more or less aware of the ex-
perienced loss, for the melancholic this is not so straightforward. This is because in mel-
ancholia, “the patient cannot consciously perceive what he has lost”, and though the pa-
tient might certainly be aware of the loss, “he knows whom he has lost but not what he 
has lost in him” (Freud, 1957, p. 245). In other words, while in mourning the loss mani-
fests itself consciously, in melancholia the magnitude of the loss retreats into the uncon-
scious. Additionally, the lowering of self-regard leads the survivor to an attack on the 
ego: “The patient represents his ego to us as worthless, incapable of any achievement and 
morally despicable; he reproaches himself, vilifies himself and expects to be cast out and 
punished” (Freud, 1957, p. 246). This is different from what happens in mourning, where 
it is the world that is perceived as worthless and not the ego. It is possible to see from this 
attack on the ego that the possibility for death to win the battle over life is real: the most 
extreme form of attack on the ego is self-harm, which can lead to self-destruction, includ-
ing social and biological death.  
Freud’s crucial insight on melancholia is that this attack on the ego is in fact a re-
proach on the lost loved one which manifests itself as reproach to self. How might this 
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be? The discipline of psychoanalysis has suggested that human subjects are capable of 
harbouring feelings without being consciously aware of them, manifesting themselves in 
non-apparent ways. Similarly, it has also proposed that affection and hatred are closely 
linked, a sign that the relations between the living are not pure but are instead character-
ized by ambivalence. Freud himself has stated that in an attachment, behind tender feel-
ings of love there is a concealed hostility toward that person, a hostility which is rarely 
conscious (Freud, 1955). With this insight in mind, it is possible to see that the loss of a 
loved one might render one incapable of articulating consciously the feelings towards the 
deceased and, as such, manifest itself in complications for mourning. As explained by 
Darian Leader, “Hatred – whether it is conscious or not – can also complicate the mourn-
ing process quite seriously. Loss and bereavement might not always allow for a ventila-
tion of feelings one might have repressed, and in general hostility to the dead is not toler-
ated well by us” (Leader, 2009, p. 43). For Freud, the ambivalence felt towards loved 
ones when they were alive engender feelings of guilt once they have died. In consequence, 
the reproach is directed towards the survivors’ ego, chastising themselves for inadequate 
behaviour towards the deceased.  
These insights on mourning and melancholia are part of Freud’s first formulation of 
the concepts. They would be the most influential, but they were not the only ones, and his 
formulation of the concepts evolved over time. Particularly in The Ego and the Id (1961), 
Freud reformulates the development process of the ego, with the infant engaging in an 
identificatory process with the lost other as a means of making sense of its absence. This 
identification gives rise to an internally divided sense of self, consisting of the superego, 
the ego and the id, and an internalisation of the lost other into the self. In other words, in 
The Ego and the Id, Freud argues that a condition for the constitution of human subjec-
tivity is the identification with a lost other. 
For Clewell (2004), this reformulation of ego development has consequences for 
Freud’s earlier work on the concepts mourning and melancholia. Because human subjec-
tivity emerges as a result of the loss of significant others, the strict opposition between 
“healthy” mourning and “pathological” melancholia disappears, as what was previously 
considered a pathological identification is now central for the existence of the self. There-
fore, melancholic identification becomes part of the mourning journey: the goal is no 
longer to detach oneself from the lost loved one, but to integrate the lost other into one’s 
self.  This implies that mourning never comes to a decisive end; rather, mourning may 
entail an interminable labour of integrating the losses experienced throughout life. 
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Clewell’s reading of Freud is supported by Butler’s (1997) ideas on subjectivity, who 
states that a severance of attachments would lead to the dissolution of the sense of self. 
This being the case, Freud’s theory of the ego as developed in The Ego and the Id implic-
itly puts forward a different characterisation of the mourning journey: “the mourning sub-
ject may affirm the endurance of ambivalent bonds to those loved and lost others as a 
condition of its own existence. Freud’s work counsels us, then, to relinquish the need for 
a strict identity unencumbered by the claims of the lost other or the past” (Clewell, 2004, 
p. 65). This would seem to imply that the ego is, over time, constituted by multitudes of 
meaningful lost others, each of whom remains part of oneself even as the original indi-
viduals have died.  
Perhaps the most important issue relevant for the study of Human-VDI interaction 
raised by psychoanalytic perspectives on mourning would be whether the VDI facilitates 
or complicates mourning. The overview on mourning and melancholia does not offer any 
definitive answers, but instead points towards ambivalence: the lost loved one is perma-
nently gone, yet some traces remain. Normally, these traces would remain internal; in the 
early formulation of melancholia, the goal would be to achieve total detachment from 
those traces and new investments in other life experiences, while in the posterior formu-
lation, the goal would be to internalise those traces within the mourner’s self. Yet the VDI 
externalises them and gives them agency, an agency that might not be dissimilar to that 
of the original individual, depending on the technical capacities of the artifact through 
which the VDI recreates the deceased individual.   
Though empirical examination of what occurs in actual practice of Human-VDI in-
teraction is needed to see what occurs, it is possible to imagine two outcomes. The first 
one is a complication of mourning, precisely because the externalisation of the other in 
the form of the VDI again aims to achieve an individuated identity, unencumbered from 
the lost loved ones and past losses. The other is that a comparison of the VDI to the real 
person results in the acknowledgement of the fundamental differences between the two, 
with the internalisation being maintained and the VDI instead being used more as a re-
pository of the information of the deceased, with thoughts and ideas the original individ-
ual had being delivered through interaction instead of looking through an object like a 
diary or a photograph album. In this latter case, mourning ensures that the bonds with the 
deceased endure despite the presence of the VDI, which serves another function for its 
human interlocutor.  
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A related but ultimately different issue is how the VDI influences the investment of 
affect in new life experiences. By either the severance (in Freud’s first formulation) or 
internalisation (in Freud’s second formulation) of the attachment to the deceased, the liv-
ing can reinvest themselves in new life experiences and new relationships. But having a 
VDI as a recurring reminder of the deceased might orient the living to invest more in that 
relationship as a continuing bond, even though it is static (the VDI does not evolve, as it 
has no conscience), because the VDI is constituted by the relational component of the 
original individual. The implications of this are likely to be varied according to each per-
son who engages in interaction with a VDI and their relationship with the original indi-
vidual, but it is possible to speculate that reliance on the VDI as a possible source of 
affective stimuli might discourage the human interlocutors to explore forming new life 
experiences.  
3.1.2.4 Discourse theoretical insights 
Discourse theoretical insights related to mourning incorporate ideas from sociology and 
psychoanalysis and suggest the concept of mourning is not tied only to specific material 
aspects but to discourse’s radical contingency. That is, discourse theoretical insights sug-
gest that when one undergoes the mourning process, what is being mourned is a discourse 
which has been disarticulated and re-articulated or replaced by a new hegemonic dis-
course. This occurs both at the individual and at the collective level, although in practice 
such separation would mostly be fictional, as discourse constitutes human subjectivity by 
default at both levels, even if tensions between these two may arise. Insights from Post-
Marxist discourse theory are useful in identifying what stance a subject takes in relation 
to a discourse, and whether he/she is aware of its radical contingency and is capable of 
change. This presents issues in relation to Human-VDI interaction, as the VDI may con-
ceal discourse’s radical contingency or, contrary to expectations, reveal a discourse’s lim-
its and guide a subject towards change.  
Some theoretical clarifications are needed to see why this is the case. Glynos (2001; 
2008; Glynos, 2014) argues that fantasy and fantasmatic elements in discourse help sub-
jects keep anxiety at bay by concealing its radical contingency. As has been described, 
the Logic of Fantasy provides a narrative structure to discourse and defines its contours, 
while fantasmatic logics (the LCE methodological approach’s operationalisation of the 
Logic of Fantasy) naturalise discourses by hiding their contingent nature and generate 
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affective investment in them. Discourse’s social ontology has two dimensions which spe-
cifically relate to fantasy: the ethical dimension, when radical contingency in discourse is 
confronted directly by the subject, and the ideological dimension, where the subjects are 
complicit in avoiding a direct confrontation with radical contingency in discourse. The 
disruption of the subjective experience of discourse by an event or perturbation is referred 
to as dislocation. In other words, dislocation makes subjects become aware of the radical 
contingency of their fantasy life, which can then trigger efforts by the subjects to recon-
stitute their fantasy life in ways that create distance between them and their anxiety. 
The prospects of death or the actual death of others can be considered instances of 
dislocation, insofar as they highlight discourse’s radical contingency. As discussed pre-
viously, following the death of a loved other a process of memory recollection follows, 
with such a process allowing the survivor to distinguish between the actual person and 
the role the deceased played in the survivor’s life. For Glynos (2014), this means that 
mourning the loss of someone is about mourning the loss of attachment to the materiality 
underlying the symbolic systems in which the deceased played a significant role, shaping 
the social relations and fantasies of their loved ones. In other words, mourning implies 
achieving a conscious awareness of how the lost other played a role in constituting a 
human subject’s discourse. Mourning, then, makes conscious those unconscious relations 
and identifications, leading the survivors to face the fact that the identificatory support 
the deceased provided in their fantasy life is gone forever. The implication of this is that 
mourning the loss of someone becomes fundamentally about mourning the loss of both 
that part of themselves which was affectively invested in the deceased and the underlying 
guarantees the deceased provided. 
Glynos (2014) emphasizes that the ethics of mourning entails facing head-on the rad-
ical contingency of social life. Mourning demands work on the part of the subjects that 
renders them attentive to the radical contingency of discourse, which can cause anxiety. 
This attentiveness allows subjects to bring elements of their fantasy life to the conscious 
level. Blocked mourning, in contrast, would lead the subjects to flee from anxiety and 
remain unconsciously overinvested in their fantasy life, the same fantasy life which gives 
structure to discourse and grounds them in it. A mourning journey which is successfully 
completed, meanwhile, would involve a successful detachment from the fantasy life that 
was enabled by the deceased and, consequently, a successful detachment from discourse.  
Although Glynos’ concept of the ethics of mourning is more clearly influenced by 
Freud’s first formulation of mourning, the one laid out in Mourning and Melancholia 
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(1957), he explicitly rejects the idea that complete detachment from a previous fantasy 
life and its associated discourse should be sought. Instead, he asserts: “Mourning, as an 
ethical response, demands the subject find a way to make loss part of one’s life in a way 
that acknowledges rather than represses it” (Glynos, 2014, p. 146). In this sense, he rec-
ognises the development of Freud’s theory of mourning as suggested in The Ego and the 
Id (1961) and reaffirmed by Clewell (2004). This would mean critically engaging with 
those identificatory supports that the deceased embodied, which might come in the form 
of ideals, principles or affects, without necessarily abandoning them. Hence, mourning 
here would entail recognising their contingency, critically examining their influence and 
either affirming them or moving on without ignoring the grip they once held.  
A crucial aspect to consider is that, because mourning is both an individual journey 
and a collective affair, and a human subject’s mourning process is affected by both indi-
vidual and collective factors, a critical interrogation should proceed to determine if there 
are conditions, perhaps hidden, that may lead to a blocked or complicated mourning. Pre-
vious research has argued that discourse, manifested via institutional power and social 
norms, may complicate mourning for a variety of reasons, ranging from ensuring the im-
plementation of public policies to preventing the articulation of counter-hegemonic strug-
gles (Gibson-Graham, 2006; Özselçuk, 2006; Glynos, 2008; Hurtado, 2016; West and 
Glynos, 2016). In consequence, identifying sets of social practices and how they respond 
to discourse (i.e. how they are governed by social, political and/or fantasmatic logics) is 
key if mourning is to be carried out ethically. For this, a critical engagement must take 
place in two planes: the normative one, where contestation of the norms of a practice that 
undermine the value and role of mourning in the lives of individuals and communities is 
central, and the hegemonic one, which identifies and constructs, through a process of 
hegemonic struggle, the agents and interests affected by the prospects of transforming 
those norms (Glynos, 2014, p. 155). For successful mourning to occur, Glynos further 
identifies two conditions to be met: the first being the event or site that enacts a publicly 
shared recognition of loss, and the second being an appropriate context within which loss 
can be processed (Glynos, 2014, p. 144-145). 
Discourse theoretical insights complement those of the psychoanalytic perspective 
insofar as they point to how human subjectivity is constituted by discourse and how dis-
course itself may complicate mourning. Human-VDI interaction, if seen through a dis-
course theoretical lens, may be part of a Post-Mortalist discourse where developments in 
technology aim for mastery over death. In other words, within this discourse a fantasy of 
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immortality shared in the network of social relations would be reinforced by develop-
ments in technology. Interacting with a VDI, for example, would reduce anxiety from the 
dislocation caused by the death of the original individual which the VDI mimics. At the 
same time, however, it might block the process of recollection and critical examination 
of the identificatory supports the original individual played in the lives of his/her surviv-
ing network of relatives and friends by allowing them to bypass the acknowledgement of 
his/her absence. This might be, for instance, if a VDI is discursively constructed as a 
“replacement” or a “substitute”. If, in contrast, the main meanings associated with the 
VDI are those of a technological artifact (e.g. “machine” or “programme”) that are con-
sidered helpful only under certain circumstances, then mourning is not necessarily 
blocked by emerging practices of Human-VDI interaction.  
Preliminarily, it can be stated that how much the VDI is used, the circumstances un-
der which it is used, and the technical capabilities of the VDI will be critical for whether 
mourning is carried out ethically or not. A VDI that replicates quite faithfully the man-
nerisms of the original individual and manifests itself in ways the original individual 
would have (text, audio, video and physical presence, for instance) would likely contrib-
ute to overinvestment in the human interlocutor’s fantasy life and, in consequence, remain 
unaware of a discourse’s radical contingency. If, however, the VDI is limited in its tech-
nical capacities and/or is visibly the result of software and its possible combination with 
hardware, the contrast between the VDI and the original individual would only be 
stronger. In any case, it is likely that, for the time horizon envisioned in this thesis, the 
VDI would fall somewhere in between these two descriptions. How much it is used and 
under what circumstances will likely reflect cultural and institutional norms, as well as 
legal standards and broader societal transformations. 
3.1.3 Conclusion to Death Studies sub-section 
The insights from these disciplines within the Death Studies field provide theoretical 
grounds for the study of social practices of Human-VDI interaction and its possible fu-
tures, in terms of how such a phenomenon might be a manifestation of human beings’ 
attempts to find meaning and continue living in the face of death, and in how they deal 
with the loss of those meaningful others.  
It is clear that, as the Virtual Deceased Individual is conceptualised in this thesis, it 
cannot be a way for actual immortality in terms of phenomenological experience. It, in-
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stead, might emerge as new ways to maintain contact with the dead in the form of ances-
tors and to gain a symbolic form of immortality, as suggested by the anthropological in-
sights. This field also suggests that, similarly to how mortuary rituals are present cross-
culturally but culturally variable, something similar might happen with the VDI in com-
plex societies driven by the goals of modernity. It also lays the theoretical foundations for 
how death and rituals revolving around death are socially and culturally constructed. 
More generally, as seen from both the anthropological and the sociological perspective, 
interaction with the VDI might constitute a social practice that mitigates the fear of death 
and orients the living away from death and towards life. This is grounded in the fact that 
talk and bodily communication operate as small everyday rituals that give a sense of sta-
bility to life.  
Sociological insights might point as well to some of the underlying forces behind the 
decision to create virtual copies of the deceased, such as creating the VDI being both a 
practice of generativity that allows its use in interaction for guidance of the next genera-
tions. It might also limit the disruption of death in institutional settings and might be a 
mechanism in which to achieve symbolic immortality within an imagined community. 
More importantly, however, sociological insights point to the fact that the VDI and the 
desire to create such a technological artifact are embedded within the aim of modernity 
of achieving mastery over nature, and more specifically, mastery over death. Finally,  the 
notion of the Death-constituted society – i.e. any society in which social and cultural life 
orients people towards life-sustaining activities to protect them from death and its mean-
inglessness – was addressed, and works as a conceptual background in which all activities 
and practices are performed.  
Discourse theoretical insights, for their part, point to the fact that discourses on death 
are radically contingent, articulate different elements which emphasise different aspects 
of death and dying, and are never universal but contextually specific. Practices surround-
ing death and dying are governed by discourse, specifically by social logics, which are 
supported by fantasmatic logics and challenged or defended by political logics. Discourse 
theory also pointed to the hegemony of some discourses and the marginalisation of others. 
In the context of studying Human-VDI interaction, discourse theoretical insights are use-
ful for identifying how such a practice is discursively constructed (i.e. what signifiers and 
meanings are attached to it), and also point to the fact of underlying conflict in a hege-
monic struggle, with discourses favouring immortality possibly leading to the emergence 
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of the VDI, and discourses favouring mortality posited to be in opposition to the emer-
gence of such a device and the practice of interacting with it.  
As for mourning, sociological insights provided ideas on distributed personhood, 
with the relational component of a person in the digital era becoming a digital persona. 
The VDI would, in a sense, be another manifestation of the relational component of a 
person, also building on the technological persona left behind by the deceased. The VDI 
could, at the very least, be considered some form of memorialisation for those who have 
died, while more advanced forms would lead to the emergence of ontologically new re-
lationships. This is complemented by the view on continuing bonds from psychology, 
which focus on an ongoing inner relationship by the bereaved with the dead. An interest-
ing aspect to consider in light of the VDI is that such a relationship is limited because the 
VDI cannot change. As such, any change in the relationship would be the result of 
changes undergone by the VDI’s human interlocutor.  
Finally, the psychoanalytic and discourse theoretical perspectives on mourning com-
plement each other as well. Psychoanalysis highlights two different approaches to mourn-
ing: one in which detachment from the deceased is needed in order to form new attach-
ments in life, and one in which the lost loved one is internalised into the ego, forever 
becoming part of one’s self. Discourse theoretical insights point to the fact that mourning 
can reveal the radical contingency of discourse and fantasy life, whereas complicated 
mourning remains invested in the fantasy life that was enabled by the deceased. For eth-
ical mourning to occur, then, an acknowledgement of the radical contingency of discourse 
and fantasy life must take place following the death of a loved one. In the context of 
Human-VDI interaction, two possibilities emerge: one in which the VDI conceals dis-
course’s radical contingency and leaves the human interlocutor invested in the previous 
dynamic with the deceased individual, without acknowledging the death event; and an-
other where the differences between the VDI and the original individual lead the human 
interlocutor to critically engage with the identificatory and material supports the deceased 
provided, revealing the radical contingency of discourse and allowing the mourner to ei-
ther affirm some values and ideals once embodied by the deceased or move on from them 
and affirm new ideals and values. 
In sum, theoretical insights from the Death Studies field enable the researcher to un-
derstand the reasoning and motivations behind the decision to engage in Human-VDI 
interaction or avoid it in the images of the future constructed depicted in this thesis. Sim-
ilarly, it facilitates the contextualisation of social practices according to certain historical 
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and cultural contexts, with the VDI being part of modernity’s project to achieve some 
form of mastery over death and an associated desire for immortality, but arguably also 
revealing the human need to mitigate the fear of death and have support from his/her 
ancestors. For the empirical analysis, this allows the researcher to understand the deeper 
aspects driving the emergence of the social practices of Human-VDI interaction unfolding 
in the images of the future. Finally, insights from psychoanalysis and discourse theory 
point to how mourning might take place or may be blocked, as well as the challenges to 
human subjectivity involved in Human-VDI interaction. These insights are helpful in 
characterising the different images of the future at the core of this thesis as either facili-
tating or complicating death acceptance and mourning.  
3.2 Interaction Studies and the constitution of social life: insights for technologi-
cally mediated futures 
The field of studies here referred to as Interaction Studies encompasses a number of dif-
ferent disciplines, though the focus adopted here is mostly that of sociology, specifically 
microsociology. However, other disciplinary approaches, such as psychology, social psy-
chology, and Human-Computer interaction complement the sociological approach that is 
predominant in this thesis. The reason for the more overt focus on sociology than on the 
other disciplines derives from the fact that a sociological focus on social interaction is 
able to address social structural pressures. Moreover, this sociological focus facilitates 
the linkage between more abstract and macro-concepts, such as discourse, worldviews 
and cultural metaphors, and the analysis of specific social phenomena without delving 
into the complexities of the individual human mind, where sensory systems and life ex-
periences need to be carefully considered. Perhaps most important from the field of inter-
action studies is that it illustrates the social construction of the social world in everyday 
activities (Berger and Luckmann, 1966; Schütz, 1967), which supports the same perspec-
tive as those presented in the Death Studies sub-section.  
In another sense, Human-VDI interaction, as the phenomenon studied via images of 
the future, has social interaction as a central concept. As this sub-section describes, inter-
action is the micro-unit of analysis for sociology, and works as a mediator of some inner 
aspects of the human being and the surrounding social world. It can also be said to be the 
foundations for the macro-level social structures, even if the latter are ultimately not re-
ducible to interactions. The VDI, however, presents certain challenges to understand from 
a sociological perspective, given that one of its interactants (the VDI) is not self-aware. 
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In fact, it is not even a living entity. As such, parallels between normal human-to-human 
interaction and Human-VDI interaction are not to be made carelessly. This is why insights 
from the Human-Computer interaction discipline are discussed in relation to expected 
Human-VDI interaction and its dynamics. A final consideration is that, because Human-
VDI interaction is not a phenomenon that currently exists in a way that would qualify as 
similar to human-to-human interaction, it is necessary to examine both what a posthu-
mous interaction and an imagined interaction are, and how they relate to both actual in-
teraction and mind processes. In reality, the data gathered for this thesis does not reflect 
actual but imagined Human-VDI interaction, which would in nature be a form of posthu-
mous interaction.  This makes it necessary to address those concepts.  
 This sub-section of the thesis first reviews some fundamental insights on interaction 
between humans and the different elements that constitute an interaction. This, in turn, is 
contrasted with how interactions could be developed in relation to the VDI, and the par-
allels are identified. Next, considerations of Human-Computer interaction, specifically 
those related to interaction with robots, will be discussed. This does not mean that a VDI 
would necessarily have to be robotic in a strict sense, but the insights from that field are 
relevant insofar as they provide a glimpse of the potential and limitations of interaction 
with complex software that might or might not have a physical manifestation. Finally, the 
concepts of posthumous and imagined interaction are described. The concept of posthu-
mous interaction is described, as such a concept captures the central idea of what would 
be happening with a VDI: an interaction between living people and data from dead peo-
ple. In turn, the notion of imagined interaction is discussed in order to clarify the onto-
logical nature of the data gathered for and examined this thesis.  
3.2.1 Social interaction conceptualised from a sociological perspective 
Social interaction can be considered the most basic unit of sociological analysis, given 
that interaction is the foundational element in the social organisation of individuals. Alt-
hough there have also been conceptualisations of social interaction at society and culture 
level (Sêga, in Carvalho Pereira and Maciel, 2013), the level of analysis of social inter-
action in this thesis is the microsocial level. In this level, discourse, emotion and social 
structure converge and are expressed in social interaction (Goffman, 1956; Goffman, 
1967; Scheff, 1990; Turner, 2002). As a constitutive element of social organisation, social 
interaction can also be said to form part of society’s mechanisms to orient its members 
away from death and towards life (Seale, 1998). However, given the way interactions 
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have been modified by new developments in technology and the way technological arti-
facts have to consider elements from the social structure as well in their development 
(Sassen, 2002; Klein and Kleinman, 2002; Leite et al., 2013; Sonia and Brangier, 2013), 
one can hypothesise that interactions with the VDI will both have some basic similarities 
to human-to-human interaction and some significant differences as well, and whether they 
are useful in orienting its living interactants towards life is still an open question. More-
over, these interactions may themselves become new social practices across different 
spaces, institutional contexts and cultures. As such, reviewing the fundamental insights 
of interaction theory from a sociological perspective is needed to adequately assess (how-
ever tentatively and preliminarily) what the dynamics in Human-VDI interaction and its 
consequences would be.  
Social interaction from a microsociological perspective has been more thoroughly 
conceptualised by Jonathan Turner, whose insights from A Theory of Social Interaction 
(1988) also form the framework for how social interaction is conceptualised in this thesis. 
He defines social interaction as “the overt process whereby the overt movements, covert 
deliberations, and basic physiology of one individual influence those of another, and vice 
versa” (Turner, 1988, p. 14). Although he recognises that social interaction is mostly ex-
amined from a symbolic interactionist perspective in sociology, he nonetheless claims 
that its basic features follow some law-like pattern and, in consequence, can be studied in 
a comparable way to natural phenomena. For that reason, he suggests a sensitising scheme 
to study, from a micro-level of analysis, the dynamics of interaction.  
Turner’s theoretical model of social interaction consists of three separate, albeit in-
terrelated, processes: motivational, interactional, and structuring, each of which he argues 
has its own theoretical model and comprises its own set of processes that, in the end, link 
to the other two and constitute an instance of social interaction. Motivational processes 
refer to the various ways and the varying degrees in which individuals mobilise their en-
ergy to engage with others in shared activity. Interactional processes are defined as the 
actions and reactions of individuals when they influence each other’s behaviour. Interac-
tional processes, as their name suggest, constitute the dynamics of a social interaction and 
involve the controlled operation of human’s behavioural capacities, such as signalling 
course behaviour while interpreting behavioural signals from all parties involved. Finally, 
structuring processes point to the fact that social interactions occur over time and are 
organised in physical spaces.  The three processes integrate in the following manner:  
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“Just how people signal and interpret is related to their motivational en-
ergies; in turn, motivation is circumscribed by prevailing structural ar-
rangements as well as by the course of signalling and interpreting; and 
the structure of an interaction is very much determined by the motivational 
profiles of individuals as these affect their signalling and interpreting ac-
tivities” (Turner, 1988, p. 16).  
A more in-depth look into each of the processes of Turner’s theoretical model of 
social interaction is needed to see which are more relevant for Human-VDI interaction. 
Of the three categories of processes, motivational processes are probably the ones that 
show the most discrepancy between human-to-human interaction and Human-VDI inter-
action. In motivational processes, gratifications and utilities are the primary motivations 
behind individuals’ decisions to engage in interaction. When there are prospects of re-
wards or utilities and of costs and punishments, individuals are energised to behave in 
such a way that they obtain the former and avoid the latter. Important sources of gratifi-
cation for an individual and which are exchanged in interaction are approval, prestige and 
power. Furthermore, expectations related to self-affirmation during an interaction are, 
whether consciously or unconsciously, powerful motivational drivers that lead individu-
als to interact with each other (Turner, 1988).  
For Human-VDI interaction, it is possible to draw some preliminary conclusions 
based on the definition of the VDI used in this thesis. Because the VDI is not self-aware, 
the VDI would not have any inherent motivation, at least not as a living entity (this, how-
ever, can be coded to some degree as part of its algorithm). Any motivational process in 
the interaction would be mostly related to the human interlocutor. The VDI would, in 
principle, not be interested in approval, prestige or power in any real sense of those words 
due to its lack of awareness. However, for the human interlocutor, these motivational 
processes do apply. How this discrepancy between the VDI’s lack of inherent motivation 
(the algorithm of the VDI may contain code which gives the appearance of motivation or 
operates as simple motivational components, but such motivation cannot, in principle, be 
as complex as that of human beings without crashing the algorithm)9 and the human in-
terlocutor’s motivation is resolved would need to be evaluated in light of the specific 
                                                     
9  This is manifested in the sometimes contradictory and unexplained ways human beings behave yet 
still go on with their lives. This is an insight from psychoanalysis, in which contradictions and some-
times opposing forces of the unconscious are constitutive of human subjectivity. This cannot be man-
ifested in an algorithm, as attempting to code it would most likely result in the algorithm failing to 
execute its programme properly.  
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motivations of the human interlocutor and how adept the VDI is at prompting, managing 
and responding to those motivations from its human interlocutor.  
Both the interactional processes and the structuring processes in Human-VDI inter-
action are more similar than dissimilar to those in human-to-human interaction. Turner 
identifies a number of elements that become activated during interactional processes. He 
borrows from George Herbert Mead (1934) the concepts of “mind”, “self”, “role-taking” 
and “generalised others”. Mind provides the interactants with the possibilities to imagine 
different alternatives for conduct, to visualise and project the consequences of choosing 
one of these alternatives, and to understand the meanings of cues from the other interact-
ant. According to Turner, mind has causal effects for other interactional processes 
(Turner, 1988).  
The concept of self refers to the behaviour displayed as a result of each of the inter-
actants perceiving themselves as objects in situations and encounters. For Turner, self is 
both a structure that transcends specific situations and a series of transitory images that 
manifest themselves in each interaction setting. As such, Turner argues that the self, hav-
ing this duality, is an “enduring configuration of attitudes, dispositions, definitions and 
feelings about oneself that selectively filters the self-image in concrete situations” 
(Turner, 1988, p. 103) and while the self is built of the transitory images of the different 
interactions held over time, it becomes structured and is reflexive in nature. Self is central 
to interaction because people aim to sustain their self-conception during an interaction, 
which makes their signalling behaviours conditioned by “relatively stable configurations 
of self-referencing attitudes, dispositions, definitions, feelings and meanings” (Turner, 
1988, p. 104).  
Role-taking is, in Turner’s view, essential to any conceptualisation of interaction, 
given that it involves the capacity to discern gestures which establish common meaning 
in an encounter, enables the interactants to interpret their significance and visualise the 
likely course of behaviour from each other, and sense hidden dispositions and attitudes 
from the other side. This is complementary to the concept of “generalised other”, which 
is a perspective that frames an encounter with others and is both imposed upon and emer-
gent from an interaction. Frames are rather rigid in nature, as individuals invoke them to 
orient themselves in an interaction and stay attuned to relevant dispositions, feelings, 
meanings and attitudes. These, however, are supplemented by abstract frameworks from 
their own personal experience (Turner, 1988). A generalised other, or a frame in an inter-
action, thus works to define the situation the interactants find themselves in (Goffman, 
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1956; Goffman, 1967; Turner, 1988). Although not explicitly discussed by Turner, it is 
likely that these frames also present cultural variability, as what in some cultural settings 
might be interpreted as a welcoming or friendly disposition, in other settings it might be 
considered offensive. 
The concepts related to interactional processes are likely to be all present in Human-
VDI interaction, albeit with some substantive differences. Mind would be present in the 
human interlocutor, but would be mostly absent from the VDI, with the exception of being 
able to understand the meaning of cues from its human interlocutor (this is assuming the 
VDI is takes some form of embodied manifestation that is able to interact with the phys-
ical world). The other features of mind would be absent because the VDI, as established, 
is not conscious nor self-aware. For this reason, self would also have substantive differ-
ences when conceptualised in relation to the VDI. The VDI’s self would only be structure, 
as it would only be performing the role of the deceased individual as understood by its 
human interlocutor. It would represent a static version of the deceased at a certain moment 
in time. As such, the transitory aspect of the self would disappear, leaving only the struc-
ture of self. Role-taking would also change, as the role would be fixed in a VDI and, due 
to its lack of imagination by virtue of being software and not a living being, would not be 
able to visualise the likely course of behaviour of its interlocutor beyond the immediate 
response. The element in interactional processes that would most likely remain without 
much substantive change for the VDI is the generalised other/frame. In this case, as part 
of the design of the VDI, a frame would be built-in that allows the VDI to recognise its 
main interlocutors (in this sense, it would be a personal frame) and act accordingly. Oth-
erwise, it would likely adopt a generic frame, although again this would depend on the 
technical features of a specific VDI.  
Though structuring processes are constituted by six different conceptual processes – 
categorisation, regionalisation, normalisation, ritualisation, routinisation and stabilisation 
of resource transfers – only categorisation, regionalisation and routinisation are described, 
as only these are relevant for the purposes of Human-VDI interaction, with the rest only 
being possible as a result of self-awareness and inherent desires that are absent from the 
VDI.10 Categorisation is the first conceptual process, and is the one most directly linked 
                                                     
10  It would seem that this approach is dismissing the relevance of these concepts for the human interloc-
utor of the VDI. Such an argument could be made, but my view here is that normalisation, ritualisation 
and exchange of resource transfers do not play a role in interaction for the human interlocutor because 
they require a conscious interlocutor who desires to gain something in an interaction. Again, although 
some motivational aspects could be coded into the algorithm of the VDI, it is highly unlikely that 
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to the interactional process of generalised other / frame. Whereas a generalised other 
might emerge during the course of an interaction or might be assessed in the moment in 
which an interaction takes place, it is the category that is called upon and relied on once 
this assessment is done. A category, then, is a structure that is mutually agreed upon 
(whether in the moment or by relying on previous situations and on cultural references) 
and provides the definition of a situation. Social actors carry these categories in their 
stocks of knowledge, but for Turner, there is no reason to presume there are a limited 
number of categories. Instead, he argues that categories are of a general kind that are then 
fine-tuned according to the specific situation. Importantly, however, is that categorisation 
process is done not only in relation to the situation but also in relation to individuals, 
which are seen as representatives of categories of persons (Turner, 1988).  
Regionalisation as conceptual processes, in contrast, are mostly independent from 
previous elements of interactional processes and motivational processes, but provide fun-
damental inputs which the interactants must grapple with. In other words, while there are 
few effects on regionalisation processes from both interactional processes and motiva-
tional processes, these two are affected by regionalisation. Turner borrows Goffman’s 
(1956) ideas on the ecology and demography of interactions to state that structuring pro-
cesses are highly influenced by elements such as the physical settings in which the inter-
action occurs, the physical props that exist, how objects place constraints on the move-
ment in a given space, the number and distribution of individuals across the physical set-
tings, and the movement of people within this space. The ecological and demographic 
forces at play in an interaction, which constitute the regionalisation processes, circum-
scribe the dynamics of an interaction, as these forces constrain what can be considered 
appropriate lines of conduct by the interactants (Turner, 1988).  
If regionalisation processes focus on space and elements (both human and non-hu-
man) within that space, routinisation processes as part of structuring processes focus on 
time and its relation to space. According to Turner, “social structure depends upon ‘hab-
its’, or routinised behavioural sequences where, without great mental and interpersonal 
effort, actors do pretty much the same thing in time and space” (Turner, 1988, p.163). 
These behaviours become routine, customary and habitual for all the parties involved. 
                                                     
these have the same force as those of a real human being. In a sense, the VDI would mostly work to 
fulfil the wants of the human interlocutor, having no inherent needs itself. Another reason why these 
aspects are not addressed is that, for the purposes of this thesis, aspects of ritualisation and routinisa-
tion are better covered by the focus on the rituals and routines related to death and mourning as part 
of social and cultural activity than those of interaction in abstract.  
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Moreover, they are also punctuated by rituals. The customary nature of these behavioural 
sequences gives a degree of predictability to an interaction (Turner, 1988).  
Structuring processes of categorisation, regionalisation and routinisation in Human-
VDI interaction would arguably be the most similar to human-to-human interaction. In 
Human-VDI interaction, categories would mostly be predetermined, and would in most 
cases consist of a personal category that establishes the personal relationship between the 
VDI and the human interlocutor, and a general category for any person who is not one of 
the intended human interlocutors. Even in institutional settings, the categories would be 
predetermined by design but allow for certain improvisational movements, so the VDI 
would have more flexibility to adapt to different contexts (the information of which would 
already be part of its algorithm). Categories, in a sense, are also the concept which link 
the microsocial processes of interaction with the macro level concepts like discourse and 
social structure. Certain discursive constructions might manifest themselves via catego-
ries, which then contribute to define (at least in the beginning) the meaning of an interac-
tion. In the context of Human-VDI interaction, general elements of such discourses could 
be coded into the algorithm of the VDI, and would constitute the general category and the 
improvisational part of the personal category that is activated when the VDI interacts with 
its human interlocutor. Similarly, these discourses, when viewed as constitutive of the 
algorithm of software-based entities such as the VDI, would be what enable these tech-
nological devices to attribute meaning to the verbal expressions (and, to some extent, 
corporeal expressions) of its human interlocutor. 
Regionalisation and routinisation may or may not appear in any given VDI, depend-
ing on the specifics of its technical capabilities. Assuming an advanced VDI that is able 
to interact with elements of the physical environment and is not limited to software set-
tings unable to be modified by the human interlocutor, regionalisation and routinisation 
processes would also need to be coded as part of the algorithm of the VDI. With region-
alisation, the VDI would not only be able to navigate in certain physical spaces and per-
ceive its properties, but also engage in meaningful interaction with these elements. It can 
be hypothesised that regionalisation processes would enable the VDI to understand the 
meaning of the physical settings it finds itself in, and in consequence facilitate an appro-
priate response from it, such as casual or comforting responses if in a private setting or 
formal or authoritative responses if in an institutional setting. Similarly, with routinisation 
processes as part of its algorithm, the VDI could engage in interaction that continues rou-
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tines the human interlocutor had with the original (now deceased) individual if pro-
grammed in such a way. Alternatively, the VDI’s algorithm could be designed in such a 
way as to avoid routinisation processes and only become activated in special, significant 
or urgent circumstances. In any case, in advanced VDIs, both regionalisation and routini-
sation processes have a role to play.  
Turner’s (1988) interdisciplinary perspective to building his theoretical model of so-
cial interaction presents a real strength, as it illustrates that apparently simple and basic 
phenomena such as social interaction between individuals are actually quite complex and 
require that both interactants share the same social construction of the world, their sur-
rounding environment and a compatible discourse. Moreover, his interdisciplinary ap-
proach to conceptualising social interaction supports the interdisciplinary approach taken 
in this thesis: if human-to-human social interaction requires interdisciplinary analysis and 
conceptualisation, Human-VDI interaction would require even more disciplines and the-
oretical insights from different fields of study to be involved in its analysis.  
To summarise the insights from social interaction as conceptualised from a sociolog-
ical perspective and its relevance for Human-VDI interaction, it can be said the three 
processes – motivational, interactional, and structuring – that constitute social interaction 
appear in some form or another in Human-VDI interaction. Motivational processes are 
most relevant for the human interlocutor, although some basic motivational processes can 
be part of the VDI’s algorithm. Interactional processes are more applicable to both the 
VDI and its human interlocutor, even though the substance of some central concepts of 
interactional processes – mind and self – would differ when the VDI is the point of focus, 
as the VDI lacks consciousness and self-awareness. Particularly when it comes to the self, 
the self in display by the VDI is pure structure, deprived of its transitory components due 
to the fact that the VDI would only consist of the relational component (the digital per-
sona) of the original individual. Nevertheless, the relational component would likely be 
the one that links the VDI to its expected main human interlocutors, and not just a rela-
tional component in the abstract. The structuring processes discussed – categorisation, 
regionalisation, and routinisation – seem to be the most similar for the human interlocutor 
and the VDI, with these being likely coded in the VDI’s algorithm similarly to how they 
are stored in the stocks of knowledge of living human beings.  
With these considerations of the similarities and differences between human-to-hu-
man interaction and Human-VDI interaction, it is possible to foresee that, while interact-
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ing with a VDI could still be limited by a low-level of sophistication of the VDI’s algo-
rithm, the evolution in creating socially successful algorithms (Augello et al., 2016) could 
lead to VDIs displaying convincing motivational, interactional and structuring processes 
that allow them to perform successful social interactions with human interlocutors. If this 
is the case, then despite the lack of human traits such as imagination and self-awareness, 
the social skills of a VDI would be quite advanced and Human-VDI interaction could 
indeed be considered social interaction.  
3.2.2 Interaction between humans and social algorithmic entities 
Given the expected differences between human-to-human interaction and Human-VDI 
interaction as described above, some insights related to the interaction between humans 
and social algorithmic entities are needed. An algorithmic entity is any kind of identifiable 
unit which performs one or more algorithms autonomously (that is, without human in-
volvement)11, but in this thesis a social algorithmic entity is defined as that which is able 
to interact meaningfully with human beings and other elements in their environment. In 
this sense, a social algorithmic entity could be anything from a pure software agent within 
a videogame which performs actions without involvement from the human player to a 
cleaning robot. Taking this definition as a starting point, the way a human being interacts 
with some embodied social algorithmic entities (that is, one which takes any form of em-
bodiment recognised by human beings) should be examined to identify relevant factors 
that affect the way the interaction unfolds. The review will be centred mostly on human-
robot interaction, with some robots being instances of social algorithmic entities, although 
it will be complemented with some insights from interaction between humans and other 
forms of social algorithmic entities.  
In their study of domestic robots, Young et al. (2009) reason that subjective consumer 
expectations of what robots are, how they work and of their technical capabilities and 
limitations condition the extent to which robots are treated as social entities. More im-
portantly, however, they point to the fact that the way these elements are understood re-
quire a thorough understanding of robots’ embeddedness within social interactions, insti-
tutions and hierarchies. In that sense, the authors’ arguments support the sociological ap-
proach to social interaction, as they believe that expectations on robots’ social nature are 
                                                     
11  This definition, however, is not universal, with the term varying from the definition given here which 
is a more technical definition to the definition that grants some specific forms of algorithms legal 
rights and responsibilities. For this second definition, see LoPucki (2018).  
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shaped by the context in which the interactions take place. In particular, interactional and 
structuring processes would seem to play a more prominent role in shaping the expecta-
tions of people regarding the social nature of robots, as the first would allow for a display 
of behaviours that would make the robot appear to behave socially and the second would 
enable it to navigate through social situations and contexts with some degree of compe-
tence.  
Robots, by virtue of their embodiment and the fact that they occupy a physical space, 
make them a good proxy for advanced forms of VDIs, which would be expected to rec-
reate human features more closely than less advanced forms. Young et al. (2009) argue 
that robots’ capacity to display varying degrees of autonomy and intelligence, coupled 
with the fact that they can react and physically alter spaces also inhabited by people make 
users respond to them as if they were living entities. However, their non-human nature 
and the medium of communicating with them also requires that users learn new interac-
tion styles, such as delivering specific voice commands or interacting with them via re-
mote controls or software-based interfaces.  
What specific meanings are associated to robots are, however, not only conditioned 
by their technical capabilities and their embodiment, but also by social activity and cul-
tural background (McNally and Inayatullah, 1988; Bijker, 1993; Bijker et al., 2012). 
Meaning in relation to technology is partially created by how people think they are sup-
posed to interact with a specific technological device, as well as how it will (or should) 
be integrated into their lives. These expectations are constituted throughout time by per-
sonal history, education and age, but also by shared social and cultural frames, which are 
in turn affected by issues of gender, class, the specific institutional structures of a society 
and the communication mechanisms available. Hence, although individual experiences 
with technology can affect a person’s disposition towards specific technological devices, 
more broadly it can be stated that “technology has a socially-embedded meaning in the 
sense that how an individual shapes his or her understanding of a technology is directly 
linked to evolution in prevailing social attitudes” (Young et al., 2009, p. 97).  
 The study of Young et al. (2009) highlights the role of theoretical insights from so-
cial psychology in providing tentative interpretive schema for making sense of human-
sociable robot interaction, which to some degree can be applicable to Human-VDI inter-
action as well. The most important theory for this research is the Theory of Planned Be-
haviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991; Madden et al., 1992). TPB posits that control over a tech-
nological artifact and the perceived safety of using it are the main drivers for adoption. 
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Crucially, Young et al. (2009) consider a decisive factor to be the intersection of users’ 
skill sets and the perceived required skills to operate a robot, with matches between both 
encouraging adoption of a technology. What is considered safe or not varies according to 
the intended purposes of the robot and the form it takes, with larger robots on which the 
human is dependent often being considered less safe in relation to smaller robots that do 
not interfere with human activities.  
When relating this to Human-VDI interaction, the match of actual skill sets and per-
ceived required skill sets might not be an issue, considering that behaving in a humanlike 
manner is one of the goals of the VDI. As such, having a skill set that allows communi-
cation between humans either in physical presence to each other or via some technologi-
cal medium is likely to be present in most potential users, and applicable without many 
changes to interacting with a VDI. However, whether the VDI can physically interact 
with the human interlocutors or not might be one of the most contentious issues. If it can 
physically interact with the human interlocutor and its surroundings, then it is likely that 
it can mimic more closely the original individual whom it is based on. However, a robot 
replica of the deceased individual might also pose some danger to the human interlocu-
tor’s safety in case of malfunction, or at least generate the impression of potential danger. 
As such, pure software-based forms might be considered safer and, in consequence, po-
tential users might be more willing to adopt them or try them out.  
Given that the study of Young et al. (2009) provides insights about how people be-
have around sociable robots, which have physical embodiments, the behaviour of people 
around social algorithmic entities which do not have a physical manifestation needs to be 
addressed as well. In the case of pure software based social algorithmic entities, human 
behaviour to them responds to whether they exhibit humanlike behaviour. In the case of 
social bots on social networking sites, early bots were easily identifiable as non-human 
algorithmic entities, and once it became habitual to spot their characteristic behaviour, 
discerning users of social networking sites mostly ignored them. However, these have 
increased their sophistication in the last decade, with some of them being able to “engage 
in more complex types of interactions, such as entertaining conversations with other peo-
ple, commenting on their posts, and answering their questions” (Ferrara et al., 2016). In 
these cases, the difference between a human being and a social algorithmic entity be-
comes blurred, and it can be argued that the capacity to distinguish one from the other is 
diminished because the interactions in social networking sites are deprived of common 
features of human interaction where the interactants are in physical presence with each 
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other. Specifically, the lack of any discernible form of embodiment and unique voice and 
speech patterns which could be easily identifiable in physical interaction are absent in 
most habitual forms of interaction within social networking sites.  
Neff and Nagy (2016) argue that technology users’ power of imagination is funda-
mental, with people ascribing disembodied social algorithmic entities rationality and hu-
man features: “users often assign agency and personality to chat bots, at least until the 
algorithms behind chat bots make notable social gaffes” (Neff and Nagy, 2016, p. 4927). 
Borrowing on Scheff’s (1990) ideas on talk and bodily communication and ritual, it is 
possible to see that the ritualistic element of social interaction which provides a constitu-
tive and structuring effect of societal dynamics is weakened by the disappearance of ele-
ments of talk and of bodily communication when interacting with basic forms of social 
algorithmic entities, as text-based communication is the most prevalent form of interac-
tion (at least in the present). The sense of inclusion in the rituals of everyday talk and 
bodily communication is weakened as well, with elements of disruption becoming more 
noticeable when the social algorithmic entities malfunction. In other words, absent the 
characteristic human features when interacting in a virtual medium, close mimicry of hu-
man behaviour by social algorithmic entities becomes more relevant, with errors in the 
algorithms’ output which are expressed as behaviour generating a greater sense of disrup-
tion and bringing to light the differences between the human beings and the social algo-
rithmic entity.  
The possibility of moments of disruption derived from errors that break the illusion 
of interacting with another human being suggest that social algorithmic entities without 
characteristic human features such as embodiment and voice are likely to be considered 
by the users as technological artifacts and not living entities. This supports the idea that 
less humanlike forms of the VDI, such as pure software which lack features associated 
with human beings, might be considered technological artifacts as well by its human in-
terlocutors. The interaction with them would probably adjust accordingly, with an under-
lying awareness that the VDI is neither a living entity nor the deceased individual it mim-
ics changing the human interlocutor’s behaviour towards it.   
To recapitulate, the insights from the studies centred on the interaction between hu-
mans and social algorithmic entities and from social psychology as applied to human-
computer interaction raise attention to the likelihood that the expectations about VDIs 
from their human interlocutors are likely to be shaped by the actual skill sets of the human 
interlocutors and the perceived skill sets to successfully engage in safe interaction with 
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the VDI. Control over the perceived safety of the technological artifact, as proposed by 
TPB, is also important in this regard.   
A further notion to consider is how similar the VDI is expected to be to a human 
being or, alternatively, how much it is understood as a non-human entity. The specific 
medium of communication is likely to be the determining factor here, with more human-
like forms of the VDI (such as humanlike robots, which could even mimic the appearance 
of the deceased) being considered social entities and human interlocutors behaving to-
wards them as if they were true human beings, or at least given some form of personhood 
status when embedded in other social practices. In contrast, a VDI which is pure software, 
lacks features that resemble human beings or is confined to an application within a per-
sonal computer or a program within another device would likely be considered non-hu-
man, and thus behaviour towards it would differ from that of human-to-human interac-
tion. These two contrasts are extremes, however, and common forms of the VDI might 
incorporate some human features (such as embodied avatars) and lack others (such as 
being able to affect the physical world where the human interlocutor resides). Hence, in 
general terms, human behaviour towards such VDIs is likely to resemble interaction be-
tween humans in some aspects and quite different in others, although this will vary person 
to person and according to the technical features of a specific VDI.  
3.2.3 Posthumous interaction and imagined interaction: conceptual considerations 
The concepts of posthumous interaction and imagined interaction are relevant for two 
reasons. The first is that any form of Human-VDI interaction is also, by definition, a 
posthumous interaction, given that the data used to create the VDI is that of a deceased 
individual. Whether gathered before or after the death of the original individual, such data 
constitutes the foundation for any technologically mediated interaction between living 
people and the deceased. It can also be argued that a posthumous interaction is, in addition 
to being a real interaction on its own, an imagined interaction when the aim is interacting 
with the deceased, and not with the VDI as a partial component of who the deceased was 
when alive (the digital persona of the deceased, if they had one, could become part of the 
VDI’s constitutive data). The second reason is that the data gathered for this thesis is not 
that of actual, current Human-VDI interaction. Instead, it is based on imagined interac-
tions in the time horizon of 2040 between the interviewees and their imagined version of 
a VDI. As such, the ontological features of an imagined interaction should be discussed.  
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Carvalho Pereira and Maciel (2013) approach the topic of interacting with the dead 
via internet-based technological systems, and define the concept of posthumous interac-
tion as that which occurs between a system and a deceased person’s data, or between 
users and the deceased person’s data via a system. It is posthumous as it occurs after the 
death event of a person whose data is online. The authors claim that interacting with a 
dead person’s photograph in social networking sites can be considered an instance of 
posthumous interaction, albeit in a significantly restricted form. However, it is possible 
that technology not only enables but also promotes more complex forms of interaction 
with the deceased based on their digital assets (Massimi and Baecker, 2010; Massimi et 
al, 2011; Meese et al., 2015).  
The reasons for engaging in posthumous interaction vary. Some have been covered 
in the Death Studies literature, but other aspects should be emphasised. For instance, in 
Carvalho Pereira’s and Maciel’s study in Brazil (2013), missing the user and seeking 
comfort were the reasons most commonly given by users who decided to engage in post-
humous interaction, mostly through online mourning practices in social networking sites. 
Their study also supports the idea that the deceased’s online profile could be functional 
for memorial purposes. More interesting is the fact that some of the survey respondents 
view keeping online profiles and data related to the deceased as a means of eternalisation. 
This suggests that the digital personas of the deceased are understood as some form of 
symbolic immortality: the deceased may be gone, but the relational component of their 
personhood remains. Though their definition of posthumous interaction encompasses 
both static and dynamic data, it is possible to speculate that data given some degree of 
agency by their technological medium could strengthen the claim of eternalisation of in-
dividuals through digital means.  
In contrast to posthumous interaction, which is a real form of interaction in the sense 
of corresponding with real world events even if the elements with which the human in-
teracts are non-living, imagined interaction is not a real form of interaction that has cor-
respondence with real world events. Instead, imagined interaction is “a process of social 
cognition, whereby actors imagine and therefore indirectly experience themselves in in-
teraction with others. Imagined interactions are a form of intrapersonal communication 
in which talking activity is related to the achievement of some intentional, social commu-
nicative goal” (Honeycutt et al., 1990, p. 1). Emphasis should be made here on the aspect 
of intrapersonal communication: the goal here is not to relay a message to another party, 
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but implicitly to oneself – to clarify elements of thought, role-taking and anticipate re-
sponses when in future interaction with others. 
The fact that the dialogues occurring in an imagined interaction are internal to a per-
son does not imply that they lack complexity. Indeed, imagined interactions can possess 
“many of the same characteristics as real conversations in that they maybe fragmentary, 
extended, rambling, repetitive, or coherent” (Honeycutt, 2003, p. 13). As such, it is im-
portant to sketch out some features of imagined interactions. Firstly, their form and se-
quence might resemble quite closely those of real conversations, although they may also 
differ in having repeated sequences with alternative choices being made, become overly 
one-sided, and are usually focused on significant members in a person’s network, with 
interactions with strangers being rare. Second, imagined interactions are central to devel-
oping and maintaining a sense of self. Thirdly, because imagined interactions are in-
stances of intrapersonal communication (as opposed to actual interactions, which are in-
stances of interpersonal communication), they help in the identification of one’s own feel-
ings and in being honest with oneself, particularly when it revolves around solving con-
tradictory values and wants. Moreover, an imagined interaction might offer perspective 
to the person imagining it, particularly if he/she is at a loss of how to deal with an issue 
or is undecided about alternatives that matter to him/her. Furthermore, and perhaps more 
interesting for this study, is that the other person in an imagined interaction is a represen-
tation for an aspect of the self, one that may be suppressed or unconscious due to it arising 
negative associations (such as shame or guilt) (Rosenblatt and Meyer, 1986; Honeycutt 
et al., 2015).  
Two aspects worth highlighting regarding imagined interactions is their role for so-
cial cognition and their role in relation to images of the future, as both of these can clarify 
how they relate to the Futures Studies field. Though some of these elements are also ex-
plored in the literature review from the Futures Studies field, it is important to provide 
clearer linkages between an imagined interaction, social cognition and an image of the 
future. Firstly, taking the stance of the Critical Futures Studies field, “the future can be 
interpreted not only as something that will materialize as time passes but also as some-
thing that already exists in the present, both in people’s thoughts and emotions” (Hideg, 
2002, p. 287). In that sense, the future is both a form of cognitive interpretation and an 
emotional attitude towards its content. Moreover, the fact that foresight is an inherently 
human capacity (Slaughter, 1990; Slaughter, 1996; Hideg, 2002) suggests that it is an 
ability related to imagination, something which only the human species is known to have 
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developed in an advanced state. These facts hint towards the fact that imagined interac-
tions and foresight capacities originate from the same source: human imagination.  
In addition to their originating source, similarities in terms of their ontological nature 
can be identified. Presenting a taxonomy of prospection, Szpunar et al. (2014) identify 
four forms of future thinking: simulation, prediction, intention, and planning. Simulation 
is the mode of thinking that can arguably encompass imagined interactions: simulation, 
in its episodic manifestation, is the ability to construct a mental representation of a spe-
cific future autobiographical event; imagined interactions, similarly, are mental construc-
tions which develop a script that visualizes behaviour between oneself and a significant 
other, and are typically of short duration (Edwards et al., 1988; Szpunar et al., 2014). 
Images of the future also present similarities to imagined interactions: 1) plurality, insofar 
as images of the future present different alternatives of a future state while imagined in-
teractions present different alternatives of the flow of an interaction situation; 2) episodic 
features, given that images of the future typically represent a snapshot of a potential future 
state without delving into its past events while an imagined interaction can take the form 
of vignettes or representations of events of short duration; and 3) emotionally-conditioned 
settings, with fears and hopes being mixed with analytical projections in images of the 
future and imagined interactions being emotionally charged as a result of the interactants 
having emotional attachments to the other (Bell and Mau, 1971; Rosenblatt and Meyer, 
1986; Edwards et al., 1988; Rubin, 2013). Given these similarities, as well as the role 
imagined interactions play for those who experience them, it can be argued that imagined 
interactions set in the future can be considered an instance of images of the future, with 
the main differences being the prominent elements in display within both. 
This review on posthumous interaction and imagined interaction allows for the char-
acterisation of imagined interactions with a VDI as particular instances of images of the 
future with very specific characteristics. First, it is a posthumous interaction, given that 
the original individual which the VDI is simulating to be would have died by the moment 
of the interaction. Second, as images of the future, it is possible that the focus of the 
cognitive construct is not on the changes in the surrounding environment, but on the 
changes the self and its networks of social contacts have experienced, with the main dif-
ference being the status of the other main interactant from living to dead (hence his/her 
recreation with the VDI). Another particularity of imagined Human-VDI interactions as 
images of the future resides in its overtly personal significance: while an image of the 
future reflects hopes, fears and expectations about the future, an imagined Human-VDI 
84 
 
interaction involves dealing with the death of a person of relevance to the personal lives 
of the human interlocutor. Having to deal with death in this manner also incorporates an 
element of mortality to the Human-VDI interactions as images of the future that images 
of the future centred on other things are unlikely to include explicitly in their content. 
Having discussed these features, it becomes clear that the imagined Human-VDI interac-
tions obtained from interviews can be understood as (contingent) images of individual 
futures, with their ideal types in this thesis abstracting their common features and inte-
grating them with other elements, thus generating more general ways in which people can 
interact with VDIs. In this sense, the ideal types might more closely resemble the images 
of the future usually seen in Futures Studies literature.  
3.2.4 Conclusion to Interaction Studies sub-section 
The insights from the Interaction Studies field offer innovative ways of conceptualising 
and analysing Human-VDI interaction as it could possibly occur in the time horizon of 
2040. Literature from sociological approaches to social interaction, from interaction be-
tween humans and social algorithmic entities and from posthumous and imagined inter-
action accentuate the fact that software-based social entities can interact meaningfully 
with human beings given some conditions, which vary from the degree to which their 
technical capabilities allow them to replicate human behaviour to the fact that their spe-
cific medium of communication places influences the willingness of some people to in-
teract with them. The review of this field is helpful in characterising the phenomenon at 
the core of the images of the future in this thesis as social interaction between people and 
VDIs, despite the differences between a person and a VDI as social actors.  
The sociological approach to social interaction highlighted motivational, interac-
tional and structuring processes that shape the nature of the interaction between humans. 
Of these processes, motivational processes appear to be the most difficult for a VDI to 
achieve given its lack of self-awareness and inherent motivation, whereas a VDI can rep-
licate most elements of interactional processes (albeit with some differences) and have 
some of the structuring processes coded as part of its algorithm. As such, although the 
technical capabilities of the VDI might reach a quite advanced level by 2040, some fun-
damental differences would remain inasmuch as the self-awareness component is missing 
from a VDI. This, however, does not imply that the VDI algorithm cannot offer a mean-
ingful interactive situation for its human interlocutors and, consequently, have an effect 
on how they relate to death and to mourning, as the meaning attributed to an encounter 
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with the VDI is not solely dependent on its technical capabilities but also on context, 
personal history and the significance read into the VDI.  
Studies centred on interaction between humans and social algorithmic entities reveal 
that the perceived skills and the actual skills required to interact with a technological ar-
tifact and to control it are likely to influence the degree to which a VDI is viewed as a 
desirable technology. Similarly, such studies reinforce the argument that social and cul-
tural background affects the possible meaning assigned to a VDI, from more technologi-
cal to more humanlike. In addition, specific human features such as humanlike appear-
ance and the ability to interact with surrounding elements might increase the humanlike 
perception of the VDI, while disembodied, pure-software forms of the VDI might de-
crease such a perception. Human behaviours towards a VDI would likely vary according 
to these considerations.  
Finally, the concepts of posthumous interaction and imagined interaction allow for 
further characterisation of Human-VDI interaction. Posthumous interaction is the result 
of interacting with the digital data left behind by the deceased individual, which in this 
case could manifest itself in the form of the VDI. Imagined interaction was seen to be an 
instance of images of the future due to its ontological properties and similarities, both 
being cognitive constructs that allow for plural outcomes of a same event. The data gath-
ered for this thesis combines these two concepts, with posthumous interaction being im-
agined by the interviewees whose data serves as the inputs for generating the ideal types 
of the images of the future of Human-VDI interaction. The particularity of imagined Hu-
man-VDI interactions as images of the future resides in its overtly personal significance: 
while an image of the future reflects hopes, fears and expectations about the future, an 
imagined Human-VDI interaction involves dealing with the death of a person of relevance 
to the personal lives of the human interlocutor. 
3.3 Social practice theory and the wider context for Human-VDI interaction  
Social practice theory suggests the co-constitution of social structure and human behav-
iour, aiming to disentangle and understand the beliefs, values, lifestyles and tastes that 
coalesce in the concept of a practice: routinised forms of behaviour that that link together 
physical and mental activity with the objects in the surrounding environment and their 
uses by social actors (Shove et al., 2012; Sovacool and Hess, 2017). This embeddedness 
of technological artifacts within routinised behaviour of the actors is central to the study 
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of Human-VDI interaction: as opposed to social interaction between humans, the techno-
logical component in Human-VDI interaction requires that more attention is given to the 
different meanings associated to the VDI in the context of an interaction. Equally central 
to the study of images of the future of Human-VDI interaction is examining how the VDI 
becomes an element of routinised behaviour, with some interactions between humans and 
VDIs not being particularly meaningful in some contexts and forming part of the every-
day activities of the human interlocutors. In other contexts, however, these interactions 
might take on a more meaningful note, but the interactions are themselves part of different 
routinised activities. It is also important to explore how social practices involving the VDI 
might be enabled or limited by the affordances of technologies and other practices, as 
these might give more or less freedom to the human interlocutor.  
The social actors involved in a practice perform roles and behave according to pre-
defined expectations about the behaviour of other social actors, the environment they are 
in, the possible behaviour enabled by the objects present in the surrounding environment 
and the social norms that are expected in such a setting (Reckwitz, 2002; Augello et al., 
2018a). Although a practice is constituted by numerous elements from the more tangible 
and identifiable at the micro-level to the more abstract and conceptualised at the macro-
level, theorists of social practices (Reckwitz, 2002; Shove et al., 2012; Sovacool and 
Hess, 2017; Burger et al., 2019) have categorised them into four themes: 1) Materials/ma-
terialities (objects, technological devices, tangible tools and instruments and other mate-
rial items); 2) competences (skill sets, habits, explicit and implicit knowledge, tech-
niques); 3) meanings (ideas, signifiers, symbols, emotional displays, cognitive constructs, 
fears and hopes); and 4) connections (a temporal dimension that illustrates processes of 
emergence, persistence, transformation and disappearance of practices).  
From these elements, it is possible to see compatibilities with both social interaction 
theory and Post-Marxist discourse theory. Social interactions involve, to varying degrees, 
materials, competences and meanings, with connections being mostly absent due to the 
fact that social interaction theory focuses mostly on single encounters. Social practice 
theory fills this gap by integrating into the analysis the routinisation of those encounters 
over time. Post-Marxist discourse theory, in turn, highlights the role of symbolic systems 
of meaning and how they shape competences and materials. But Post-Marxist discourse 
theory also incorporates connections of social practices: they emerge via political logics, 
persist by social and fantasmatic logics, and are transformed by opposing political logics. 
Because of these compatibilities, it can be stated that an analysis that requires focus on 
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social interaction, discourse and social practice will not face theoretical contradictions; 
rather, what changes in the analysis is the specific lens adopted at some moments for the 
examination of the phenomenon under scrutiny.  
Social practices, due to the vast number of elements involved, often require the in-
corporation of insights from other methodological approaches for data gathering and data 
analysis. Research projects that combine ethnographic approaches with the filtering of 
data through micro-episodes and a zooming in/ zooming out process have used social 
practice theory to get detailed descriptions of how particular technologies are used and 
what meaning is given to them by social actors (Emerson, 2007; Nicolini, 2009; Burger 
et al., 2019). This indicates that other analytical perspectives and methods might be em-
ployed to disentangle the elements of a social practice and establish their relevance.  
Due to the current limitations in technology for the development of complex VDIs 
and the rarity of current Human-VDI interactions, an ethnographic study of social prac-
tices centred on Human-VDI interaction would have been impossible. For such purposes, 
a future-oriented approach is preferred, where interviews that encouraged imagination 
processes were the primary source of data, and images of the future being the conceptual 
category which allow for meaningful discussion of social practices related to interaction 
with complex forms of the VDI. Concerning Human-VDI interaction as a social practice, 
it can be speculated that the material aspect (in this case, the technical features of the 
VDI) would have a primary role in the meaning that the human interlocutors associate 
with the VDI in the first instance. This supports the insights from the literature on inter-
action between humans and social algorithmic entities, which suggest that more human-
like forms of the VDI (which would have human physical embodiment and move in the 
physical world) would likely be regarded as having almost human status, and those forms 
less identifiable as human (such as text-based software confined to a technological de-
vice) would likely be regarded as non-human. However, broader discursive pressures 
which imbue some practices with specific meaning should also be considered if a refined 
account of meaning is to take place.  
Meaning in the social practices would also be shaped by the context in which it is 
taking place, with the home or private spaces likely encouraging more personal and inti-
mate relations with the VDI, while public spaces would encourage more distant and for-
mal behaviours in Human-VDI interaction. Competences would need to be assessed 
based on the technical features of the VDI as well and the acquired knowledge of tech-
nology use by the human interlocutors. However, judging by the state of current Human-
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VDI interaction, the competences required are not likely to be complex, with natural lan-
guage and simple controls being preferred to maintain the flow of the interaction. Finally, 
although the concept of images of the future would seem to downplay the connections 
between practices, given their episodic nature, aspects of routinisation might be inter-
preted from the words used by the interviewees. As such, Post-Marxist discourse theory 
might complement at times the analysis of social practices centred around Human-VDI 
interaction by highlighting the signifiers and their meaning, which might otherwise be 
absent from the study given the lack of experiential accounts of such a practice. 
Social practices with Human-VDI interaction as their core activity could, in princi-
ple, be envisioned as taking place in a societal context where advanced digital technolo-
gies are highly integrated into everyday life. These social practices focused on Human-
VDI interaction can be expected to be enabled, or at least significantly facilitated by, other 
social practices which are centred on monitoring, registering and analysing data. People 
could either willingly generate data for personal, social and institutional forces, or data-
producing practices could be forced upon them by the prevailing technological systems, 
cultural perceptions, and the dominant economic and political institutions. These social 
practices could therefore be described as obeying a paradigmatic vision of datafication, 
wherein the dominant actors in a social and cultural setting would believe that everything 
can be reduced and recreated through data, and consequently promote practices that pro-
duce data in order to monitor and manage social behaviour. Datafication as expressed in 
a multitude of practices coalescing around the idea of generating data could give rise to 
the development of the VDI as a desired technological artifact in a given context, as the 
personality, speech patterns, physical features and other personal characteristics of the 
deceased individual would be codified, incorporated into the device of the VDI and dis-
played in performance with its human interlocutors. 
Datafication would likely not act on its own for the creation of the VDI and its inte-
gration into everyday life, however. The central role that industry and technology corpo-
rations currently occupy is also sustained by a deeper and broader capitalist discourse, 
which operates according to a social logic of commodification, in this case of human 
activity and its associated data produced when it intersects with the online domain sup-
ported by the internet (Campbell and Carlson, 2002; Kang and McAllister, 2011; Bottis 
and Bouchagiar, 2018; Crain, 2018). Capitalism as a (discursive) system would likely be 
the wider context under which datafication operates, at least in the time horizon of 2040. 
Unless there is a challenge to hegemonic capitalist discourse, it can be speculated that this 
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is also the discourse from which some social practices related to Human-VDI interaction 
would emerge, particularly those where people are viewed in terms of their instrumental 
value.  
Datafication is likely to support immortality-favouring discourses as well. Under that 
frame, a VDI could potentially be thought of as replacing the relational component of the 
deceased person, given that the VDI would be constituted by data gathered from the de-
ceased before the death event occurred. As such, questions of whether the VDI could 
usher thoughts of replaceability of the deceased by technological means should be con-
sidered as ethical concerns if or when the development of such a technological artifact is 
in process.  
3.4 Conclusion to the interdisciplinary literature review: a sensitising scheme 
The intention of this interdisciplinary literature review was to provide an overview of the 
theoretical foundations to conceptualise social practices of Human-VDI interaction and 
comprehend their thematic underpinnings and importance for personal, social and cultural 
life. It identified possible motivations of the social actors involved, likely (though contin-
gent) outcomes, structural pressures influencing behavioural patterns and the co-consti-
tution of technology and social life. By now, the positioning of Human-VDI interaction 
at the centre of Death Studies, Interaction Studies, and social practice theory has hope-
fully been argued successfully. However, a model which allows for the meaningful anal-
ysis and discussion of the social practices of Human-VDI interaction in 2040 featured in 
the images of the future in this thesis still needs to be developed.  
For this reason, inspiration has been taken from Turner (1988) regarding the use of a 
sensitising scheme that allows for the characterisation of complex social phenomena con-
stituted by a set of interrelated elements. For analytical purposes, the most clearly linked 
concepts will be presented as part of this sensitising scheme. This does not mean that it is 
a faithful representation of the social practices of the Human-VDI interaction phenome-
non. Rather, the sensitising scheme allows for meaningful observations to be made be-
tween different forms of Human-VDI interaction as integrated into social life in the im-
ages of the future which serve as the core of this thesis.   
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Figure 1: Social practices of Human-VDI interaction.  
Figure 1 shows the sensitising scheme which integrates several of the concepts and in-
sights reviewed in this chapter. It presents Human-VDI interaction as a form of social 
interaction that, as repeated over time, becomes a social practice. Such social practice 
integrates the elements from social practice theory (materials, meanings, competences 
and connections) that are involved in Human-VDI interaction. As Human-VDI interac-
tion becomes routinised and hence becomes a social practice, its thematic content – which 
focuses on death and mourning – characterises it as a social practice with undercurrents 
of death and mourning which intersects with and forms part of a broader constellation of 
social practices that are also death- and mourning-focused.12  
The sensitising scheme of Figure 1 can be read by following the order of the numbers, 
starting from 1 and ending at 3. Number 1 points to the phenomenon of Human-VDI 
interaction, expressed in Figure 1 via the rectangle in bold at the centre. This is a social 
phenomenon that constitutes the core activity of social practices focused on the VDI, 
which by nature are also dealing with death and mourning. The three processes of social 
interaction – motivational, interactional and structuring – are present, although they are 
                                                     
12  That social practices centred on Human-VDI interaction are focused on death and mourning might be 
a point of contention. Opponents to such a characterisation might argue that Human-VDI interaction 
is actually focused on life and continuity, given what the effects it has on the human subjects. Under 
some circumstances and frames, I would agree with this interpretation, but I would argue that even 
then such practices are still centred on death and mourning precisely because death is the necessary 
event for such practices to emerge (indeed, for the creation of the VDI), and because the practices 
only acquire meaning in relation to death and mourning. If it were otherwise, it would be like any 
other kind of practices that involve living individuals.  
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transformed as a result of the limitations of the VDI: 1) the lack of an inherent motivation 
which, to some extent, could be coded; 2) the differences in the manifestation of the con-
cepts of mind, self and role-taking for the VDI within interactional processes; and 3) the 
lack of some structuring processes and the possible rigidity of the remaining structuring 
processes (categorisation, regionalisation and routinisation) which constitute part of the 
code of the VDI.  
Number 2 points to the social practices themselves that involve the VDI, phenomena 
which is expressed via the large ellipse surrounded by two arrows (which aim to convey 
the performative dimension of the social practices) and with several smaller ellipses at-
tached with lines. Human-VDI interaction, even in a single encounter, involves the pres-
ence, display and interpretation of the different elements of a social practice: materials, 
competences, meanings and connections. As Human-VDI interaction goes beyond single 
encounters, becomes a routinised behaviour and is integrated as part of everyday life 
and/or regularly scheduled activities, it becomes a social practice. As a social practice, 
Human-VDI interaction could take place beyond the confines of the home and become 
embedded in institutional contexts and in networks of social relations whose focus is not 
explicitly related to death, but which nonetheless form part of the Death-constituted so-
ciety, following Seale’s (1998) argument.  
Specific materials, competences, meanings and connections would be involved in 
social practices whose core activity is Human-VDI interaction. In Figure 1, these four 
concepts are expressed as ellipses surrounding the rectangle of Human-VDI interaction, 
within the circle of death- and mourning-focused social practices involving the VDI. The 
ellipses outside, formed by different patterns of dots and dashes, present specific exam-
ples of these concepts as they manifest when performing a social practice. Materials, rep-
resented in Figure 1 in ellipses formed by squared dots, would involve hardware and soft-
ware currently associated with high-end electronics, and the medium of communication 
between the VDI and its human interlocutor would be partially composed by these mate-
rials. In many cases, the VDI’s software would incorporate the original (now deceased) 
individual’s relational component or digital persona, as such an element would have ex-
tensive data related to the digital identity of the deceased. However, the materials in Hu-
man-VDI interaction need not be limited to only those that facilitate the interaction, as 
other materials (objects, instruments, tools, features of the spatial design and so on) would 
be found in the setting of the interaction and could be used and/or affected by the human 
interlocutor, other social actors and, in some cases, the VDI itself.  
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For Human-VDI interaction to take place, a set of competences, represented in Figure 
1 in ellipses formed by dashes, are needed on the part of the human interlocutors. This is 
because the human interlocutors must know how to use the materials comprising the me-
dium of communication and be able to navigate an interface that allows for interaction. 
Moreover, given that Human-VDI interaction requires the deployment of social and cog-
nitive abilities inherent in social processes, such competences are not only related to how 
the human interlocutors engage with the materials during an interaction, but also to com-
munication and interpretative skills that they display during interaction with other people. 
Talk and bodily communication are instances of those skills, which according to Scheff 
(1990) strengthen the social bond and, in line with Seale (1998), orient the human inter-
locutors towards life and away from death. Furthermore, a level of cognitive and emo-
tional maturity should be expected from the human interlocutors. In other words, they 
should ultimately be able to recognise the VDI as a non-sentient entity, and as a replica 
of the deceased, not as the deceased himself or herself. Similarly, they should be capable 
of managing their emotions during an interaction, as an overwhelming emotional reaction 
to being in the presence of a VDI might make an interaction impossible or very difficult 
to sustain.  
Meanings related to the VDI and to the interaction itself are diverse. In Figure 1, 
these are expressed via ellipses formed by fine circular dots. It is likely these vary accord-
ing to cultural standards, personal history, and the predominant discourses and ideological 
frames in a given context. For illustrative purposes, different social practices with Hu-
man-VDI interaction at their centre could generate the meaning of an interaction with 
ancestors (though the human interlocutors may not explicitly refer to the VDI as such), 
the maintenance of a continuing bond, or a practice of generativity within a family or an 
institutional setting. There is, however, a different kind of meaning that can also emerge 
– not one attached to the interaction but to the VDI as a technological artifact. For exam-
ple, one range of meanings imparted to the VDI could vary from it being an inert techno-
logical instrument in one extreme and as a social entity in the other extreme. The meaning 
attached to the VDI would also affect the meaning attached to the ensuing interaction.  
Finally, illustrated in Figure 1 as ellipses formed by a pattern of dashes and dots, the 
element of connections relates to how the social practices of Human-VDI interaction con-
nect to other social practices in a given context. Preliminarily, it can be speculated that 
practices involving interaction with the VDI might connect to practices of commodifica-
tion in the capitalist system, with attempts to commodify human life and grief for profit-
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seeking purposes. This might result in services related to VDI development and enhance-
ment being valued in market terms. Parallelly, practices immersed in the paradigm of 
datafication can also intersect with those focused on Human-VDI interaction, as data-
producing and data-sharing practices might lead, intentionally or otherwise, to the crea-
tion of a digital persona which could be incorporated into a VDI’s algorithm. In short, 
these practices do have effects on the kind of practices involving Human-VDI interaction 
that might emerge and their process of emergence, despite being separate from them.  
Number 3 brings to light how death- and mourning-focused practices involving the 
VDI would acquire their meaning by being performed within a discourse that pursues 
immortality through technological means and which is radically contingent. This is best 
expressed by means of highlighting the discursive struggle between a Post-Mortalist dis-
course reliant on technology and alternative discourses (which are not present in Figure 
1). This is shown in Figure 1 by the line in bold that is touching the contours of the con-
nection practices and the larger ellipse, as well as by the smaller ellipse in bold which 
attaches itself to the larger ellipse and contains antagonistic discursive struggles. While 
these other discourses will be described later in the thesis, for now it is relevant to mention 
that these antagonistic discursive struggles might emerge as critiques to the practices of 
creating and interacting with a VDI, on one side, and the defence of these practices by 
developers and human interlocutors. Such critiques would be quite diverse: more “civil” 
instances could be public debates questioning Human-VDI interaction or open editorials 
in communication media, and more extreme examples might derive in industrial or tech-
nological sabotage.  
 
Figure 2: Social practices and images of the future within a Death-constituted society 
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Figure 2 is a continuation of Figure 1, locating the social practices of Human-VDI 
interaction within a broader context and within images of the future. For this reason, the 
sequence of explanation starts at Number 4. Number 4 highlights the different ideological 
structures, cultural myths and metaphors and other social practices that shape and are 
shaped by death- and mourning-related practices involving the VDI, and which are found 
in the Death-constituted society. These provide broader social and cultural influences that 
imbue with meaning the social practices of Human-VDI interaction, which are consider-
ably stable forces but in the long term are eroded or transformed.  
Finally, number 5 frames all of this as taking place within an image of the future, the 
analytical concept of Futures Studies used in this thesis, represented by the rectangle 
which contains all the previously described elements and is surrounded by two arrows 
(which aim to convey the continuous shaping and reshaping of images of the future in the 
process of imagining them). Although images of the future might not have sketched out 
all of these elements, by constructing ideal types of the images of the future based on 
interviewee data, some general features can be identified and described. Crucially, images 
of the future are not the result of pure and immanent creativity from those who imagine 
them: they also emerge from persons or groups who are immersed in discourse and have 
assimilated, consciously or unconsciously, cultural myths and metaphors that guide their 
actions. Similarly, they also emerge from within a Death-constituted society, and their 
content is influenced, to varying degrees, by this fact.  
This conceptualisation of Human-VDI interaction as the core activity of social prac-
tices centred death and mourning incorporates insights from the three fields of study re-
viewed in this chapter. The interdisciplinary view taken in this chapter allows social prac-
tices involving Human-VDI interaction to be understood, at least preliminarily, as spe-
cific yet complex social phenomena that display meanings associated to death and mor-
tality, and which brings into focus issues related to technology’s embeddedness into so-
cial practices that are immersed, to varying degrees, in discourses that promote certain 
forms of Post-Mortalism. As such, it highlights how technology enables social practices 
which strengthen, via their routinised performance, a discourse which aims to overcome 
limitations imposed by human mortality. 
This interdisciplinary approach to the literature review has also provided sound the-
oretical foundations for the following argument to be made: insofar as the VDI is regarded 
as a social (algorithmic) entity by its human interlocutors, Human-VDI interaction can 
indeed be regarded as interaction. Hence, the constitutive processes of Turner’s (1988) 
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conceptualisation of social interaction – motivational, interactional and structuring – are 
also constitutive of Human-VDI interaction, expressed to varying degrees according to 
the technical specificities of the VDI. This meaning could be attributed to Post-Mortalist 
discourse, which circles around signifiers and meanings related to overcoming death. But, 
as seen by the model and the literature review, other discourses may provide alternative 
meanings to the VDI.  
Moreover, emphasis should be made on the interdisciplinary value: by covering only 
one field, objections could be raised as to whether social practices involving the VDI 
would indeed count as interaction, or in relation to the decision to include technology in 
examining social practices. This interdisciplinary review shows that technology might 
grant greater agency to the dead in contemporary and future societies by giving them 
(limited) social agency within some contexts, and that some features of social interaction 
can be present even when the other interactant is not a person.  
As previously stated, this conceptualisation of the social practices of Human-VDI 
interaction as unfolding within images of the future is meant to offer an approach to mak-
ing sense of the meaning of those practices and how they orient subjects in their confron-
tation with mortality and in facing the loss of others. This grants the possibility to study 
the images in detail and discuss whether the practices depicted in the images promote a 
pedagogy of death or, conversely, increase the sense of alienation from death and mourn-
ing for the subjects engaging with the VDI in the envisioned future of 2040. In this sense, 
it serves as an outline that is explored thoroughly in chapter 6, where the ideal types of 
the images of the future are presented, and the social practices and their deeper founda-
tions are critically examined. The next chapter, in turn, describes some basic characteris-
tics of the VDI as a technological concept, as well as its characterisation as an instance of 
a Virtual Human and how persons relate to it.  
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4 CHARACTERISING THE VIRTUAL DECEASED INDIVIDUAL 
(VDI) AND HUMAN-VDI INTERACTION IN THE PRESENT 
This chapter delves deeper on what a Virtual Deceased Individual (VDI) is, what can be 
expected from it, and how Human-VDI interaction has been seen to occur in the present 
in the few reported cases. The focus of the chapter is mostly descriptive, with the theo-
retically informed analysis being the focus of the chapter where the images of the future 
are presented. Nonetheless, references will be made to theoretical concepts introduced in 
previous chapters when suitable for understanding the phenomenon of Human-VDI in-
teraction.  
4.1 The VDI as an attempt at recreating a deceased individual 
The VDI is, firstly, a technological construction reliant on various hardware and software 
components. At its core, it is a social algorithmic entity which gathers data from different 
sources about the deceased, usually through texts, images and video produced by the de-
ceased individual while alive, but complemented with the different insights about the per-
son from others who knew him or her in personal and professional life. The result is ex-
pected to mimic the speech patterns, mannerisms and personality traits of the deceased. 
The VDI, in other words, would have all the necessary information associated with the 
original individual, and when prompted, it would answer faithfully and in a way that 
mimics the way the original individual would answer. It is a programme which simulates 
being him or her in the eyes of the other members of his or her network of contacts and 
aims to replicate his or her behaviour in social interaction through defined means. At the 
same time, the VDI is a social construction in the sense that it acquires meaning through 
its integration into social practices in a given cultural setting, the language it is used to 
describe it, and the effect it has on the symbolic worlds of subjects. Currently, the VDI is 
part of broader discourses on digital immortality, digital resurrection, digital afterlives 
and digital endurance (Bassett, 2018), and its place within them is outlined below.  
As previously established, a VDI cannot be considered a form of actual resurrection, 
but a symbolic one, wherein the relational component of a deceased individual remains 
in the social world by virtue of it being digitalised through different means. It would fall 
under the classification of Alexander Turchin and Chernyakov Maxim (2018) as a form 
of partial resurrection, where an AI-enhanced program mimicking the deceased individ-
ual would aim to fulfil the goals of the people who resurrected him or her by virtual 
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means. They distinguish between resurrection based on the identity of the deceased and 
resurrection based on behavioural patterns. While the former strives for authenticity in 
terms of how closely the social algorithmic entity matches the original individual, the 
latter could be interpreted as a way for the bereaved to deal with the absence of the person. 
Specifically, a partial resurrection by a VDI would involve adopting one or more of the 
following approaches in the process of reconstructing that person: 1) reconstruction based 
on the expectations of the relatives, 2) reconstruction based on expected social function, 
3) reconstruction of behaviour but not internal states, and 4) reconstruction with elements 
of randomness (Turchin and Maxim, 2018). These approaches to recreating the dead in 
the form of a VDI emphasise different aspects of a living person and their relation to 
society, with some privileging his or her embeddedness in a network of contacts (such as 
the one based on the expectations of relatives) and others favouring institutional roles 
they perform (such as the one based on expected social function).  
Crucially, none of these approaches aims to replicate the consciousness of the origi-
nal (now deceased) individual. Part of the reason is that a strong understanding of what 
consciousness is has not yet been reached, although different disciplines offer partial (if 
often contradictory) answers. In consequence, its replication is out of reach. Additionally, 
even if a working definition of consciousness were available that allowed it to be artifi-
cially created, it is not a given that the technology necessary to do so exists. In their con-
ceptualisation of digital immortality, Microsoft researchers Gordon Bell and Jim Gray 
(2000) proposed a continuum about the forms digital immortality could take: at one end 
of the spectrum, there is the enduring frame, which is linked to one-way immortality by 
allowing the transmission of ideas to the future; at the other end, there is endless experi-
ence and learning, which allows for two-way immortality, wherein the remaining part of 
a person that resides in a technological device could continue to learn and evolve accord-
ing to the inputs it receives. In this framework, one-way immortality would imply tran-
scendence by some immortalising act made concrete by technological means, while two-
way immortality moves closer to the development of autonomous virtual avatars of the 
deceased.  
Gordon Bell continued developing these ideas on digital immortality along with Jim 
Gemmell (2009), with four intentional steps which would pursue the evolution of mech-
anisms for and the effectiveness of digital immortality. The first involves the transference 
of non-digital of the deceased into digital form. The second supplements the already dig-
ital memories with new sources of online data about the deceased. The third focuses on 
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an interactive avatar that responds in the same manner the deceased would, a feature en-
abled by the deceased’s gathered and processed data. Finally, the fourth one represents 
an evolution of the third step, with the addition of inter-temporal learning and actualisa-
tion strategies. The third and fourth steps could potentially give rise to social practices 
where future generations can ask ancestors for advice, and the ancestors, in their virtual 
form of immortality, could offer some faithful answers (Bell and Gemmell, 2009, p. 151). 
The concept of the VDI could be situated between the third and fourth steps of Bell and 
Gemmell’s framework, with interactive immortality in virtual form an explicit intended 
aim for the VDI (third step) while learning and actualising skills could be considered a 
possible option, according to the needs of the VDI’s interactants. Learning and actualising 
skills, however, would not mimic those of a human, but would resemble those seen in 
complex artificial intelligence systems, in particular neural networks.  
Understanding where the VDI falls in the different degrees of digital immortality is 
necessary, then, to understand its potential and its limitations. The VDI, as conceptualised 
in this thesis, is certainly on the higher end of the current paradigm of digital immortality 
as a symbolic form of immortality, moving between the third and fourth steps of Bell and 
Gemmell’s framework. In the foreseeable future, self-awareness and consciousness are 
not features which a VDI is expected to have; if it did, questions about it being a virtual, 
conscious replica of the original individual, or an entirely different entity altogether, 
would have to be addressed.  
4.2 Overview of the technical features and development of a VDI 
The VDI can be considered an instance of a digital immortal (Savin-Baden et al., 2017; 
Savin-Baden and Burden, 2018), which itself is a sub-category of a Virtual Human: “Soft-
ware programs which present as humans, and which may have behaviour, emotion, think-
ing, autonomy and interaction modelled on physical human capabilities” (Burden and 
Savin-Baden, 2019, p. 17). A virtual human has the following features, although their 
degree of complexity can vary between basic forms and advanced forms (Burden and 
Savin-Baden, 2019): 
1. Its main properties must be in digital form. 
2. It must have an ability to communicate through more than one of the follow-
ing mediums: text, audio, video, touch, virtual reality and augmented reality.  
3. It should have an embodied manifestation, even if it is not present in the phys-
ical world.  
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4. It should be of human appearance.  
5. It must communicate in natural language with real humans.  
6. It should have extensive autonomy, and not merely respond to commands 
given to by real humans.  
7. It needs to convincingly portray emotion to its interactants.  
8. It has the capacity to display personality traits.  
9. It possesses the ability to reason – making sensible decisions based on the 
information it has at any given time.  
10. Advanced forms exhibit some degree of learning ability for a machine (that 
is, not in the same way a human being would learn).  
11. Advanced forms display the ability to visualise or create something that is 
currently inexistent, a virtual equivalent of imagination. 
12. Under ethical considerations and guidelines, an aspiration to eventually give 
sentience to a Virtual Human (if this is something that is even possible), based 
on the previous attributes, should be considered.  
Digital immortals would, in principle, possess these same attributes, with the differ-
ence being that the digital immortal is a social algorithmic entity of a person who has died 
while the Virtual Human could either be the virtual duplicate of a living person or a new 
entity entirely. What constitutes, then, a VDI as a specific instance of a digital immortal? 
A digital immortal is a concept that can also encompass technological creations where 
the goal is to match the identity of the whole individual to the highest degree possible, 
based on the available information. Independent of the context, this variant of the digital 
immortal should have a core personality matching the deceased, his or her various ex-
pressions across contexts, and behave in an autonomous manner that reflected the original 
individual’s behaviour. Moreover, the concept of the digital immortal can also be used to 
refer to the attempt to create a permanent version of the deceased that exists as data, im-
plying a foreseeable immortality in the sense that such social algorithmic entity would 
not cease to exist unless suffering from damage or having all its copies deleted.  
The VDI, conversely, only emphasises the manifestation of the traits of a specific 
person within a network of social relations. There is no attempt at matching the autono-
mous identity of the deceased, but only the relational identity it has with its expected 
human interlocutors, adjusted to the possible contexts of activation. A VDI cannot operate 
in isolation, for there would be no living social actor to would give it any stimulus to react 
to. In this sense, as a singular entity, it lacks agency and will. The VDI, then, can be 
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considered a more restricted version of the digital immortal, assuming a specific role 
identity with its interlocutors, although some of the central personality traits of the origi-
nal individual might express themselves when suitable for the purposes of achieving faith-
fulness in the interaction.  
The development of a VDI could be expected to follow the same process of creation 
of a digital immortal, which has been delineated by Maggi Savin-Baden and David Bur-
den (2017, with Helen Taylor; 2018) as they attempted to create one. The first phase is 
gathering data on the person to be recreated. They acknowledge that a person who died 
suddenly would not be able to be involved in the creation of their digital immortal, but 
ideally, in-depth interviews with the original person on a variety of topics would allow 
them to get a sense of their thoughts and emotional reactions should matters concerning 
these topics arise. Complementing the interviews with questionnaires and the completion 
of spreadsheet grids filled out by the original person would ensure consistent data collec-
tion. In the case the person is absent, the remaining sources of data – data produced by 
the original individual from documents and social media posts (which include text, image, 
video and audio) and data generated by interviews with those who knew him or her – 
would constitute the foundations for the creation of the digital immortal.  
The second phase revolved around distilling the data, coding it and organising it ac-
cording to the expected user interface the digital immortal was expected to have. This 
meant considering what combination of elements in the system, which included user in-
terface, content, word choice and conversational style, would lead to specific manifesta-
tions of the recreated persona and to their degree of faithfulness in interaction. In their 
research, the original individual was a person named Barry, and the different combination 
of elements for his digital immortal would yield different degrees of “Barryiness”. In the 
case of conversational style, longer responses were more faithful but also disrupted the 
flow of interaction, while shorter responses were less faithful to the tone of the original 
Barry but minimised discontinuity.  
The third stage involved the design of a system that made the digital immortal func-
tional. This is described the following way: 
“A central core manages memory, reasoning, motivation, planning and 
possibly emotion. The digital immortal “reads” a variety of information 
sources, and has two-way access to a variety of real-world systems. It can 
also embody itself in virtual worlds (as an avatar), and possibly in the physi-
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cal world (via a robot). It has a natural language understanding and gener-
ation facility to enable two-way communication with people in the physical 
world (by text, audio, video, email, textchat, Twitter and other systems), and 
it potentially synchronises its knowledge and activities between multiple in-
stances of itself” (Savin-Baden et al., 2017, p. 18).  
Two issues are worth highlighting here. The first is that the central core is not only a 
manual creation but is greatly enhanced by the use machine learning and deep-learning 
techniques to allow the digital immortal to gain higher degrees of faithfulness. The second 
issue revolves around the nature of the interaction. The system itself could appear more 
or less human, depending with the nature of the interactants (living, conscious entities 
such as human beings, versus other technological and administrative systems). If inter-
acting with a human being, then the digital immortal would need to treat it as an instance 
of a social interaction, adopting a more humanlike behaviour. Conversely, if the interac-
tion is with other digital systems, the digital immortal could just behave as an algorithmic 
entity.  
The fourth and final stage outlined concerned the actualisation of the digital immortal 
by having continuous access to data sources of the network of social relations of which 
the original individual was a member. Receiving regular updates about this network 
would improve the faithfulness to which the digital immortal could simulate being the 
original person. Indeed, it is the intent on giving off an illusion that the interaction is with 
a person, the deceased individual, that characterises this Virtual Human as a digital im-
mortal (Savin-Baden et al., 2017, p. 18).  
In the development of a VDI, for it to be successful in a social interaction situation 
and to be further integrated into social practices, it should be programmed to have social 
intelligence. For social intelligent robots, specifically, this means designing an appropri-
ate modelling of its identity, which includes the knowledge of the expected interactants 
and the physical environment, codifying sociocultural practices in the form of code that 
constitutes its knowledge base, structuring the software in a manner that enables the robot 
to understand the specific instance of interaction, and subsequently planning for and per-
forming the interaction (Augello et al., 2018a). Depending on the sophistication of the 
VDI, developers would need to pay equal attention to the hardware and software compo-
nents if the expectation is to create physical VDIs. If, however, the intention is for the 
VDI to remain purely virtual, the focus would reside in crafting a convincing programme 
that emulates a human being in a social interaction situation. While this is still a challenge, 
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current research (Augello et al., 2016; Augello et al., 2018a; Augello et al., 2018b) sug-
gests creating a successful virtual agent for social interaction, which integrates aspects of 
social practice theory for their interpretation of social situations and the interactants in 
them, is possible. The degree to which a VDI could display compelling humanlike behav-
iour towards its expected human interlocutors and not only successful social behaviour 
is, however, a more complex challenge that needs to be solved.  
A final issue to address regarding the features of a Virtual Human and, by extension, 
also the features of a digital immortal and a VDI, is the possible uncanny valley effect, 
which refers to the uneasiness that might result from encountering objects that appear to 
be almost human but ultimately are not (Mori, 1970). The uncanny valley effect can occur 
as a feature of design, where an artificial entity is designed to resemble human beings in 
appearance and behaviour, but its inability to successfully resemble one in the eyes of its 
interlocutors leads to discomfort. While the argument has been made that the uncanny 
valley effect cannot be overcome until the algorithms are able to mimic human sociality 
so well that they pass the Turing Test (Turing, 1950) – a test which aims to make an 
instance of machine intelligence indistinguishable from a human when in some limited 
form of interaction with another human – and conscious effort is required from their hu-
man interlocutors to recognise them as artificial entities, Young et al. (2007) argue that 
cartoon representations of sociability in robots can complement the algorithmic aspects 
and create a sense of ease for the human interactants. For the VDI, this could imply that 
if the technology is not advanced enough to be able to mimic human sociality flawlessly, 
then other design approaches which emphasise the VDI’s artificiality but simultaneously 
encourage displays empathy and affinity from the human interlocutors could be consid-
ered as options.  
The uncanny valley effect, however, should not be regarded as a purely aesthetic 
issue, but also something that is shaped by cultural expectations of technology. In partic-
ular, whether a Virtual Human, digital immortal or VDI produces an uncanny valley ef-
fect or not is related to how people think of themselves in relation to the digital realm and 
how the concepts between digital and physical, real and fake, and alive or inert are so-
cially constructed in a given spatial and temporal setting (Graham et al., 2013; Bollmer, 
2013; Kera, 2013). Hence, it could be expected that those who associate the digital to the 
fake and/or to the artificial will experience an uncanny valley effect if in interaction with 
a VDI, whereas others who do not make that distinction might find the VDI as an accepta-
ble social algorithmic entity to interact with.  
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4.3 Emergent practices of Human-VDI interaction 
Despite the existence of services for the creation of a VDI, such as Eter9 (2017), Lifenaut 
(2017), and Eternime (2019), the obscure nature of projects intended to create digital im-
mortals and/or the current technological limitations mean that social practices of Human-
VDI interaction have not become widespread. These services, as well as the VDI, could 
be considered forms of thanatechnology, which have the dual role of immortalising some-
one by virtual means and helping people to confront their own mortality and that of others 
(Sofka et al., 2017). Current manifestations of the VDI are mainly the result of intentional 
recreation of the dead by the bereaved, and the two examples discussed below illustrate 
their role for practices related to death and to mourning.  
Eugenia Kuyda, the co-founder of Luka, an artificial intelligence start-up, lost her 
friend, Roman Mazurenko, to a traffic accident in late 2015. During the funeral, Ma-
zurenko’s friends started discussing what would be the best way to honour his memory, 
with options ranging from a life-story book to a memorial website. Those options felt 
inadequate to Kuyda, who realised, after reading countless messages sent to her by Ma-
zurenko throughout their years as friends, that many of those messages reflected Ma-
zurenko’s idiosyncrasies. Although Kuyda was aware of references in popular culture on 
digital artifacts being used to recreate the dead and understood the concerns raised in 
those references, she nonetheless felt that the digital remains left behind by the deceased 
for confronting the death of someone. After using Google’s machine-learning system 
Tensorflow and asking the developers in Luka to create a neural-network based on Ten-
sorflow in Russian (Mazurenko’s native language), Kuyda collected the messages be-
tween her and Mazurenko and pasted them into a file in the new neural network system. 
The system was subsequently trained to respond as if it were Mazurenko by Luka’s engi-
neers, favouring his speech whenever possible. After some initial tests, for Kuyda, the 
Mazurenko bot (i.e. the neural-network system trained to mimic him) did approach the 
speech patterns and responses she would expect from her real friend (Newton, 2016).  
The Mazurenko bot can be characterised as a VDI insofar as it is an instance of build-
ing a digital immortal using currently available technology and does not attempt to give 
it autonomy from its intended interlocutors. The Mazurenko bot is predominantly consti-
tuted by the relational component of the deceased, Roman Mazurenko, which was mani-
fested through its personal messages with Kuyda. Kuyda acknowledges that the Ma-
zurenko bot was only a vestige of a person, but believes that digital technologies have 
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enabled the creation of the Mazurenko bot and the future developments can enhance what 
can be accomplished in recreating a virtual persona of the deceased (Kuyda, in Newton, 
2016).  
Kuyda’s decision to create the VDI of Mazurenko occurred after her friend’s death, 
but the story of James Vlahos (2017) depicts an attempt at creating a VDI of his father 
since before the latter’s death. Knowing his father would die soon from stage IV lung 
cancer, Vlahos scheduled a series of interviews with him on a number of topics that he 
deemed relevant for keeping his memory alive in the form of an autobiographical book, 
which would include his memories on the family history, education, career, and other 
activities. When the series of interviews concluded, he happened to read an announcement 
from a software company which outlined their plans to release their software for creating 
conversational agents. From there, he developed the idea of turning the series of recorded 
interviews with his father into data to create a bot of his father. In Vlahos’ account, the 
themes of digital immortality and transcendence of death are the driving forces behind 
the (partial) recreation of his father as an artificial intelligence system. Moreover, they 
motivated his emotional investment in personally developing his father’s VDI, as unlike 
Kuyda, Vlahos had to do it himself without a team of engineers and without a professional 
background in software development. Importantly for the design process, Vlahos asserts 
that the VDI should not be limited to his father’s knowledge in an artificial intelligence 
system, but should also include his mannerisms (as expressed digitally), his outlook on 
life (which tended to be positive mixed with gloominess) and his personality (highly in-
telligent, logical and humorous).  
As with the VDI of Mazurenko, the VDI of Vlahos’ father does not possess auton-
omy: any updates or relationship to the external world is dependent on who has physical 
and digital access to the VDI. Similarly, the manifestation of the programme as Vlahos’ 
father mostly appeared when Vlahos himself and other members of his family were the 
users; other users, not having that specific relationship with the VDI, generated inputs 
that the VDI could not process accurately, leading to the production of incoherent state-
ments by the algorithm. In a sense, Vlahos’ story highlights the relational component of 
an identity embodied in the VDI. In this version, at least, there was no attempt at fully 
recreating the person in the form of an artificial intelligence system, but to match the 
deceased’s traits when in interaction with the living.  
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The cases of Eugenia Kuyda and James Vlahos offer some insights about these emer-
gent attempts at Human-VDI interaction. For one, the limitations of current digital tech-
nologies restrict the extent to which Turner’s (1988) social interaction framework could 
be applicable in the present. The complexity of the algorithms did not include in their 
code aspects that gave different motivations to the VDIs beyond expressing the appropri-
ate text response to their respective interlocutors. Likewise, the structuring processes 
were also not displayed from the VDIs’ side, as they lacked any awareness of context and 
were confined to software, without the possibility to influence the physical world. From 
the human interlocutors’ perspective, however, all the three elements of social interaction 
could be identified, although structuring processes had reduced importance due to the 
text-based medium of communication. Hence, while for the human interlocutors the sit-
uation could, to an extent, be considered interactive, the current forms of the VDI do not 
exhibit the complexity required for instances of social interaction to take place. In conse-
quence, while the present phenomenon (at least, as seen in Kuyda’s and Vlahos’ stories) 
cannot be characterised as social interaction, the level of sophistication of the artificial 
intelligence systems in the future could allow encounters between a human being and a 
VDI to be classified phenomena of social interaction.   
Another insight to be derived from these accounts is how the motivations behind the 
creations of the VDIs – to better mourn the deceased and to allow them to remain in the 
social world after their physical deaths – drive the meaning created by the living interact-
ants. Both Kuyda and Vlahos, the main creators of their respective VDIs, acknowledged 
the artificiality of the interaction, yet still considered it worthwhile and they were re-
minded of good experiences their loved ones. Moreover, both felt comforted to an extent 
by the presence of the deceased in their digital, interactive manifestation. This might be 
explained by their emotional attachment to the deceased they were trying to recreate, re-
ferring to the VDIs not as code or as algorithms, but as “Mazurenko bot” (for Kuyda) and 
“Dadbot” (for Vlahos), and affirming the presence of traces of their loved ones within the 
VDI. Although it was a limited experience, the language used by the VDIs’ main inter-
locutors indicates they perceived the presence of both Mazurenko and James Vlahos’ fa-
ther within the VDIs.  
A final insight is that what seems particularly relevant in Kuyda’s and Vlahos’ stories 
is not the ability to be fooled by the system, but to get to experience the emotions they 
felt when interacting with their loved ones. Furthermore, the degree to which the VDIs 
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allowed the deceased to remain in the world of the living was considered an important 
goal.  
4.4 Conclusion: Human-VDI interaction in the future 
The current forms of the VDI have been deemed to resemble the individual they are mod-
elled after in meaningful ways but have significant limitations in text-based interfaces. 
Eugenia Kuyda’s story described the way a VDI was helpful for coming to terms with the 
sudden death of a friend, while James Vlahos’ depicted a son’s struggle to grant his de-
ceased father an ongoing presence in the world of the living. If this was desirable under 
present technologies, it is reasonable to think that as the artificial intelligence systems, 
hardware and user interfaces evolve in the coming decades, deeper integration and better 
outcomes of interaction with a VDI can be expected. The dynamic development of digital 
technologies and their increasing integration into everyday life offers reason to believe 
that greater acceptance in their use for confronting death and undergo mourning might 
await in the future. The rest of this thesis explores what the different futures of social 
practices of Human-VDI interaction might look like, and how they affect the way subjects 
face mortality and loss.   
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5 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: MATERIALS, METHOD AND 
ANALYTICAL CATEGORIES 
5.1 Research material: semi-structured interviews 
The empirical research material gathered for this thesis consists of semi-structured inter-
views with thirteen (13) research subjects. Interviews, as a technique of qualitative data 
gathering, were deemed suitable for this research project because they would yield data 
that facilitated its analysis in discursive terms; discourse, as seen in the literature review, 
is central insofar as it structures the ontology of the subjects’ social world (Laclau and 
Bhaskar, 1998). This meant that the researcher would gain depth into the various under-
standings, expressed via language, that the interviewees held on of death, technology and 
their relationship to each other. In consequence, diversity in terms of the profiles of the 
interviewees was required, as diversity leads to different worldviews and discursive ar-
ticulations.  
Because social practices related to death and technology, as well as personal perspec-
tives on both topics, are influenced by culture and age (Palgi and Abramovitch, 1984; 
Robben, 2004; Helsper and Eynon, 2010; Jacobson et al., 2017), diversity in terms of 
cultural background (for this research, it was mostly based on nationality) and in terms of 
age was a guiding principle for selecting potential interviewees. Additionally, pluralism 
in terms of educational and professional background of the interviewees was considered 
relevant, as years of being within a specific domain of knowledge and professional prac-
tice could shape, to varying degrees, the worldview the subjects hold. Although not con-
sidered specifically relevant in terms of how it affects views on death and technology, 
balance in terms of the gender of the interviewees was also sought.  
Because one of the main purposes behind this research project was to construct, based 
on the interview data, the images of the future that possible human interlocutors of the 
VDI have regarding social practices based on Human-VDI interaction, the interviewees 
were selected in their role as subjects who, in 2040, might become interlocutors of the 
VDI or would otherwise be part of a sociotechnical network wherein the VDI, as a tech-
nological creation, plays a social role.13 This means that the interest resides not in the 
                                                     
13  This did not exclude people who might be professionals or academics in the technology industry or in 
the social sciences from participating. It just means that they would not be interviewed in their role as 
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forecasting of the presence of such technology in 2040, nor in assessing from expert views 
the likelihood of Human-VDI interaction in 2040 and its social consequences. Rather, it 
resides in exploring alternative ideal types of the “user experience” of the VDI by focus-
ing on the kind of features the VDIs have in the context of the 2040 social world and on 
the meaning attached to the device and to the social practices wherein Human-VDI inter-
action is central. Furthermore, the social implications of these questions are examined 
through a Death Studies lens, looking into how social practices based on Human-VDI 
interaction influence the way human beings relate to mortality and to the mourning pro-
cess.  
As the object of study (i.e. images of the future of social practices based on Human-
VDI interaction) of this research project is best explored under an interdisciplinary per-
spective, insights from the different fields of study were also taken into account for the 
process of recruitment, for interview design and implementation, and for data processing 
and analysis.   
In terms of recruitment, because the discourses on death and the personal perspec-
tives on Human-VDI interaction were deemed to be of personal significance and carried 
emotional weight, recommendations for qualitative interviews from the field of Death 
Studies were used for getting knowledge of best practices. Rosenblatt (1995) points to 
different ethical issues to consider for interviews focused on death: recruitment without 
coercion, causing (emotional) pain, having informed consent, crossing the boundary be-
tween therapy and research, unintentional reinforcement of dysfunctional family dynam-
ics, and revealing of previously unstated feelings or issues of sensitive nature during the 
course of an interview. While Rosenblatt’s recommendations were based on his research 
experience on bereaved families who had experienced the deaths of loved ones and such 
events were going to be the topic of discussion, this research project differed from that in 
that an actual past event of death of a loved one was not the focus. Instead, the death of a 
person (in this case, the one who would become the VDI) would be assumed as a back-
ground event in the context of the interview – focus would be diverted from it and directed 
towards interaction with the VDI. Nevertheless, the death was an important background 
event that would alter how the interviewee approached the VDI, as opposed to how he or 
she would approach any other Virtual Human.  
                                                     
experts. Instead, those interviewees who had a background in either or both of those domains of ex-
pertise were asked questions in their role as possible interlocutors or users, and it was their personal 
perspectives that mattered, not their expert view.  
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For this reason, Rosenblatt’s insights were still relevant to a degree, specifically those 
related to participation without coercion, causing unnecessary emotional pain, and having 
informed consent. This is because an imagined event can have both cognitive and emo-
tional complexity and provoke emotional reactions comparable to those of recalling an 
actual event. For the recruitment phase, an invitation was drafted that specified the re-
search topic, the different themes of the interview, and clearly stated that thinking about 
the (mostly imagined, but in some cases actual) death of a person within their network of 
personal contacts was going to be required. Moreover, the element of emotional pain was 
specified in the interview invitation, with “emotional distress” mentioned as a possible 
consequence of participating in it. By accepting to be interviewed after reading the invi-
tation, the interview subjects would therefore be aware of potential emotional pain that 
could be experienced in the course of the interview.  
Under some circumstances, such as getting qualitative information on sensitive is-
sues, establishing trust in a researcher-participant relationship (McGinn, 2008) is re-
quired. Because death-related topics can be considered sensitive issues, this approach has 
also been recommended for qualitative studies within the Death Studies field (Rosenblatt, 
1995; Ribbens McCarthy, 2006; Coombs, 2017). For this reason, a combination of con-
venience sampling and snowball sampling was used to get the potential interviewees. The 
procedure was to contact acquaintances and/or friends of the researcher who had ex-
pressed personal interest either in issues of technology or issues related to death and who 
fit the profile regarding diversity (in terms of age, nationality, gender and professional 
background). The researcher’s previous and current experience as student in three differ-
ent universities known for the number of international students enrolled in them was use-
ful in this regard. However, to reduce the appearance of homogeneous perspectives sur-
rounding the concept of the VDI, the researcher also asked some of his contacts to ask 
friends or acquaintances of theirs who fit the profile in terms of diversity if they would 
be interested in participating. The purpose of this was to channel the trust in the relation-
ships through the network – if the researcher was trusted by the person mutually known 
by him and the potential interviewee, the latter might be willing to grant him his/her trust. 
Interview invitations were sent by e-mail to the potential interviewees, with the exception 
of two, one of which was asked in person and read a printed version of the invitation, and 
another one who asked to be sent the invitation via a social networking site.  
In turn, insights from the field of Futures Studies, as well as from general qualitative 
research methodology, were the main influence for the interview design. In addition, the 
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researcher added a few elements intended to stimulate the interviewees’ imagination. 
Within the field of Futures Studies, it can be argued that narrative occupies an important 
role in scenario development insofar as it allows a certain sequence of events to be 
mapped out and the main actors in those events to have relationships with one another, 
intentionality and an evolution according to the consequences of the events that occur. In 
addition, Critical Futures Studies highlights the transformative aspects of narrative by 
allowing participants to reach deeper levels of social reality in order to enact social change 
(Milojević and Inayatullah, 2015). However, the approach taken in this research toward 
narrative has not been that of scenario development or of transformative aspects. Instead, 
it was based on a minimal definition of the concept: “the telling of a story; the succession 
of events is (often) given in chronological order” (Jarva, 2014, p. 16). The reason for 
adopting the minimal definition of narrative followed practical reasons: given the relative 
novelty of the concept of the VDI, the interviewees might have difficulty placing them-
selves in a narrative with it. As such, taking out common elements of narrative such as 
plot and conflict could facilitate the interviewees to outline aspects of characters (them-
selves, the VDI and third parties), setting, and sequence of events within which the inter-
action takes place. Questions related to narrative were focused on getting the interviewees 
to describe themselves in a given day in 2040 and how they would imagine their personal 
Human-VDI interaction to be during the day, as well as motivations behind such interac-
tion and the resolution to that interaction. Though some interviewees gave these elements 
out of order, clarification questions asked by the researcher allowed for further narrative 
elements to be obtained. This, in turn, was reflected in the narrative construction of the 
ideal types of social practices centred on Human-VDI interaction.  
To get the interviewees to think about themselves and the future world they would 
inhabit in 2040, one in which the VDI would be present, two imagination elicitation ex-
ercises were integrated. The decision to integrate these two exercises was based on in-
sights based on the use of photographic and pictorial elicitation in social research, which 
suggest that they promote participant agency, reveal feelings in relation to certain con-
texts, elicit memories and emotional responses, alleviate interview fatigue and miscom-
munication, and provide interview focus (Banks, 2001; Harper, 2002; Banks, 2007; Rich-
ard and Lahman, 2015). The first exercise consisted of showing the interviewees five 
images and asking them to imagine going into the places depicted in the images and de-
scribing what they saw and what they would do while exploring those places. Although 
this set of images was not directly related to the content of the interview, the aim of this 
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exercise was to get them to think in more detail about the spatial settings of an interaction, 
to get them used to describing a sequence of events, and to reveal preferences for certain 
contexts over others. The second exercise was a visual representation of the VDI in three 
different images, using generic icons of people and technological devices (a computer 
and a robot) accompanied by a description of the content in the images. While describing 
the concept, they were asked to imagine themselves in the situation which each picture 
described. This would allow them to understand the concept and to imagine the main 
elements involved in Human-VDI interaction. These latter three images are found in Ap-
pendix 2.  
Additionally, the format of the interview would be that of the semi-structured long 
interview, as outlined by McCracken (1988). This was taken more as a guideline in terms 
of preparation by the researcher, rhythm of the interview and sequence of questions, as 
his suggested approach – one mostly driven by the interviewee – could be problematic to 
make the interviewees think about a concept which might be foreign to them (i.e. the 
VDI). In the end, the researcher adopted a more interventionist approach to the interview 
process, with him providing the basic parameters within which the interviewees would 
picture themselves in. As such, images of the future resulting from this research cannot 
be said to be purely or mostly the interviewees’; they are a co-creation between the re-
searcher and the participants, inasmuch as the former gave some central ideas about pos-
sibilities in the future (e.g. the common practice of Human-VDI interaction) and the latter 
explored the possibilities surrounding those ideas.  
A comment on the sequence of questions is also relevant here: the questions that 
would yield the more substantive content related to the interviewees’ discourse and 
worldview were strategically separated by the more imaginative sections. The interview 
was structured with an initial presentation from the researcher and the interviewee, which 
was followed by questions on the themes of death and technology. Next, the imaginative 
questions with the pictures were asked, and finally their narratives and their opinions on 
their possible interaction with a VDI were requested. This was done to energise the par-
ticipants and to allow them to become more engaged in the interview after deep thought 
in the first section, and then to complement their imagined future interactions with the 
VDI with the general opinions on the possible social consequences of this concept being 
integrated into everyday life.  
Regarding interview implementation, again insights from the field of Death Studies 
were integrated. Specifically, Coombs’ (2017) recommendations on choosing a place that 
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felt comfortable to the participants were considered. The interviewees had the opportunity 
to choose the location of their preference. In physically present interviews, most of them 
selected common areas in places known both to the researcher and the interviewee, alt-
hough there were three exceptions: one who chose a coffee house, one who chose his 
workplace office, and one who chose her home. For those interviews which were carried 
out using online means, the location was not an issue, with the interviewees by default 
choosing their preferred location. Thirty-five (35) potential interviewees were sent an in-
vitation, although due to the themes to be explored, scheduling issues and problems with 
the medium of communication (for online interviews), the final number of interviews was 
thirteen (13).14  
The interviews were carried out in English, or in Spanish if the interviewees were 
more comfortable (Spanish being a shared language between the researcher and some of 
the interviewees). They took place between the months of September 2019 and January 
2020. Table 1 shows the interviewees, as well as their profile in terms of diversity (na-
tionality, age group, professional and educational background, and gender). For research 
purposes, it was decided that a way to identify the interviewees within the text was 
needed. Therefore, their names have been changed for privacy reasons and to comply 
with legal and ethical research standards.  
Table 1: Profiles of the interviewees 
Name Nationality Age range Professional 
and 
educational 
background 
Gender Notable 
facts 
Jakov Ouromov Bulgarian/ 
Russian 
18-29 (Young 
adult) 
Service 
industry 
Male Single, 
immigrant, 
Christian 
Anahita Golshiri Iranian 18-29 (Young 
adult) 
Social work Female Married, 
non-religious 
Juan Ignacio 
Alcántara 
Montesinos 
Mexican 18-29 (Young 
adult) 
Robotics and 
Digital 
Systems 
Male Single, 
atheist 
Wai Ling Chinese 18-29 (Young 
adult) 
Consulting and 
tourism 
industry 
Female Immigrant, 
Buddhist 
Alberto García Mexican 18-29 (Young 
adult) 
Economy and 
social policy 
Male Single, 
Catholic 
Olivia Mendoza Uruguayan / 
Italian 
18 – 29 (Young 
adult) 
Economy Female Single (with 
romantic 
partner) 
                                                     
14  The thirty-five potential interviewees included ten (10) potential interviewees from the African con-
tinent. Lack of interest in the topic, scheduling conflicts and lack of response to the invitation resulted 
in no African subjects being interviewed for this research, a major limitation in terms of empirical 
data.  
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Dac Kien Hyunh Vietnamese 18-29 (Young 
adult) 
Business 
management 
and commerce 
Male Single, 
Buddhist 
Thomas 
Hubbard 
British  18-29 (Young 
Adult) 
Biology and 
ecology 
Male Single (with 
romantic 
partner), 
non-religious 
Carolina 
Olabuenaga 
Colombian 30-59 (Mature 
adult) 
Social robotics Female Married, 
non-religious 
Karl Suotamo Finnish 30-59 (Mature 
adult) 
Cultural 
studies 
Male Married, has 
children, 
non-religious 
Natalia Gómez Mexican 30-59 (Mature 
adult) 
Business 
management  
Female Single, has 
one child, 
non-religious 
Antoine 
Thibeault 
French 30-59 (Mature 
adult) 
Academia / 
Political 
Science 
Male Married, has 
one child, 
non-religious 
Verónica Castro Mexican 60+ (Senior 
adult) 
Dentistry Female Married (2nd 
marriage), 
has two 
daughters 
and one 
son, one 
stepson, 
Catholic 
 
Of the thirteen interviews, eleven (11) lasted between 60 and 120 minutes, as was de-
signed. One of them lasted around 40 minutes because of the limited availability of the 
interviewee, and one of them lasted around 140 minutes, as the researcher and the inter-
viewee moved from one location to another during the interview, but the interview con-
tinued while both were walking to the second location.  
For data processing, each interview was recorded in audio. All of the interviews were 
then transcribed by typing manually in Microsoft Word. Although there is software avail-
able for data transcription and data analysis, doing the transcription manually allowed the 
researcher to identify the themes while doing the transcription, and reflect on the best 
material from each interview. Coding was also done at this stage: quotes that reflected 
relevant aspects of social practices based on Human-VDI interaction, discourses on death 
and technology, the mourning process and emotional responses to certain ideas were high-
lighted. Because the researcher was aware of the themes while interviewing the partici-
pants and made some notes immediately after, coding of the themes in the transcribed 
interviews was straightforward. In addition, text relevant to the layers of analysis accord-
ing to the CLA method (described below) was identified during the coding process.  
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5.2 Approach to data analysis: Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) method from Fu-
tures Studies research 
Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) is a qualitative approach to research from the field of 
Futures Studies, specifically Critical Futures Studies. Depending on its use, CLA could 
function as a method, as an analytical tool, as a technique to Futures Studies research or 
even as a pedagogy (Inayatullah, 1998; Inayatullah, 2004a; Turnbull, 2006; Inayatullah, 
2017; Rubin, 2017). Over the years, it has developed a research program around it, pro-
ducing scholarly literature on a variety of themes, including environment, resources, 
work, finance, conflict and peace, health, community and well-being (Inayatullah and 
Milojević, 2015). The decision to use CLA as a central part of the methodological ap-
proach to the study of images of the future of social practices focusing on Human-VDI 
interaction (possibly) taking place in 2040 is due to its potential for qualitative Futures 
Studies research (particularly those where text is the main source of data, see Kaboli and 
Tapio, 2018). Moreover, it was considered suitable for revealing how social practices 
acquire meaning because of its influences from poststructuralist thought. As a method, it 
is committed to studying the depths of images of the future by revealing underlying dis-
courses /worldviews and myths/metaphors. As such, it is helpful in uncovering discourses 
related to death and mourning, foundational metaphors of personhood and mortality, and 
their combination with discourses on technology and other discourses.  
As reflected in Sohail Inayatullah’s article, “Poststructuralism as method” (1998), 
Poststructuralism as a school of thought provides the main influence for the design of 
CLA and for its use as a method, most particularly in its relation to the epistemes or 
historical frames of knowledge from Michel Foucault and the notion of deconstruction 
from Jacques Derrida. Other notable influences for CLA are macro-history and postcolo-
nial multicultural theory, and authors such as Johan Galtung and P.R. Sarkar. Similarly, 
from the field of Futures Studies itself, Richard Slaughter’s categories of different futures 
according to their depth were incorporated into the CLA method (Slaughter, 1989; Ina-
yatullah, 2004a; Inayatullah, 2009). 
CLA considers opening up the present and reinterpreting the past to create alterna-
tive, transformative and emancipatory futures as its main task, instead of forecasting or 
predicting futures. It aims at problematisation – undefining the future by identifying “how 
an issue has been constructed as an event or trend in the first place as well as the ‘cost’ of 
that particular social construction—what paradigm is privileged by the nomination of a 
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trend or event as such” (Inayatullah, 1998, p. 817). However, in contrast to common post-
structuralist approaches to scientific enquiry, it does not approach research in Futures 
Studies only from a horizontal perspective and does not consider all frames to be of equal 
value, an approach which could veer too closely into relativism. This horizontal perspec-
tive focuses on identifying oppressive assumptions and emancipatory alternatives to so-
cial and cultural life, while CLA complements this by also adopting an understanding of 
reality as vertically constructed where moving downwards and then upwards in the layers 
of social reality results in a deconstructive and reconstructive process of a variety of fu-
tures.  
The vertical reality envisioned by CLA is comprised of four layers. They are, from 
the more superficial to the deepest: litany, system / social causes, discourse / worldview, 
and myth / metaphor. The litany presents the most visible aspects of social reality, with 
short-term perspectives on the future, while the myth/metaphor presents the most hidden 
aspects of social reality and is related to temporal changes that occur over the long-term. 
The images usually conjured when thinking of a pictorial representation of the CLA 
method are that of a pyramid (Inayatullah, 2004b) and an iceberg (Inayatullah, 2017; 
Kaboli and Tapio, 2018). Both images offer visual representation of layers with different 
degrees of visibility, with litany being the first layer at the top, followed by system/social 
causes as the second layer, then the discourse/worldview as the third layer, and finally 
locating the myth/metaphor at the bottom. 
Of the four layers, litany presents problems in quantitative terms via trends which are 
usually exaggerated for political purposes or for diffusion by news media. Although it is 
superficial, it is not inconsequential – it might generate apathy or helplessness (Inayatul-
lah, 1998), and becomes the official description of a social phenomenon. Arguably, this 
description is useful for the researcher when trying to identify power relations, because 
those who stand to benefit from such descriptions might be considered the powerful social 
actors in a given context.15 However, as Rubin (2017, p. 261) argues, there is no use in 
attempting to gain meaningful theoretical insights from the litany.  
                                                     
15  This is an instrumental use of litany. The researcher identifies the litany and uses it as an entry point 
to get an idea of who are the actors expressing themselves in this way. This links to the second layer, 
where the actors in a system are identified, and to the third layer, where discourse and power is a 
predominant theme.  
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The next layer, the system / social causes layer, identifies problems, usually of short-
term nature, and its different dimensions (economic, cultural, political, historical, envi-
ronmental, and so on). The problems are usually expressed in quantitative terms, and 
these are given interpretation and linked to one another. As such, “this level excels at 
technical explanations as well as academic analysis. The role of the state and other actors 
and interests is often explored at this level” (Inayatullah, 1998, p. 820). Further, the results 
of this layer often focus on the future itself and the reasoned justifications for the future 
phenomenon under scrutiny. According to Rubin (2017, p. 261), while technical 
knowledge of the system is desired and results are seen as the most valuable output, depth 
and critical choice are lacking at this level, given that the assumption is often to operate 
under existing (or evolving) structures and procedures, instead of challenging them and 
crafting other alternatives.  
Within the third layer, that of discourse/worldview, “discerning deeper assumptions 
behind the issue is crucial here, as are efforts to re-vision the problem” (Inayatullah, 
2004a, p.12). This is because discourse, as understood from a Poststructuralist perspec-
tive, goes beyond causation and mediation of an issue to form a constitutive aspect of it 
by way of its framing. Therefore, exploring the power of ideology, worldviews as ex-
pressed in civilizations, and epistemes is central in this layer. Methodologically, a way to 
access the discourse / worldview content is to “search for deeper positions that create 
notions of collective identity” (Inayatullah, 2004, p. 12), with the decision of which dis-
course to use (stakeholder, civilizational, ideological or epistemic) being context-depend-
ent. It is based on these different discourses that the horizontal dimension of analysis of 
CLA emerges – different discourses yield different institutional configurations and social 
practices. In consequence, the images of the future or scenarios also become diverse.  
Finally, the fourth layer, that of myth/metaphor, is the deepest and comprises those 
unconscious, collective archetypes of culture. They might take the form of stories which 
structure deeply held cultural beliefs. In contrast to the previous layers, the myth/meta-
phor layer “provides a gut/emotional level experience to the worldview under inquiry. 
The language used is less specific, more concerned with evoking visual images, with 
touching the heart instead of reading the head” (Inayatullah, 2004a, p.13). Within this 
layer, the researcher needs to step back and examine rooted assumptions about funda-
mental concepts. For instance, would time be linear, circular or resemble a spiral? What 
are the roots of agency and how can it be expressed? What is consciousness and how does 
it structure reality? What is the core manner in which human beings relate to one another? 
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These questions are not extensive, yet thinking about them offers points of entry to dis-
cover what are the myths and metaphors that are the foundations of certain images of the 
future or scenarios. Rubin (2017, p.263) identifies several myths that could be found in 
this layer, such as hero myths, transformation myths, origin myths, victim and saviour 
myths, and so on.  
As previously mentioned, CLA can be used in a variety of ways. While the commit-
ment towards transformation and emancipation is usually reflected in CLA in its use as 
an overall method and as a technique for data gathering (Milojević and Inayatullah, 2015; 
Inayatullah, 2017; Minkkinen et al., 2019), the approach taken in this thesis is to use it as 
a data analysis tool. This decision follows practical and theoretical considerations. On the 
practical side, an aim of this research project was to discover the images of the future held 
by subjects of different ages, cultural contexts and professional and educational back-
grounds on the topic of social practices based on Human-VDI interaction. As such, the 
researcher needed the interviewees to focus on futures wherein Human-VDI interaction 
was a common element to be found. If the transformative and emancipatory approach was 
taken during the data gathering phase (i.e. during the long interviews), the interviewees 
could have thought of images of the future where Human-VDI interaction was absent, 
and the interviews could have gone on to different paths where the data obtained would 
not be useful for the aims of this research. On the theoretical side, the layered account of 
reality offered by CLA allows the researcher to make the argument that a phenomenon 
such as social practices focused on Human-VDI interaction can only become common-
place within specific discursive articulations, with other kinds of practices concerning 
death and mourning (and its potential relationship with technology) emerging from dif-
ferent discourses. In more explicit terms, CLA allowed the researcher to link a visible 
phenomenon (social practices focused on Human-VDI interaction) to less visible but con-
stitutive aspects of the phenomenon (such as discourse and underlying metaphors).  
A methodological addition was incorporated into this version of the CLA as a data 
analysis tool. In this case, it is argued that the system/social causes layer (wherein social 
practices centred on Human-VDI interaction can be located) and the discourse/worldview 
layer can be linked more explicitly by incorporating the Logics of Critical Explanation 
(LCE) methodological approach of Post-Marxist discourse theory (see  chapter 3, dis-
course theoretical section on death) to the analysis. As described in the interdisciplinary 
literature review, death, mortality and mourning can be analysed through a discourse the-
oretical perspective. In addition, the way these concepts are discursively articulated and 
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the positioning of subjects in relation to discourse provide the meaning-generating frame-
work for human interlocutors in relation to the VDI. The LCE approach allows some 
practices of Human-VDI interaction to be characterised as being governed by specific 
discursive social logics, is useful for revealing the narratives subjects respond to during 
Human-VDI interaction via fantasmatic logics, and makes it easier for antagonism to be 
addressed as a phenomenon occurring between competing discourses via political logics 
(Glynos and Howarth, 2007; Glynos and Howarth, 2008).16 In other words, while CLA 
acknowledges questions of power and alternative discourses, the identification of antag-
onism and discursive struggle is mostly absent within the deeper layers. The LCE ap-
proach could bridge this gap by specifying that while some discourses are alternative in 
a manner that implies a variation or a difference in content, there are other discourses 
which are not only different but are also marginalised, opposed to or in conflict with the 
hegemonic discourses.17 It is important to stress that this methodological addition was not 
intended to replace CLA as a data analysis tool – it complemented it by refining the in-
terpretation of the deeper layers and establishing clearer links between the system / social 
causes layer and the discourse / worldview layer. 
5.3 Analytical categories for contrasting images of the future 
The conceptualisation of the social practices focused on Human-VDI interaction offered 
in chapter 3 displays a number of interrelated elements that constitute such practices. 
There are, however, significant ways in which that model can vary in its actual content, 
depending on the effects they produce on subjects’ relationship to death and to mourning 
and on the context within which these practices take place. To present meaningful con-
trasts in the ideal types of the images of the future that resulted from the interviews, some 
                                                     
16  An important question needs to be addressed: Are the future practices themselves governed by the 
discursive logics, or is it the present telling of those practices that is governed by the logics? The 
answer is arguably both. If the practices end up matching the present telling of them, then they will 
be governed by those logics. Thinking of the logics in the present, it is true that they structure the 
meaning in the present of the imagined future practices. But, at least preliminarily, there would not be 
any reason to believe that this construction of meaning would be different in general terms to the 
actual practices themselves (assuming, of course, that the practices exhibit the features depicted in the 
images of the future). This is because meaning is structured by discourse, and in describing something, 
meaning is assigned to the phenomenon being described. This is applicable for both phenomena that 
reside in the present and imagined future phenomena, which are also described through language.  
17  To some extent, CLA already does this, as it offers critique on a variety of different futures which do 
not offer emancipatory alternatives. In my view, however, this is mostly assumed by specifying how 
the content relates to emancipation (by either obstructing it or working towards it), and not by any 
specific theoretical mechanism that establishes conflict between discourses, something which the LCE 
framework covers by bringing to the forefront questions of hegemony and antagonism.  
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elements had to be abstracted from the conceptualised model and established as analytical 
categories whose content varied in each image. In other words, the analytical categories 
had to be present in all the images of the future that were constructed from the interview 
data, but the specific content of each analytical category in a given image of the future 
was different from the content of the analytical categories in the other images. These 
analytical categories do not replace the conceptualised model of social practices of Hu-
man-VDI interaction; instead, they present the hollow structure of each image of the fu-
ture, with the data gathered from the interviews providing the content of the structure.  
There are five analytical categories which were deemed to be the most relevant for 
providing contrasts in the ideal types of the images of the future. These are the following: 
1) Continuing bonds. It focuses on how the living might continue the relationship 
with the deceased in some way or form.  
2) Mourning process. This category focuses on how the living come to terms with 
the reality and permanence of death, and the characterisation of the process from 
the dislocation caused by the death event to either the concealment or the ac-
knowledgment of a) discourse’s radical contingency, b) the affective investment 
in fantasmatic narratives, and / or c) the material, emotional and identificatory 
support the deceased provided for the living.  
3) Degree of humanlike interaction. This category concerns the way the human in-
terlocutors approach their interactions with the VDI, in terms of how they think 
of what the nature of the VDI is and/or how they act towards it. These leads to 
different forms of interaction, where applicable, or alternative forms of human 
behaviour towards the VDI.  
4) Setting of interaction. This category has two different dimensions to it. The more 
visible one and relatively easy to determine is the spatial and temporal environ-
ments and conditions under which Human-VDI interaction occurs. The less visi-
ble one – and one which may transcend a single physical space and timeframe – 
is subjective dimension, wherein the human interlocutor assesses his or her inter-
action with the VDI as taking place within a private setting or a public setting. A 
public setting might imply either in plain view of many others, or an institutional 
/ organisational environment within culturally appropriate timeframes.  
5) Reasons for immortalisation. This category comprises the reasons why the human 
interlocutors decided to engage in interaction with the VDI, as an avatar of the 
deceased individual, or why they refused to interact with it. It focuses on why, 
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through interaction with a VDI, the human interlocutors choose to immortalise a 
deceased person, or the way the original individual is socially treated after death 
in the absence of the VDI. 
In the next chapter, the narratives that constitute the content of each ideal type of the 
images of the future are described, and their elements examined through the CLA method. 
The deep examination enabled by CLA yielded not only four different ideal types of im-
ages of the future that display social practices of Human-VDI interaction, but revealed 
different ways in which people in 2040 would relate to issues of death and mourning as 
expressed via their interactions with the VDIs.  
5.4 Methodological limitations 
This research presents some limitations that are both internal to the methodological ap-
proach taken and external to it. In terms of the data gathered, the interviewee profile, 
while diverse and valuable in getting different perspectives on Human-VDI interaction, 
was still restricted in terms of diversity. Particularly, senior interviewees (those aged 60 
and older) were lacking, with only one agreeing to be interviewed. This is derived from 
the linguistic limitations of both the researcher and the interviewees, given that they 
would need to speak to each other in the same language and be fluent in it. The researcher 
can speak fluently in English and Spanish but cannot communicate adequately in other 
languages. Senior interviewees, unless they were part of a globalised industry and/or reg-
ularly interacted with people from other cultural contexts and nationalities, are unlikely 
to have the linguistic skills to express themselves confidently in a foreign language in an 
interview setting. Additionally, it is not an unrealistic assumption that some seniors might 
be uncomfortable talking about death, mortality and mourning. This was in fact expressed 
by the sole senior interviewee in this thesis. This assumption made the researcher hesitant 
to try to actively recruit other senior interviewees, as causing unnecessary distress to the 
participants would be unethical.  
Another limitation in terms of the interviewee profile is that the perspectives of Af-
rican people are not accounted for. Although effort was made to contact several African 
people who had expressed interest in this topic or who were acquaintances or friends of 
the initial interviewees, they all either declined, were unavailable or did not respond to 
the invitation. Therefore, African perspectives on death, time and technology might be 
absent from the ideal types of images of the future presented in this thesis. 
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A final limitation regarding interviewee profile relates to the fact that, because some 
interviewees were recruited by following the snowball sampling technique, the views that 
constitute the basis for the images of the future are mostly presenting the perspectives of 
a professional, well-educated class of individuals. Perspectives from indigenous people, 
people living in poverty conditions, and those without a formal education are excluded, 
which might leave out other ideal types regarding how these groups, among others, would 
engage with the VDI in an encounter with it. However, the different images of the future 
suggest that homogeneity is not an issue, as there is at least one image that challenges 
hegemonic discourses within which social practices focused on Human-VDI interaction 
are performed.  
Another limitation concerns researcher positionality and how this relates to the use 
of CLA as a method. Although the researcher is Mexican and is well aware of cultural 
differences between Europe and Latin America as geopolitical regions, he has many years 
of education in Western institutions, and his academic perspectives are heavily influenced 
by the Western project of modernity. As such, by using CLA as a data analysis tool, this 
Western and modern perspective filters through the analysis and interpretation of data. 
This issue notwithstanding, a critical stance towards modernity and Western views is also 
present, to a lesser extent, in the content interpreted via CLA.  
A final limitation might be related to the ideal type framework adopted for classifying 
the images of the future. Because ideal types are abstractions, their content is based on 
similar patterns identified in each of the interviews. However, as with any social phenom-
enon, the images of the future rarely expressed elements of only one ideal type, with 
elements of two or even three other ideal types often having secondary or background 
presence in an interview. For this reason, it could be argued that the abstractions distort 
the message of the images of the future as it is expressed by the interviewees. Neverthe-
less, as stated by Rubin (2013, p. S40), a person may simultaneously hold multiple images 
of the future which, by virtue of being expressed by a single person, may conflict with 
one another or manifest contradictory elements. To remain faithful to each interview in 
its integrity, the most salient elements and the overall message of the interviewee were 
taken into account for the construction of the ideal types. Quotes from their interviews 
are therefore predominantly found in only one ideal type, unless they described elements 
of equal importance for other ideal types.  
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6 IMAGES OF THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL PRACTICES FOCUSED 
ON HUMAN-VDI INTERACTION: A CAUSAL LAYERED 
ANALYSIS 
6.1  Four ideal types: Ambivalence, Restoration, Concealment and Autonomy 
Four images of the future were constructed based on the data. The first step was specify-
ing the criterion that is used to establish substantive differences between the ideal types 
of the images of the future of Human-VDI interaction and its associated social practices 
in 2040. The criterion for the separation of images of the future into four distinct ones is 
the relation the Human-VDI interaction has to death and mourning practices in 2040. 
More specifically, the criterion for separation focuses on the different ways the Human-
VDI interaction acknowledges (or not) the implications of death and facilitates (or com-
plicates) mourning. As stated in the previous chapter, the analytical categories constitute 
the structure of the images of the future of social practices focused on Human-VDI inter-
action. Taken together in an image of the future, the content of these categories offers 
tentative answers for the effects of Human-VDI interaction on the subjects’ manner of 
relating to mortality and to mourning.  
Following this criterion, there were four ideal types constructed from the data, based 
on the overall tone of the narrative and a theoretical analysis from the insights presented 
in chapter 3. Different elements of the envisioned social practices were brought together 
according to the opinions expressed by the interviewee about potentially interacting with 
a VDI, with commonalities between them revealing patterns that could be condensed into 
an ideal type. The researcher’s own knowledge was then used to place some elements 
according to their thematic correspondence with the rest of an ideal type’s elements. 
Briefly summarised, the four ideal types are: 
1) Ambivalence – The interaction between human and VDI is of a personal nature. 
It takes place mostly in a setting that is considered (reasonably) private by the 
human interlocutor, which may constitute part of everyday life or be central as-
pects of personal rituals. The name “ambivalence” points to a mixed acceptance 
of death, where the ambivalent behaviour is based on the normalisation and rou-
tinisation of the VDI in everyday life. Parallelly, it is also an acknowledgement 
towards the permanence of death, yet it is set in the background of the subjects’ 
mind. It is thus a simultaneous reminder of love and loss. Within this ideal type, 
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users want the functional and/or fantasmatic benefits of the dead while acknowl-
edging that it will be an incomplete experience. 
2) Restoration – Human-VDI interaction is neither normalised nor routinised as part 
of everyday life but is focused exclusively on mental healthcare and/or on helping 
the human interlocutors face death-related issues and solve problems of personal 
nature. The goal of having a person interact with a VDI is to orient him or her 
towards death acceptance: acknowledging the fragility of life, the possibility that 
it could end at any moment, but still engaging in life-sustaining activities. An-
other possible goal would be to guide the person in his or her mourning process, 
supervised by either a close social contact (family member or friend) or a mental 
health professional, with the acceptance of the radical contingency of the sub-
jects’ fantasmatic narratives and the subjects choosing to integrate the loss as part 
of their lives being successful outcomes.  
3) Concealment – Human-VDI interaction is also highly normalised, and it takes 
place within institutional contexts. The interaction here is of instrumental nature 
and to minimise the disruption that a death event would have on an organisation. 
The intended aim of the social practices focused on Human-VDI interaction 
within this ideal type is to conceal the permanence of death by ensuring the con-
tinuity of institutional dynamics and minimising risks caused by the absence of 
the original individuals. Because death goes unacknowledged, subjects cannot 
face its implications consciously. 
4) Autonomy – In this ideal type, there is an active avoidance of interaction with the 
VDI. Though Human-VDI interaction is present in the contextual background of 
this image of the future, the subjects here aim to achieve an acceptance of death 
by traditionally culturally acceptable means. Autonomy here is reflected in both 
the personal journey of the mourning process18, and in autonomy from advanced 
electronic technology. Regarding autonomy from this technology, the expecta-
tion here is that any kind of relationship the living have with the dead should not 
be mediated by modern electronics, but instead be the result of a social and a 
personal process.  
                                                     
18  On the idea of the personal journey of mourning, the adjective “personal” does not intend to imply the 
mourning process only occurs in an individual level, in the privacy of one’s thoughts. The experience 
of mourning someone is unique for everyone, because it is quite dependent on the specific relationship 
two people had. Mourning, as is discussed in the literature review, is personal, relational, and com-
munitarian and even political.  
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Of the four images of the future, the Ambivalence one is the most extensive, as it 
involves a greater degree of complexity regarding the acknowledgement of the implica-
tions of death and of mourning by its subjects. Meanwhile, the Concealment image is 
arguably the least developed image because few interviewees specified the different im-
plications of the presence of the VDI for organisational dynamics. This results in more 
qualitative empirical material being used for some images than for others, leading to an 
imbalance in the amount of detail among the images of the future. Despite this, because 
the interviews yielded enough contrasting content for the analytical categories, four im-
ages were obtained.  
Although a more extensive description in narrative form will be provided for each 
ideal type in each of the following sections by specifying the content of the analytical 
categories, the above summaries of the images of the future should provide meaningful 
contrasts between the ideal types, allowing the reader to begin to identify different ways 
in which the subjects relate to death and to mourning based on how the VDI is integrated 
into social life. Although the integrated content of the analytical categories is described 
in detail to introduce each image, a comparison of their values for each ideal type is pre-
sented in Table 2: 
Table 2: Content of the analytical categories for each ideal type 
Analytical 
Categories 
Ambivalence Restoration Concealment Autonomy 
Continuing 
bonds 
Ongoing 
routinised 
interactive 
connection with 
the dead, 
personal nature. 
General. 
Externalised via 
technological 
medium.   
Ongoing time-
bound interactive 
connection, 
personal nature. 
Specific. Both 
internal and 
externalised via 
technological 
medium.  
Ongoing 
interactive 
connection. 
Formal, 
impersonal. 
External.  
Ongoing 
bereaved-
initiated 
connection, 
personal nature. 
Internal.  
Mourning 
process 
Complex, 
ambivalent; 
weak recognition 
of dislocation. 
Initially complex, 
later successful. 
Dislocation is 
recognised.  
Blocked or 
complicated 
mourning. 
Dislocation is 
concealed.  
Successful 
mourning 
eventually 
accomplished. 
Dislocation is 
recognised.  
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Degree of 
humanlike 
interaction 
High humanlike 
interaction. 
Subjects 
acknowledge 
technological 
nature of VDI.  
Low humanlike 
interaction. VDI 
understood as 
technological 
artifact.  
Human to 
system 
interaction.  
Rejection of 
interaction with 
VDI. VDI 
understood as 
technological 
artifact.  
Setting of 
interaction 
Private setting 
(both tangible 
and emotional 
dimensions).  
Private or 
private-
institutional 
(professional 
therapy). 
Public, 
organisational 
setting.  
Random, 
impersonal 
setting with VDI. 
Internal 
continuing bond 
in private or 
personal settings.  
Reason for 
immortalisation 
Sentimental-
pragmatic. 
Sentimental-
therapeutic. 
Instrumental. Non-
immortalisation 
via VDI. Other 
means of 
immortalisation.  
 
The sensitising scheme that conceptualises the social practices of Human-VDI inter-
action, located at the end of chapter 3, is meant to help the reader go through the analysis 
of the images of the future in this chapter. While an overview of each ideal type is pre-
sented by describing the content of the analytical categories, a theoretical analysis that 
integrates the insights from the interdisciplinary literature review provides the content to 
address in the layered analysis: after reviewing conventional discourses that might 
emerge in the litany layer, the characterisation of the practices start in the system / social 
causes layer with the core activity of Human-VDI interaction and how the different pro-
cesses involved in interaction unfold in the ideal type being examined. This is followed 
by describing what form the constitutive elements of a social practice adopt in that image 
of the future. From there, the deeper discourses and metaphors of the Death-constituted 
society are discussed in the following layers, and the chapter ends with an assessment of 
hegemonic and marginal images of the future and their relevance for themes of mortality 
and mourning.  
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6.2 Ambivalence: Human-VDI interaction and orientation towards life 
The Ambivalence image of the future presents a picture of Human-VDI interaction being 
routinised as part of everyday life in the lives of the human interlocutors. This routinisa-
tion occurs in the personal lives of the interlocutors, with the continuing bonds being 
personal in nature and the relationship between the living and the dead generally under-
stood as being ongoing, not final. The Ambivalence image displays a complex mourning 
process, where the implications of a death event produced a dislocation in the human 
interlocutors’ discursive reality and fantasy life; though the permanence of death is 
acknowledged, it often occurs in the background of the subjects’ psyche, and rarely 
emerges in explicit ways within the social practices enabled by Human-VDI interaction. 
The VDI can be said to provide some comfort to its human interlocutors, and reconfigures 
the material, emotional and identificatory supports of the subjects by embodying them in 
a technological medium. Subjects, however, also acknowledge that the death event had 
real consequences, and the new supports embodied in the VDI are of limited nature and 
cannot substitute the ones offered by the original (now deceased) individual.  
The Ambivalence image features a form of interaction that is perceived by the human 
interlocutors in humanlike terms; what this means concerning the specific technical af-
fordances of the VDI varies from person to person, but the VDI should produce in its 
human interlocutor the effect of making him or her think it is humanlike and should be 
approached as if it were a person. The spatial environment and temporal conditions are 
characteristic of a private setting, with the subjective dimension being characterised by 
undercurrents of affection: Human-VDI interaction would take place during special com-
memorative occasions or in moments throughout the day where the human interlocutors 
would have interacted with the original individual in an intimate manner. The reason for 
immortalisation can be characterised as sentimental-pragmatic, given that the subjects 
wish to re-experience some aspects of the joy engendered by the relationship they had 
with the original individual, but because they acknowledge the permanence of death, they 
look for a technological medium to evoke generally diminished but still joyful aspects of 
the relationship.  
The narrative pattern of the Ambivalence image of the future, abstracted from the 
different interviews, can be characterised in the following manner:  
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1) The subjects (i.e. the human interlocutors of the VDI) begin their daily activities 
in a private setting, usually their home. During this time, previous to work-related activ-
ities, the subjects engage in interaction with other loved ones who are alive and share their 
same physical setting, unless they live alone.  
2) If the subjects live alone, and the original (now deceased) individual used to live 
with them, the subjects might engage in brief, routinised interaction with the VDI in terms 
of greetings. In some cases, the VDI helps them by reminding them of some scheduled 
activities the human interlocutors had planned for later that day or interacts with them 
during breakfast.  
3) The subjects leave their private setting and carry out their work-related activities. 
If retired, they still leave their home to carry out other activities.  
4) After finishing work or their other activities, the subjects go to a place where they 
would interact with the VDI in a conscious manner. The VDI would be a family member, 
a spouse or a friend.  It might be their home, or it might be another location they consid-
ered private and associate with the original (now deceased) individual. They engage in 
interaction in a variety of ways: they talk, they might have a meal together, or do another 
leisure or recreational activity (depending on the technical specificities of the VDI). Alt-
hough the human interlocutors enjoy this moment, there might be underlying feelings of 
emptiness, sadness or nostalgia.  
5) The subjects decide to stop interaction with the VDI and continue with their daily 
activities. Unless set up in a way where the VDI has a high degree of autonomy, they do 
not expect to interact with it until they so wish.  
This narrative pattern suggests that social practices of a personal nature with the VDI 
might allow for a continuation of activities they once derived pleasure from when per-
formed with the original (now deceased) individual. The overall tone of the narrative 
manifested feelings of comfort, although undercurrents or sadness and nostalgia are also 
present though not necessarily clearly articulated. Despite a generally positive opinion of 
the concept of the VDI and their interaction with it, the interviewees nonetheless ex-
pressed some hesitance and concerns about the presence of the VDI in their lives, men-
tioning that interaction with the VDI might generate feelings of grief or lead to the ap-
pearance of mental health problems. This is where the ambivalence is expressed more 
clearly: because the VDI is a technological embodiment of the relational component of a 
person and only exists because the original person died, its human interlocutors have a 
conflicted relationship with it. It reminds them of moments of both joy and grief, and 
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though most of their interactions with the VDI orient them towards life, they also prompt 
hidden or unconscious tensions with death to become routinised.  
6.2.1 Litany: The VDI allows the deceased to come back into the world of the living 
The layer of the litany would most often highlight the benefits of Human-VDI interaction, 
mentioning how it allows for the living and the dead to be reunited and engage in activities 
together. The message conveyed in the time horizon of 2040 would share many similari-
ties with those of the present concerning the VDI: the dead could come back and allow 
the living to keep them as part of their everyday life. With the VDI being commonplace, 
social practices focused on Human-VDI interaction would be seen as limiting the impact 
of death on loved ones, and perhaps could even be understood as challenging the notion 
that death implies the permanent disappearance of a person from social life.  
Bringing families together again, after the death of one of its members, would be a 
central theme in the litany layer. Dac Kien, a Vietnamese young adult, illustrated this via 
a hypothetical example: if a son were to die and his parents missed him, “this kind of 
device [the VDI] can allow them to see and feel their son again” (Dac Kien, personal 
interview). Similarly, Carolina Olabuenaga, a Colombian adult woman, expressed: “it's 
definitely like an extension of life. Like what I told you, it's like a virtual reincarnation” 
(Carolina Olabuenaga, personal interview).  
These statements showcase an apparent desire for immortality, with technology be-
ing the tool to stop the undesirable consequences of death from happening. Relating back 
to the anthropological insights on death, the VDI here is offering a form of symbolic 
immortality for the dead, one that can extend social life. The virtues of technology are 
exaggerated as well, with the language used overstating the actual affordances of the VDI 
and the way the human interlocutors engage in interaction with the VDI.  
The ambivalence itself might also manifest itself in the litany layer, in this case by 
also highlighting the potential risks and dangers that Human-VDI interaction entails. Loss 
of control and mental health issues become prominent aspects of the downsides to Hu-
man-VDI interaction. Jakov Ouromov, a Bulgarian/Russian young adult, mentions: “for 
mental health, this is really bad because when people die, when a person dies, it is a big 
issue for you personally. And then having again his copy… and another person dies, and 
then you get her copy, and… I don’t know. It just gets crazy” (Jakov Ouromov, personal 
interview).  
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Overall, one might expect the conventional discourse to generally focus on the ad-
vantages of engaging in Human-VDI interaction and having the VDI become part of the 
everyday routine. At the same time, other viewpoints might emphasise the problems often 
ignored with Human-VDI interaction. However, neither would be a nuanced perspective, 
with exaggerations being present in both discourses. At the litany layer, then, ambivalence 
comes in the form of contradictory, magnified statements.  
6.2.2 System / Social Causes: The social practices integrating Human-VDI interaction 
in everyday life in personal settings 
The system / social causes layer is concerned with the social practices centred on Human-
VDI interaction. In contrast to common approaches to this layer which take a macro-level 
perspective in research of large social phenomena, the microsocial focus of this phenom-
enon requires that attention be directed to the constitutive elements of a social practice: 
materials, competences, meanings and connections. The analysis of these and how they 
affect the manner the subjects relate to death and mourning is the focus of this layer.  
As stated, Human-VDI interaction is the focal activity that, as routinised into every-
day life, becomes a social practice. The motivational processes of the interaction are in-
timately linked to the reason for immortalisation of the deceased individual in the form 
of the VDI. In this case, the motivation behind the interaction resides in being able to 
recall and re-experience previous moments with the original (now deceased) individual 
and derive positive affects from them. For the VDI, the motivational processes would 
entail fulfilling its coded parameters for interaction. As stated by Juan Ignacio Alcántara 
Montesinos, a Mexican young adult, the interaction with a VDI may help “you remember, 
or relive, or go through the same experiences you had with other people. I believe that 
feeling or experience can be appealing” (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal 
interview). While this could be considered a “healthy” way of engaging in Human-VDI 
interaction, there is another reason which displays the ambivalent aspect of this image of 
the future: bringing back the dead into embodied form via technological means as a way 
to cope with the loss of someone. This is expressed in Carolina Olabuenaga’s remarks: “I 
would really try and see how I feel about it. Only until you lose someone and see how 
they interact with it [the VDI], could you say with more certainty” (Carolina Olabuenaga, 
personal interview). 
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The structuring processes in the Ambivalence image indicate that the categorisation 
of the interaction between human interlocutor and VDI would fall under “personal” fram-
ings of an encounter. Regionalisation processes as part of structuring processes are linked 
to the setting of the interaction, in this case a private setting. As is the case, not only is 
the place a location that the subjects consider personal and comfortable, but it is often 
only populated by themselves, the VDI and others who are close to them and also used to 
have a close relationship with the original individual. This is best illustrated by Jakov 
Ouromov’s account, which takes place during a typical weekend in 2040:  
“After [finishing work], I went to visit my grandma in her apartment. 
And there is this hologram of her. She is like… the spirit of this apartment 
where she was living during all her life. And without her, it is pretty 
empty… But the hologram is nice. You can come in and turn it on. When 
you turn the electricity when you go inside, there the hologram appears. 
And, like, it speaks to you, how was your day, what was your life, how your 
kids are growing” (Jakov Ouromov, personal interview).  
For Jakov, the VDI’s presence in a place he associates with joyful moments in his 
childhood evokes memories and seems to bring the energy and presence of the deceased 
via a technological medium in what would otherwise be an empty space devoid of life 
and, in consequence, of the pleasant feelings it induces. In this case, the structuring pro-
cesses of categorisation, regionalisation and routinisation converge: the category of “per-
sonal” assigned to the encounter seems to affect Jakov’s subjective perception of the set-
ting, leading him to interpret it as a comfortable, private space and decide to make visits 
to it as a common activity during his weekends.  
Patterns similar to Jakov’s, which are valued positively by the subjects, can be ex-
pected to be the most common in the Ambivalence image. Nonetheless, ambivalence 
arises because the reanimated presence of the dead in the same familiar setting can also 
become confusing, overwhelming or distressing for the human interlocutor. Anahita Gol-
shiri, an Iranian young adult, describes it in the following terms: “Sometimes you feel it 
doesn’t make sense, sometimes you think you will feel something [by interacting with the 
VDI], and sometimes you would think, ‘I wish she were here’. And sometimes it would 
feel good, and sometimes not. Sometimes you would think she is not here” (Anahita Gol-
shiri, personal interview). Here, there seems to be a contrast between the feelings ex-
pected and what the actual outcome of the interaction is regarding the subjective appre-
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ciation of the space, with the underwhelming effects of the interaction on the human in-
terlocutor’s emotional state apparently increasing the desolation felt in the setting where 
the interaction takes place.  
As described in the theory, the interactional processes would have some elements 
fixed, particularly the roles of each interactant. Since the VDI and its human interlocutor 
would be replicating dynamics the latter had with the original (now deceased) individual, 
it would mean that the VDI only has a very limited number of roles, those it was pro-
grammed with for it to engage in interaction with its expected interlocutors. This would 
be the result of the relational component of the original individual becoming embodied in 
the VDI, perhaps by using the original individual’s digital persona as reference. The hu-
man interlocutor, meanwhile, would mostly occupy the role he or she had in relation to 
the other person. As Dac Kien expresses in relation to how the VDI would function when 
in interaction: “When one family member wants to talk to the dead person, the story in 
the bank of information will be chosen automatically to interact with this person” (Dac 
Kien, personal interview). This suggests that it would mostly be the relational data that 
would be summoned by the VDI’s algorithm when in interaction, which would result in 
a mostly fixed role. Unless there were some malfunction or some negative affectivity was 
involved, it is unlikely that the human interlocutor would attempt to adopt a different role 
than they had in the original relationship.  
The analysis of the processes in Human-VDI interaction can be complemented if the 
elements of a social practice are brought to the forefront and some of their expressions 
are examined. Starting with the element of materials, the hardware and the forms of em-
bodiment are very variable. Some imagine it as being pure software within a physical 
device, similar to an application in current smartphone devices. Within this form, the 
VDI’s form of embodiment may be limited but still possess some humanlike qualities. 
An example includes a cartoonish, or non-realistic, embodied form: “One of the ones I 
imagined was a virtual avatar. I don't know if you've seen the new emojis coming out on 
Samsung and iPhone devices. It's like a cartoon of the person who moves his eyes just 
like you, and opens his mouth just like you” (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, per-
sonal interview). Others, in contrast, would prefer it to be a realistic, but intangible, form 
of embodiment: a hologram or a 3D projection of the person. Referring to a VDI of her 
grandmother, Wai Ling, a Chinese woman, describes its embodied form: “I would see the 
face of my grandmother that we took from a file and we are virtually recreating it. It 
would be exactly like she was, but I think I would see her face and she would be laughing 
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or something” (Wai Ling, personal interview). Finally, there were others who imagined 
the VDI as a fully tangible identity, as in Natalia Gómez’s, a Mexican woman, recreation 
of her mother: “[I imagined it] as a robot, as I saw in the image. I imagined it like this. 
Well, rather like an android with her appearance” (Natalia Gómez, personal interview). 
The software component is similarly variable in its functionality, but it seems to ad-
here to the basic criteria that qualify a virtual entity as a virtual human: “If the entity’s 
core personality, actions and thought processes are those of a human, then it should qual-
ify as a virtual human” (Burden and Savin-Baden, 2019, p. 9). Some wish a VDI to have 
a more comprehensive set of functions that involve some autonomy from the human in-
terlocutor, as is the case with Natalia Gómez’s VDI of her mother: “I met her in the 
kitchen, she had already prepared coffee. We chatted for a while. And I imagined that 
[dynamic] throughout the day. As if it was someone who lived in the same house as I did” 
(Natalia Gómez, personal interview). Others, however, would only focus on the conver-
sational component: “We could also interact like… we could have a direct conversation. 
It could be like the previous conversations with the dead person” (Dac Kien, personal 
interview). What can be grasped from these accounts is that the hardware and software 
components of the VDI would combine to produce an interaction experience suitable for 
the subjects’ needs for emotional, routinised company. In the case of tangible VDIs, the 
materials of the social practices would not be limited to those of the medium of commu-
nication, but would also involve those elements of the physical setting involved in per-
forming social practices of the home, such as preparing a meal or carrying out a joint 
activity.  
The competences displayed in the practices centred of Human-VDI interaction would 
be bound to the amount of autonomy the VDI has been set up with, in the case of the VDI, 
and to both the technical skills and cognitive state of the human interlocutor. When the 
VDI is a software that only has agency inside a hardware device, the VDI’s competences 
of most importance would be those of an advanced virtual human, and the human inter-
locutor’s technical competences would require that they know how to handle such a hard-
ware device. The interviewees’ accounts suggest that such devices would not be particu-
larly complex, with an easy user interface similar to those of social networking sites now-
adays: “It would be like the messenger in the sense that I could log in to the app, and they 
would appear and talk, and I would share them my stories, my sorrows, my hobbies” (Dac 
Kien, personal interview). The other crucial aspect here is that the VDIs need to be able 
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to sustain a long conversation as if they were human. It is this feature that gives them their 
humanlike quality and produces the everyday rituals that sustain social life.  
The accounts presented so far portray Human-VDI interaction as embedded in the 
routines of the subjects, and as such it is important to discuss how this routinisation of 
Human-VDI interaction might sustain life and orient subjects away from death, as occurs 
in a Death-constituted society. Recalling Scheff’s ideas on talk and bodily communication 
as ritual (1990), the expression and transmission of emotions seems to be what drives 
Human-VDI interaction: “For me, the most important thing is their face and the emotion 
on their face. That would make me happy to interact with them much” (Dac Kien, per-
sonal interview). Though the VDI, as a non-sentient being, could not have a genuine emo-
tional reaction, the VDI’s emotional expressions would seem to hold special significance 
for their human interlocutors. The generation of positive affects in the human interlocu-
tors via talk and bodily communication would be a powerful force that strengthens the 
social bond they feel towards their close circle of family and friends. A strong social bond 
would probably be necessary for a symbolic transcendence of death, and from the per-
spective of the human interlocutor, it is possible to interpret the VDI as a technological 
mechanism through which the dead can regain some agency in the world of the living, 
symbolically transcending death.  
Because Human-VDI interaction could also involve taking part in life-sustaining ac-
tivities such as eating together, and shared meals are reciprocal acts which both reaffirm 
the social bond and provide nutrients to living beings (Seale, 1998, p. 157), interacting 
with the VDI as part of the routine of the home life would constitute the continuous re-
newal of life as experienced by the human interlocutor and the dismissal of the threat 
posed by death. This is reflected in Carolina Olabuenaga’s depiction of an interaction 
with a VDI of her husband: “I would have him in person all the time, like being at home. 
It would be something like ‘What are we going to eat today?’, And he would answer 
‘Well, I would not eat anything, but we can eat what you want’” (Carolina Olabuenaga, 
personal interview). In this case, the routinisation aspect of a social practice is fore-
grounded by the fact that the VDI would be permanently present in Carolina’s house as a 
resident in her home. Despite the limitations of the VDI of not being able to eat, it would 
nonetheless take part on the life-sustaining ritual of a shared meal. In this way, Human-
VDI interaction orients the interlocutors towards life and away from death.  
While most interviewees’ accounts involve the avoidance of the threat of death by 
engaging in talk or in life-sustaining activities, there is some hesitation on the quality of 
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Human-VDI interaction. If low-quality, or if disrupted by a technical failure, a negative 
emotional reaction could be observed: “I feel that if it tries to be realistic and failed, and 
it will probably fail in at least one detail, the experience would be ruined” (Juan Ignacio 
Alcántara Montesinos, personal interview). Juan Ignacio’s statement is useful to see the 
integration of the material features (in this case, hardware and software) and how they 
contribute or detract from the experience of talk and bodily communication, leading to an 
ambivalent evaluation of Human-VDI interaction. In the case of malfunction of the tech-
nical components or misrepresentation of the deceased, the VDI could generate an unde-
sirable effect that disrupts not only the experience of interaction but could also break the 
illusion of the transcendence of death. The consequences, then, would be that the inter-
locutors would realise the permanence of the death of the original (now deceased) indi-
vidual, and the magnitude of the loss would become apparent, as evidenced by Anahita 
Golshiri’s remarks: “Well, I’m sure this device can’t be complete. It can’t be my friend. 
You know, it has some… faults” (Anahita Golshiri, personal interview).   
The references to bodily communication and technical malfunctions suggest that con-
sidering the uncanny valley effect for the Ambivalence image would be necessary if the 
aim is to interact with the VDI in daily life. Having the uncanny valley effect emerge 
during interaction might discourage the VDI’s human interlocutors from further interac-
tions with it. The degree of sophistication of both the algorithm and the user interface, 
then, would need to be advanced so as to offer meaningful bodily communication signals 
in addition to generating the reactions that match those of the original (now deceased) 
individual. This does not, however, imply that a realistic form of embodiment is the only 
option. Though for Jakov Ouromov a hologram that closely mimics her grandmother’s 
physical features is preferable, for Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, a cartoon version 
is a better option. This suggests that a version of the VDI which simultaneously reminds 
the interlocutors of its artificial nature without disturbing them should be a goal of its 
design, at least in the time horizon of 2040.  
The element of meanings of the social practice theory as expressed with Human-VDI 
interaction needs to be addressed as well. The different future stories of the interviewees 
point to the fact that the meaning often given assigned to the interaction with the VDI 
could be characterised as that of a continuing bond: the subjects view the VDI as a tech-
nological extension of the original (now deceased) individual, and their interactions with 
it follow the same dynamic as in the original relationship as much as the hardware and 
software allow for such a dynamic. But another meaning was also discovered, albeit with 
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much less prominence than the continuing bond: that of the ancestor. Natalia Gómez de-
scribes the possibility to collect as VDIs the family members from different generations: 
“Imagine, you organise a meeting or a meal, and there you have Grandma, Grandpa, 
Mom, you all have them there. So, am I going to have my house full of those robots 
already? How am I going to do it? [she laughs nervously]” (Natalia Gómez, personal 
interview). While depicting this situation, Natalia did not evaluate it in positive terms. 
Instead, she viewed having the different family members as indicative of unresolved is-
sues with death. This could mean that in a setting where the VDIs were common, having 
one of them for each family member who died could possibly complicate the mourning 
process. A frame where the previous generations are treated as sources of wisdom is not 
often considered. A possible interpretation of this could be the clash between an image 
the future where the current trends of late modernity, including advanced electronics, are 
extrapolated, and the influence from pre-modern practices of ancestor veneration.  
Ambivalence on this, however, can also be observed if Natalia herself adopts the 
perspective of recreating herself as a VDI, a practice of generativity that she would be 
open to, which would include “answering questions like ‘What are you doing?’ or ‘And 
when you witness this, what do you feel?’, so that they are saving the person's data. For 
example, in this case of myself, so that when they make the robot, it is the closest thing 
to me” (Natalia Gómez, personal interview). An active involvement on Natalia’s part in-
dicates that she can view herself as a guide to following generations, with her daughter 
benefitting most from her being recreated in the VDI. Ultimately, she could become an 
ancestor herself, despite the negative orientation of her interactions with VDIs of previous 
generations of her family.  
From these elements, the characterisation of the mourning process can also be in-
ferred. Mourning when a person is involved in Human-VDI interaction as routinised into 
a social practice is itself ambivalent. By reintegrating the loss into their everyday routines 
via the VDI, Human-VDI interaction allows the human interlocutors to continue experi-
encing a familiar and comforting dynamic, with an underlying weak recognition of the 
loss. By having the VDI in their presence, the human interlocutors can recall their previ-
ous experiences and, at least for those that can occur in the boundaries of the home, have 
a chance to reinvest themselves in life-sustaining activities. Conversely, there is always a 
lurking danger of a technical malfunction, which results in the restored presence of the 
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original individual disappearing again, and the dislocation in their fantasy life, the mag-
nitude of the loss and the permanence of death become apparent to the human interlocu-
tors.  
Simultaneously, the differences between the original individual and the VDI could 
become too evident and increase the difficulties in confronting the loss: “Sometimes I 
need my friend, and the device cannot meet my needs. And in this point, I think it’s hor-
rible. Because sometimes I think I have my friend, or my sister, and it turns out that I 
don’t have them” (Anahita Golshiri, personal interview).  In this sense, it might be that 
the externalisation of the integrated lost other via technological means would result in a 
greater risk for the ambivalent nature of the mourning process to become overwhelming. 
How prevalent this could be, however, is a matter that should be further explored, as 
opposing accounts imply that an interaction might help in fulfilling an emotional need to 
reunite with the deceased and recognise their influence in the lives of the living: “If you 
think of a situation in which you have not seen your parents in a long time, and you miss 
them too much, a lot of the automatic action that this concept would involve would allow 
us to reconnect with them” (Dac Kien, personal interview).  
Although the ambivalence prevails, a possibility concerning the mourning process 
could be raised based on the narratives of the interviewees: the ambivalent nature of Hu-
man-VDI interaction is associated to how the living have processed the death of a loved 
one, as is proposed by Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos: “It does contribute something, 
but something that is not vital. Obviously, I also find it useful, and people continue their 
lives after their loved ones die. But it could still be good for situations where such a death 
was very abrupt” (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal interview). Insofar as the 
human interlocutors have not successfully integrated the loss into their lives after the 
death of the original individual, they could be susceptible to experiencing increased grief 
when a VDI malfunctions. If, on the other hand, they have confronted the magnitude of 
the loss of their loved one and acknowledged the permanence of death, Human-VDI in-
teraction might offer renewed feelings of joy and the possibility to encounter an external-
ised, technological form of the lost other.  
6.2.3 Discourse / Worldview: Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism – Technol-
ogy to overcome mortality 
Social practices centred on Human-VDI interaction emerge from and are governed by 
what can be described as Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism: a discourse that 
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embraces and promotes various ways, actual or symbolic, in which technological means 
can help humans to overcome their mortality and extend their presence in the world of 
the living. It offers a symbolic return of meaningful others granted by technological 
means in the form of the VDI. This discourse possesses three constitutive features – a 
symbolic return of the dead, technological replication of the deceased by integrating data 
into social algorithmic entities and the personal nature of the relationship between the 
VDI and the Human interlocutor – that are likely to be found across a variety of cultural 
landscapes where social practices of Human-VDI interaction are common.  
This discourse can be considered as one of the techno-optimistic responses of Post-
Mortalism to thanatophobia, which frames death as something undesirable and to be 
feared. Techno-optimism is reflected in the discursive construction of technology as an 
inherently positive force for human dynamics, as expressed by Natalia Gómez’s under-
standing of technology as a concept: “like the tools we need but they evolve, with tech-
nology being the force that gives us those tools” (Natalia Gómez, personal interview). 
This notion of technology evokes forward motion by reference to evolution, which is 
commonly associated to linear, if contingent, progress from a lower state or condition to 
an upper state of being or improved condition. In this case, the condition to be improved 
by technology is death, which implies the cessation of existence in the world. The mani-
festation of thanatophobia within Ariès’ fourth model of death, “the death of the other” 
(1981), generates anxiety by contemplating the deaths of meaningful others: “If you are 
a collectivist family, as in Iran, death is the biggest phobia of most families in Iran. You 
think, ‘Oh, what if my brother, my sister, my parents… My neighbor, even, sometimes…’ 
in the event they pass away, what should we do?” (Anahita Golshiri, personal interview). 
Discourses where thanatophobia dominates display signifiers concerning negative emo-
tional states and reactions (anxiety, horror, fear) circling around the concept of death.  
Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism as a discourse, then, could give meaning 
to practices focused on Human-VDI interaction by providing a framework of interpreta-
tion where the VDI is not simply a device to be used, but a technological extension of a 
person who has died. Therefore, the VDI would constitute a form of symbolic immortality 
(Lifton and Olson, 1974) when viewed in this manner. Within this framework, the VDI 
dissipates the subjects’ fear and horror of permanently losing their loved ones after the 
latter’s deaths by enabling for some form of reunion in the world of the living via tech-
nological means, perhaps by harnessing the data of his or her digital persona. In this sense, 
the emergence of social practices based on Human-VDI interaction could be seen as both 
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an individual and a sociocultural response that this discourse offers against the threat of 
death (in this case, the death of others) and thanatophobia more generally. 
The replication of a person into a social algorithmic entity can be related back to the 
fourth element of social practice theory: that of connections. In this case, it is connected 
to the paradigmatic vision of datafication and to the production, gathering, analysis and 
application of data for a variety of purposes. In a sense, datafication finds a tangible ex-
pression in Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism through the VDI’s algorithm, and 
the existence of the VDI would be partially influenced by a context in which practices of 
datafication are not only present but viewed as desirable and thus encouraged.  
Social practices of Human-VDI interaction acquire meaning within the discourse of 
Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism, and arguably are only able to become prev-
alent within it. Post-Marxist discourse theory can offer a deeper examination into this by 
characterising these social practices as discursive practices; that is, these practices are 
governed by a set of linguistic markers which privilege some signifiers over others, allow 
for the constitution of hegemony and enter an inter-discursive struggle with other prac-
tices. To illustrate the constitution of meaning via discursive articulation, the interpreta-
tion of the VDI and the effects of Human-VDI interaction by the human interlocutors are 
necessary: “You would have a chance to talk and to communicate with the people, your 
relatives, who have died” (Dac Kien, personal interview). In this description of the phe-
nomenon, the signifier “communicate” is linked to the nouns “people” and “relatives”, 
indicating that the VDI, at least to some degree, embodies elements of the deceased, being 
a technological equivalent of them. Something similar occurs in the case of Anahita Gol-
shiri’s dynamics with her VDIs: “When they send their voice, I can feel them with me. I 
think, ‘Ok, they are with me. We are with each other’” (Anahita Golshiri, personal inter-
view). This implies the presence of the deceased in the world of the living as manifested 
via the material aspects of the VDI, in this case the voice archives that emerge during 
interaction. The nodal points in this discourse are those that imbue the VDI with a degree 
of personhood and portray a personal relationship with the living: “people”, “relatives”, 
“family”, “friends” and similar signifiers become  the linguistic markers which, in sym-
bolic terms, equate the VDI with the deceased.  
In terms of the Logics of Critical Explanation framework, this points to practices of 
Human-VDI interaction as being governed by a social logic of technological revivalism: 
a discursive logic within which Human-VDI interaction routinely and continuously un-
folds as if the VDIs were, at least partially, the deceased. From the human interlocutors’ 
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perspective, the VDI is a technological mechanism which brings back the relational com-
ponent of the dead and enables them to participate in social life. The signifiers which 
convey personal relationships and attachments, such as “family” and “loved ones”, are 
the nodal points through which the discourse acquires meaning, and these are articulated 
with other signifiers related to technology: “messenger”, “apps”, “hologram”, “robot” and 
so on. While the VDIs would not be able to assess their condition as a technological en-
tities (unless it was coded with commentary that displays this awareness), the human in-
terlocutors would indeed respond to them as if they were alive and refer to them in living, 
personal terms. Therefore, the social logic of technological revivalism can be said to en-
dow technological artifacts (in this case, the VDI) with attributes of personhood, and al-
lows subjects to carry out activities with them as if they were alive.  
The social logic of technological revivalism which governs practices of Human-VDI 
interaction is supported by fantasmatic logics of immortalisation19: the unconscious nar-
rative mechanisms which take thanatophobia as their foundation and view death not only 
as a problem, but as the ultimate problem which must be overcome. The beatific dimen-
sion involves the successful victory over death by finding means to extend one’s presence 
indefinitely in the world of the living, while the horrific dimension foretells of the extinc-
tion of the self if death results victorious. Fantasmatic logics of immortalisation reinforce 
social logics of technological revivalism by orienting the subjects towards life-sustaining 
activities, either symbolic ones (e.g. conversational activity that strengthens the social 
bond) or biological ones (e.g. having a meal together with the VDI), and away from death. 
Therefore, fantasmatic logics of immortalisation sustain the social logics of technological 
revivalism by ensuring that subjects derive satisfaction from performing activities involv-
ing the VDI, unconsciously investing the subjects in life. This is best reflected in Dac 
Kien’s opinion on the potential of the VDI: “I hope it would become real, because it helps 
me to connect. If this kind of thing happens in the future, how could I be more scared of 
death? It would be like, ‘Ok, I die, but I still have connection with the people that we 
love’” (Dac Kien, personal interview). 
                                                     
19  Despite the overall discourse being called Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism and the contrast 
between Immortalism and Post-Mortalism being established, the fantasmatic logics of immortalisation 
still play a role in Post-Mortalist discourse. The logics of immortalisation are unconscious drives 
which attempt to protect the self from disappearance, in this case by death. Though they do so in a 
different way in Post-Mortalism than they would do in Immortalism – in Post-Mortalism, death is 
experienced but reverted or overcome; in Immortalism, death is avoided altogether – fantasmatic 
logics of immortalisation are still active in the unconscious and reinforce social logics.  
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 Because political logics emerge from an antagonistic struggle with other discourses, 
drawing symbolic boundaries between them, it is challenging at this stage to characterise 
the political logics. A relevant theme for political logics involves highlighting the positive 
effects of Human-VDI interaction, which could be to help combat loneliness: “I would 
have contact on the phone or something with the robot [the VDI]. If I needed to tell some-
thing to someone, and no one was available, she [the VDI] would be the one to talk to, I 
think” (Natalia Gómez, personal interview). Such practices would not be limited to Hu-
man-VDI interaction, however, as they could emerge from a broader political position 
which promotes technology’s potential for social companionship purposes: “[In a video] 
they showed us some villages in Southeast Asia. And there is an old woman there, and 
all of her children are not in the village. And then some robots are there, eating dinner 
with the old woman. They help her in her job, and other things” (Anahita Golshiri, per-
sonal interview). This position would encourage viewing some technological devices as 
techno-social entities, presenting contrasts with discourses which suggest viewing them 
as instruments is more appropriate, or with those that reject the infusion of human attrib-
utes to technological artifacts. These political logics could be labelled political logics of 
techno-anthropomorphism, given that they advocate for the ever-increasing incorporation 
of technological devices into social interaction dynamics, defend an interpretation of them 
as if they were the deceased, and foster the addition of humanlike qualities to them so that 
they can faithfully mimic human behavioural features.  
Taken together, social logics of technological revivalism, fantasmatic logics of im-
mortalisation, and political logics of techno-anthropomorphism govern social practices 
focused on Human-VDI interaction by imbuing them with linguistic meaning, making 
them discursive practices as well. Technological revivalism logics operate in the repro-
duction of everyday life dynamics, structuring via language Human-VDI interaction and 
characterising the VDIs as the dead brought back to life. Fantasmatic logics of immortal-
isation support them by offering the symbolic possibility to obtain victory over death and 
orient subjects to life-sustaining activities. Finally, political logics of techno-anthropo-
morphism promote viewing social algorithmic entities and advanced robots as humanlike, 
resulting in framing their integration into social dynamics in favourable terms. The inter-
play of these logics, the practices of Human-VDI interaction and the broader discourse of 
Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism is schematised in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3: Discursive logics and social practices of Human-VDI interaction – Ambiv-
alence image.  
Figure 3 shows (discursive) social practices of Human-VDI interaction as they are routinely performed, 
expressed via the arrows surrounding the ellipse. Because the performance is normalised, it occurs within 
a synchronic dimension, where the social logics of technological revivalism imbue the practices with mean-
ing. Social logics stand on the unconscious drive for immortality, and have been instituted and defended by 
political logics of techno-anthropomorphism.  
 
Within the discourse/worldview layer, a deeper examination of what occurs with the 
mourning journey of the subjects is required, as mourning becomes not only about pro-
cessing the loss, but about acknowledging their inner fantasy life adopting an ethical 
stance in relation to discourse.  
A first approach to explore how mourning occurs (or does not occur) in Personal 
Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism would be to ask the following: what kind of mourning 
process is encouraged by this discourse? This answer is related to the way technology 
operates in the performance of these practices and to the awareness of the loss as felt by 
the VDI’s human interlocutors. In relation to the role of technology, Juan Ignacio Alcán-
tara Montesino’s preference for a non-realistic appearance of his VDI provides some 
clues: “I feel that if it is very faithful, but there is something that fails, it would create that 
contrast of believing that it is the real person, but when it fails, you would think ‘Ah, it is 
not’. It is that specific detail” (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal interview). 
Given that Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism offers a fantasy of loved ones 
overcoming death by technological means, technical glitches or failures would break the 
fantasmatic narrative that conceals the permanence of death and the absence of the de-
ceased. In that sense, the limits of technology might lead to the disruption of experience 
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and affect during an instance of Human-VDI interaction, and might also lead the subject 
to adopt a critical stance towards said practice, recognising the radical contingency of a 
discourse that attempts to “resurrect” someone or their overinvestment of affect in the 
technological embodiment of the relational component of the deceased. From this per-
spective, it can be affirmed that technological features contribute to the ambivalence that 
defines this image of the future: a faithful replication of the original individual’s behav-
iour in the VDI during interaction with the human interlocutors might strengthen the fan-
tasy of the reunion of loved ones, whereas technical malfunctions might weaken it or 
dissipate it, leaving the subjects to fully confront the magnitude of the loss.  
This leads to the second question concerning mourning and Personal Techno-opti-
mistic Post-Mortalism: how does this discourse enable or restrict the ethics of mourning? 
In other words, how can the mourning journey and the integration of loss be characterised 
within this discourse? Anahita Golshiri’s statement illustrates a complicated, conflicted 
journey: “With this device, they would always feel that they don’t have their mother or 
their father… It is good, but it can be horrible, I think, because sometimes we need to 
forget something, and this device doesn’t let us to forget something” (Anahita Golshiri, 
personal interview). The ambivalence is again at the forefront here, where detachment 
from the deceased is positioned as the desirable goal, and the inability to achieve this 
detachment because the presence of the deceased in the form of the VDI is what produces 
negative affective reactions.  
In other instances, however, Human-VDI interaction not only encourages the recol-
lection of positively valued memories, but enables the recognition of the interior fantasy 
life and identificatory, symbolic and emotional supports the original individual embodied, 
as emphasised by Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos: “I think this technology could 
change the way a person sees death. And it would help to separate the real person and the 
image they had of that person, from the person who died. And reassess and see the inter-
action in a different way before it died” (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal 
interview). This quote suggests that continued interaction with the VDI by the human 
interlocutors could help in identifying the fantasmatic underpinnings of personal narra-
tives and in understanding how the deceased supported the subjects’ fantasy life, some-
thing that Glynos (2014) argued has to occur during mourning. A conscious recognition 
of the technological nature of the VDI could reveal the fantasmatic elements that used to 
emerge during interaction with the original individual. If this were to be the case, then the 
contrasts between the interaction with the VDI and the interaction with the original could 
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lead the VDI’s human interlocutors to reassess the benefits they derive from Human-VDI 
interaction and to comprehend the complexity of human life and of the loss they have 
experienced: this loss encompassing not only the physical separation but the disappear-
ance of dreams, ambitions, a sense of safety, and even a part of themselves that was in-
vested in the deceased.   
Therefore, when it comes to the ethics of mourning raised by Glynos (2014), the 
interviewees’ accounts allude to the possibility that Human-VDI interaction could com-
plicate or even block mourning to the degree it positions the VDI as a substitute or an 
avatar of the deceased and fails to meet unrealistic expectations regarding its faithfulness 
to the deceased. Conversely, insofar as Human-VDI interaction allows subjects to identify 
those fantasmatic elements that constitute their psychic lives and that framed their rela-
tionship with the original (now deceased) individual, the phenomenon can be said to ori-
ent subjects to confront the contours of Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism and 
its associated fantasies, it can strengthen the ethics of mourning. For this reason, the lim-
itations of the VDI while engaging in interaction with it might disinvest affective attach-
ment in it, while favouring a creative integration of the lost other into the self.  
A final comment regarding Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism is how it can 
connect and morph according to other discourses with which it intersects. In this case, the 
influence of capitalist discourse should be noted. All the interviewees, even those who 
disliked the concept of Human-VDI interaction and offered alternative images of the fu-
ture, envisioned the structural possibility of the commodification of personal data for the 
purposes of designing a business models centred on the VDI, as in the case of professional 
services dedicated to replicating the deceased as faithfully as possible. Karl Suotamo, a 
Finnish man, hypothesised the following: “barring any unforeseen things, seeing that 
these are already existing situations, I can speculate that at some point there will be an 
already existing developer, or a start-up and they will be bought up at some point” (Karl 
Suotamo, personal interview). What is to be highlighted here is that the business sector is 
likely to lead the development of such a technology, offered as a service to those people 
who wish to be symbolically reunited with their deceased loved ones. Moreover, other 
profit-seeking practices could emerge for a fee that include the VDI as part of the experi-
ence: “You could also have it as a paper session service, like the séances or psychics of 
old. And they would… I could see it as being a more exploitative branch. But of course, 
people being people, people would exploit it” (Karl Suotamo, personal interview). This 
possibility shows that Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism can be combined with 
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practices of commodification which are part of capitalist discourse: the relational compo-
nent of the person (maybe in the form of its digital persona) can be commodified and sold, 
and grief can be exploited in the pursuit of profit.  
6.2.4 Myth/Metaphor: The communicating man’s relational information 
As the deepest layer of CLA, myth/metaphor aims to evoke images which symbolise that 
which captures a core foundational premise upon which the upper layers are built. For the 
phenomenon explored in this thesis, that of social practices focused on Human-VDI in-
teraction, suitable myths or metaphors are those that point to core premises of the concepts 
of life, death, and personhood. The complexity of the phenomenon for the Ambivalence 
image also resides in its core metaphor: the communicating man (Pecchinenda, 2017).20  
The communicating man is one of the metaphors for what a human being is, the 
central idea of what constitutes its specific features and identity. According to Pecchi-
nenda, the defining aspect of the communicating man is his ability to communicate and 
create tools that enhance such communication: “humans are communicating beings, par-
tially structured by a sort of impulse to show himself, to ‘get himself out’, that motivates 
him” (Pecchinenda, 2017, p. 146). It is this innate impulse to communicate that pushes 
man to design technological systems and artifacts that operate according to the commu-
nicative nature of humans, and which facilitate the transmission of messages from one 
being to another. Crucially for Pecchinenda, the communicating man, the need for com-
munication is shaped by historical occurrences and dynamics that emerge from them. 
With the rise of theoretical cybernetic models following World War II, the metaphor of 
the communicating man came to stand for a social entity comprised of the whole of in-
formation which can be transferred across networks, and which is embedded in a social 
structure where exchange of information with his counterparts is the norm (Pecchinenda, 
2017, p. 147).  
This metaphor of humankind exhibits characteristics which arise from modernity’s 
goals concerning human domination of nature and its fight against death. In this case, the 
communicating man’s desire to create technological tools that enhance communication 
                                                     
20  The communicating man is the concept offered by Gianfranco Pecchinenda (2017) when discussing 
the metaphors of humankind and strategies for immortality. All his metaphors are about “man”, alt-
hough they refer to humankind as a whole. Although a gender perspective should be applied, and a 
neutral term which represents all of humankind would be preferred, this thesis remains faithful to the 
concept of Pecchinenda, despite the disagreement on the use of the term “man” instead of “human”.  
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mirrors the desire of the creators of the VDI to control extensively the kind and amount 
of information that a VDI has about the original individual, which in turn could manifest 
in an interaction. When Dac Kien was describing how he envisioned the technical aspects 
of the creation of a VDI, he explained:  
“This device can be good if… If I get a hold of this device, and I use 
it… the alive person [that is, the person in a time previous to his or her 
death] can refine the information he or she wants to share. For example, 
if there is some information that is not good information and it can hurt 
the other ones… If it can hurt anything, it’s not good” (Dac Kien, personal 
interview).  
Dac Kien’s quote showcases the ambivalent stance regarding the information that 
could be used to create the VDI. In this case, a risk is perceived regarding how the VDI 
could conceivably share in the course of interaction sensitive information that the original 
individual would have liked to keep hidden from others. For this reason, the management 
of information, an expression of control, is regarded as a positive action to take when 
designing and providing inputs for the VDI.  
The desire to control the constitutive information of the VDI would not relate only 
to privacy concerns, however, but to the desire to extend oneself via technological means, 
in this case using information obtained from communication processes. In the communi-
cating man’s metaphor, even if it is absent from the network of social relations in which 
he is embedded, his place and his uttered messages remain. This has parallels with what 
the VDI offers for the deceased in their network of social relations. Considering the com-
municating man’s features, control of the information that constitutes the core of the VDI 
by the original individual (in the process of creating it, should he or she be still alive 
during this process) would mean exerting control of oneself for a post-mortem presence 
in the world of the living: “If there is something like settings in this device, I can modify 
the settings so that depending by myself on the circumstances, I can share the information 
I want to share” (Dac Kien, personal interview). By exercising this control over the infor-
mation held by the VDI, the implication is that the living are managing their post-mortal 
existence, allowing for some continuity by providing embodiment to the relational (and 
communicative) features of a person. Hence, the VDI as an expression of the communi-
cating man, illustrated in its involvement in Human-VDI interaction, would feed the fan-
tasy of immortalisation by offering post-mortal presence in a world characterised by com-
municative capabilities are understood to be the central features of a human being.  
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In sum, the communicating man metaphor showcases the communicative skills of 
the human being and crystallises the relational component of a person within the network 
of the social relations he or she is part of. This confers to the data and information of a 
person personal attributes, allowing them to be interpreted as an extension of the deceased 
himself / herself. This structures Personal Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism, which rea-
sons that the VDI is can be assigned personal and social characteristics and constitutes a 
form of symbolic immortality. As seen, this discourse structures the practices in the upper 
layers, which integrate the VDI into everyday life and, in conventional discourse, would 
allow for “reunions” between the living and the dead.  
This image of the future contributed to the pedagogy of death by exploring the am-
bivalent forms of relating to mortality and of undergoing mourning when engaging in 
interaction with the VDI. It offered the texture of an envisioned personal experience 
wherein the VDI is integrated as part of a personal routine, being a continuous reminder 
of the mortality of others (and, for some, their own mortality). It showed that people can 
incorporate elements related to death in their daily lives, but the extent to which they 
would reflect on them varies according to personal experience, discourse and the tech-
nical capabilities of the VDI. The subjects’ ambivalence portrayed in relation to how the 
VDI oriented them to death acceptance and mourning in this ideal type implies that the 
social practices of Ambivalence image also adopt an ambivalent stance concerning a ped-
agogy of death: on the one hand, the dead continue to be present, to some extent, in tech-
nological form, bringing mortality to the foreground of their lives; on the other hand, this 
presence may reduce familiarity with mortality insofar as the dislocation caused by their 
deaths in the lives of the living is weakly acknowledged, if at all.  
6.3 Restoration: the VDI as instrument to gain death acceptance 
The content of the Restoration image’s analytical categories depicts social practices 
where Human-VDI interaction is not part of the everyday life of people, but is instead 
meant for specific therapeutic purposes or for providing emotional stability when subjects 
are feeling distressed or are incapable of successfully navigating through the mourning 
process. As with the Ambivalence image of the future, the Restoration image presents 
instances of continuing bonds between the living and the dead that are of personal nature. 
The continuing bonds, however, only emerge for a limited time, usually in the context of 
explicitly thinking about the deceased. This might be due to the subjects wishing to reach 
a conclusion of an unresolved issue with the original individual prior to his or her death, 
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or to request concise advice on personal matters. The continuing bonds has an existence 
independent to that of the VDI, although under some circumstances the VDI can also be 
considered an externalisation of the bond if it clarifies for the user some aspects of the 
personal relationship between him or her and the original individual.. The Restoration 
image owes its name to the fact that what is being restored is the reinvestment of the 
subjects to new life experiences and / or emotional stability that had been previously lost. 
This is reflected in the mourning process, where there were complications in accepting 
the loss caused by the death of the original individual and its impact in the lives of the 
living. However, acceptance of death and of the permanent changes this event has brought 
to the lives of the subjects is gradually reached by precise, focused dynamics of Human-
VDI interaction.  
Within the Restoration image, the subjects are generally aware of the loss of their 
loved ones, which is at the forefront of their interactions with the VDI. This awareness 
means that the VDI is predominantly understood as being a technological construction 
during Human-VDI interaction, even if it stands symbolically for the deceased. The VDI 
is perceived to be displaying relational information of the original individual to the human 
interlocutor but, in the human interlocutors’ eyes, is not an extension of the original indi-
vidual in technological form. It is rather a device which is deliberately infused with mean-
ing by the subjects, a process of which they are aware. For this reason, the common in-
terpretation reached by subjects is that they are “using” a technological device.  
The setting continues to be perceived as private by the human interlocutors, although 
it stands apart from the one in the Ambivalence image in two ways. The first is that, in 
contrast to the Ambivalence image where subjects autonomously integrate the VDI into 
their everyday routines, within the Restoration image Human-VDI interaction is guided 
or facilitated by a third party which the human interlocutors trust, such as a close friend 
or family member, or a therapist. The second way is that this private setting might, if it 
occurs under a formal therapeutic process, also be characterised as institutional, given the 
specific goals of Human-VDI interaction in this context. These therapeutic goals can be 
considered the reason for immortalisation – the purpose does not aim to recreate normal 
patterns of behaviour and activities that the subjects and the original individuals used to 
enjoy together, but attempts to allow subjects to face the implications of death at an exis-
tential level and to creatively integrate the loss of their deceased loved ones into their 
lives. Consequently, the reason can be characterised as sentimental-therapeutic. In other 
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words, were subjects’ orientations toward life become threatened by their inability to ac-
cept the fragility of life that the prospect of death imposes, or were they to find themselves 
struggling to come to terms with the permanence of the death of their loved ones, a sim-
ulation of the deceased as manifested in the VDI might re-orient them towards life.  
The overall narrative pattern of the Restoration image can be summarised in the fol-
lowing sequence: 
1) Someone experiences a personal problem which produces emotional distress. 
2) The decision to engage in interaction with the VDI is considered, either by the 
person who experiences the personal problem or by a third party whom the person 
of focus trusts (family member, friend or therapist). 
3) The third party supervises, facilitates or mediates Human-VDI interaction.  
4) Human-VDI interaction allows the person of focus to feel better, to obtain 
knowledge on how to face a problem or begins to remove the obstacles that com-
plicate or block the mourning process.  
5) Once the goal of the interaction is achieved, Human-VDI interaction ceases.  
This narrative pattern of the Restoration image suggests that social practices focused 
on Human-VDI interaction are not as common or do not have widespread acceptance in 
a given context. Whereas the Ambivalence image integrated the VDI as social compan-
ions in daily life, the Restoration image abandons the social potential of the VDI to re-
frame it as a technological tool that can help solve specific problems that manifest them-
selves at the personal and microsocial level. The interviewees’ opinion of the VDI within 
this image is that it is beneficial when Human-VDI interaction is limited, goal-oriented 
and supervised, but harmful when the VDI becomes a normal component of a person’s 
life because it can create dependence and distort cognitive processes. The overall tone of 
these narratives is conflicted and mournful, although they end on an optimistic or even 
hopeful note. This is where restoration can be observed: what is restored is not a past 
condition or relationship, but a willingness to engage in life-sustaining activities by ac-
cepting human fragility and the implications of losing a loved one.  
6.3.1 Litany: Human-VDI interaction as therapy or emotional counselling  
The layer of the litany in the Restoration image would focus on the envisioned advantages 
offered by the VDI in terms of mental health and its use during the mourning process of 
grief-stricken subjects. Media outlets and social networking sites could be using headlines 
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exaggerating the benefits of Human-VDI interaction for coming to terms with loss of a 
loved one.  
The VDI would be framed as a cure for complicated mourning or for overwhelming 
grief. In contrast to the Ambivalence image where the focus was on reuniting loved ones 
after the death of one of them, in the Restoration image the central theme highlights men-
tal health issues. As is the case in the present with many forms of contemporary psycho-
logical discourse in the English speaking world, the psychological discourse in 2040 on 
topics related to death and to mourning could still involve a problem-solving narrative, 
where grief and melancholia are perceived as problems that require a solution, instead of 
a natural experience that subjects go through when someone close to them dies (Leader, 
2009). For this reason, statements such as the following could be characteristic of the 
litany layer in some cultural contexts: “I think being able to heal and being able to accept 
that the other [the original individual who died] is no longer here is going to be achieved 
by using the humanoid robot who represents the deceased [the VDI]” (Natalia Gómez, 
personal interview). This view of Human-VDI interaction depicts the natural reactions to 
loss as illnesses from which one can be healed. In consequence, the complexity of mourn-
ing and the role of melancholia disappear from conventional discourse on Human-VDI 
interaction as part of a therapeutic process.  
6.3.2 System / Social causes: Social practices of supervised Human-VDI interaction for 
therapeutic purposes or for solving specific personal problems 
Although initially social practices of Human-VDI interaction in the Restoration image 
would seem to present minor differences in regard to the way the VDI is approached by 
its human interlocutors, the substantive aspects of social interaction display significant 
contrasts to the Ambivalence image. In the framework of Turner’s (1988) social interac-
tion theory model, the motivational processes in the Restoration image would see the 
human interlocutor seeking gratification in the form of concluding unresolved issues of 
personal nature by entering an interactional situation with the VDI, as evidenced in the 
account of Thomas Hubbard, a British young adult: “If you are using it in a way to sort 
of… potentially you didn’t say something to someone before they died, and you’ve sort 
of wish you’ve had, I think that could be useful for some people” (Thomas Hubbard, 
personal interview). Whereas in the Ambivalence image the sources of gratification cen-
tred on the generation of positive affects for the human interlocutors and on the VDI 
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aiming to behave according to its coded parameters, in the Restoration image the motiva-
tion arises from a specific emotional or mental health issue that Human-VDI interaction 
could help in addressing. In this sense, the scope of the goals of interaction would be 
circumscribed to resolving those issues.  
The reason for immortalisation would be similarly limited in scope, as the purpose 
shifts from replicating interactions with the original individual as part of everyday life to 
obtaining specific benefits from the interaction. This would imply that those who created 
the VDI in the Restoration image foresaw potential problems, often but not exclusively 
related to death and to mourning, that affected them at some indefinite moment in the 
future, at which point they would decide to engage in interaction with it. This restricted 
scope is also reflected in the tangibility of the continuing bonds, with the VDI being an 
external manifestation of a mostly internal bond, as evidenced in the perspective of Al-
berto García, a Mexican young adult: “More than anything, it helps you remember. I see 
it more like this. I don't have a perspective that in some other situations it could be useful” 
(Alberto García, personal interview). The quote exhibits a specific goal, which is remem-
bering the deceased. The main continuing bond is active internally, in the subjects’ psy-
che, and this is complemented by the presence of the VDI in the external world. This 
leads to an interpretation of the motivational processes of an interaction as being more 
practical in nature in the Restoration than in the Ambivalence image, yet still focused on 
matters of emotional relevance for the subjects’ personal lives.  
The structuring processes in the Restoration share a slightly closer resemblance to 
those in the Ambivalence image: the categorisation processes still confer the meaning of 
a personal encounter with the VDI and the regionalisation processes involve a setting that 
is considered private by the subjects. There are, however, differences in a few elements. 
For the regionalisation processes, the ecology and demography change. Whereas the Am-
bivalence image portrayed a variety of locations where the human interlocutors felt com-
fortable, it is likely that the locations in the Restoration image are limited to specific 
places inside the home (e.g. the bedroom or the living room) or in the therapist’s office. 
Additionally, the Restoration image always features a third person that facilitates, guides 
or mediates the interaction with the VDI: “I think it could be useful, if guidance were 
present. Specifically, if there was someone there facilitating it, an interaction with that 
purpose [to accept the death of someone]” (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal 
interview). Finally, the routinisation process either becomes formalised by its integration 
into a formal therapeutic setting, or only takes place occasionally, when the emotional or 
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mental health issues present obstacles for the subjects. Routines, as they are commonly 
understood, can be said to disappear if no formal therapeutic process is taking place.  
The interactional processes are again characterised by fixed roles for the VDI and the 
human interlocutor and a generalised frame in the encounter that allow them to interpret 
each other as having a personal relationship. But these processes are slightly altered by 
the required presence of a third party whose role might change. The third party might be 
an observer trying to examine how the human interlocutor engages in interaction with the 
VDI. He or she might also be a facilitator, either suggesting to the human interlocutor to 
act in a certain way towards the VDI or generating inputs for the VDI’s behaviour. Per-
haps the most active intervention of a third party would be that of mediator between the 
VDI and the person of focus who would get the benefits from the interaction. To illustrate 
this point, Alberto García’s narrative involves him at some point engaging in interaction 
with a VDI of his mother to ask for advice and help his brother, who is struggling with 
some emotional issues: “If this device managed to save or have my mother's way of re-
flecting and advising, I think I would resort to this device to know what to do. To have 
the correct answer and then know how to support someone” (Alberto García, personal 
interview). In this case, the third party, Alberto, is actively engaging with the VDI to ask 
for advice himself, but the resulting benefits would not be directed to him but to his 
brother, who is going through complicated mourning in his narrative. Therefore, the third 
party as mediator becomes a central figure in the interactional encounter as well, although 
the purposes would be of a more instrumental nature than those of the main human inter-
locutor.  
Turner’s framework of social interaction remains useful as long as the framing of the 
encounter involves living humans and a technological entity to which they attribute social 
characteristics (i.e. a social algorithmic entity). There is, however, an alternate framing 
which, based on the main interview data of the Restoration image, is equally prevalent 
and dominant in the subjects’ psyche: that of the VDI as a tool or instrument. Though this 
is more explicitly discussed in the Discourse / Worldview layer, the main idea here is that 
the VDI is deprived of its social characteristics in the construction of meaning by the 
subjects who are in its presence. What happens instead is that they approach it as an arti-
fact that can help them fulfil certain needs: “I think it depends on how it’s used, for ex-
ample, if it’s for therapy then it’s actually great, if you’re using it with a therapist” 
(Thomas Hubbard, personal interview). In this account, the therapeutic process resorts to 
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the VDI as an instrument which can be used to accomplish delimited goals. Though de-
tails on the behaviour of the therapists were lacking in the narratives, the overall tone of 
the interviews suggests the VDI would be controlled by the humans in the therapeutic 
setting and given specific commands so that the goals of therapy could be achieved.  
The manner in which the core activity of the social practices in the Restoration image 
– either Human-VDI interaction or the use of the VDI as an instrument by the subjects – 
becomes linked to the other elements of social practice theory displays a number of sig-
nificant variations. Concerning the material component, the VDI could either faithfully 
resemble the original (now deceased) individual as in the Ambivalence image or be lim-
ited to basic hardware and software that serve as a repository of knowledge of the de-
ceased person. The reason for this would probably be related to the specific purpose for 
approaching the VDI, as expressed in Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesino’s description of 
the VDI’s characteristics while undergoing a therapeutic process:  
“My first intuition is that it would need to resemble as much as possi-
ble the original person. But I don’t know about any specific psychological 
theories or suggestions that would change this approach. For instance, 
modifying it to make it an improved or a worse version than the original 
person to force out some reaction or process in the patient” (Juan Ignacio 
Alcántara Montesinos, personal interview).  
In this version of a therapeutic process, the degree of humanlike interaction could be 
described as high, with the resemblance to the deceased and then the differences the VDI 
exhibits being part of the goal to orient the subject towards mourning by facilitating the 
integration process of the lost other into the ego. This way, perhaps, the subjects under-
going therapy would relinquish a desire to be reunited with him or her in a physical, tan-
gible way – a form of detachment from the deceased – and  allow themselves to continue 
living after incorporating personality traits, insights and admired attributes of the lost 
other into the self – a form of healthy melancholic identification with the deceased.  
Conversely, however, when the VDI is limited in its hardware and software features, 
the purpose might not be to allow for mourning but to ask for specific, personal advice, 
as in Alberto García’s imagined VDI: a small electronic speaker with his mother’s voice 
(Alberto García, personal interview). Such a version of the VDI was envisioned as it was 
perceived as suitable for the exceptional circumstances in which it would be used. The 
restricted features of hardware and software reaffirm the alternate framing that considers 
the VDI as an instrument to be used, foregrounding the technological components and 
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pointing to the subject’s way of accepting the loss of someone loved: “I would be moti-
vated to use it is in a moment of weakness, or reflection. Not by choice, it is not something 
I wanted to do. I feel like there would have been a choice, but I always refused” (Alberto 
García, personal interview). This reasoning exhibits a desired mourning process by de-
tachment, by clearly distinguishing the living from the dead and by describing the mo-
ment of deciding to use the VDI as a moment of weakness. Nonetheless, the fact that it 
was also a moment of reflection suggests that the actual mourning journey ended in a 
form of melancholic identification in the subject’s psyche which is cherished, something 
disrupted by the decision of using the VDI as a repository of her mother’s relational com-
ponent. The material component here would make this a low-degree form of humanlike 
interaction, if the term can be applicable at all.  
Here it is again relevant to raise the issue of the uncanny valley effect. The supervis-
ing person in the Restoration image would need to assess if the intended goal of Human-
VDI interaction requires a form of the VDI that closely resembles the physical appearance 
of the original (now deceased) individual, or if a more disembodied form of the VDI is 
actually better suited to meet the intended goal. This is subject to vary according to the 
specific issue being addressed, as well as the personal preference of the interactants in-
volved. However, particular attention must be paid to the uncanny valley effect here, 
given that the instances of Human-VDI interaction are for very specific purposes and a 
comfortable setting is an expected feature that enable the goals of Human-VDI interaction 
to be met. Therefore, any glitch or malfunction needs that results in the uncanny valley 
effect should be avoided in the Restoration image, unless engendering that feeling of al-
ienation and discomfort is part of the objective to facilitate the recognition of the contrasts 
between the VDI and the original individual. 
If the framing of Human-VDI interaction is adopted, the competences involved in the 
social practice would be the emotional skills to be aware of (initially) and regulate (later 
on) the emotional response when in the presence of the VDI, as the human interlocutor 
would have acknowledgement of its artificiality (that is, recognising that the VDI is a 
device), but the VDI would still simulate being the original (now deceased) individual, as 
speculated by Natalia Gómez: “I think it takes a lot, a lot of maturity. A lot. To accept 
that this is not the person. They are only your memories made robot” (Natalia Gómez, 
personal interview). Hence, having an artificial presence reminding the human interlocu-
tor of the deceased might be distressing or emotionally draining. The other set of skills 
that is central in the Restoration image is that of the third party. The therapist or other 
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human facilitator of the interaction would be able to guide the main human interlocutor 
through its interactions with the VDI so that an acknowledgement of the loss and the pain 
of loss is made. The VDI, for its part, would have similar features as in the Ambivalence 
image, albeit adjusted to the purposes of the therapeutic or mourning process.  
The meanings in the Restoration image vary according to the adopted framing, but 
they vary between those of a continuing bond and those of the VDI as an instrument, as 
described previously. As for the routinisation aspects that transform the core activity into 
a social practice, if the framing of Human-VDI interaction is adopted, the interactions 
would be structured and scheduled, and would circle around certain themes that are of 
importance to the human interlocutor, instead of being more free-form and spontaneous 
as in the “Ambivalence” ideal type. Conversely, if the framing of the VDI as an instru-
ment is adopted, then routinisation into an expected schedule would disappear, although 
patterns could still be identified. For instance, instances of depression or of family dis-
putes could lead to use the VDI to get some insights into the predicaments the living are 
facing. Similarly, symbolic dates (such as the cultural festivities or dates that mark mean-
ingful moments between the living and the dead) might encourage engaging with the VDI 
in some form of controlled, planned interaction.  
6.3.3 Discourse / Worldview: Techno-neutral Mortalism - Live, mourn and let die 
The differences reflected in the way the VDI is approached in the social practices de-
scribed in the previous layer reveal a different discourse at work in the Restoration image: 
Techno-neutral Mortalism. This discourse possesses two prominent features: the practical 
orientation of technology and the idea of mortality as necessary for our personal and col-
lective life.  
Here, death is not portrayed as a problem or in fearful terms, nor is it depicted as 
something desirable in itself. The central point of the Restoration image’s discourse con-
cerning death is to accept mortality as both an inescapable condition and as resulting from 
the fact that living beings are necessarily mortal beings: “I think if someone departs pretty 
early, if someone dies like early in the life, it’s really sad, but once you get to an older 
age or, like a lot older, senior, you should have gotten ready yourself for that anyway” 
(Thomas Hubbard, personal interview). This perspective on death and mortality echoes 
Todd May’s (2009) reasoning on the centrality of death for the human experience, which 
acknowledges the fragility of life but insists that dying is needed for the creation of mean-
ing. This stance towards death is complemented by technological neutralism, wherein the 
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deployment of a technique or an instrument / device that has not been designed in a way 
that restricts its usefulness to one possibility, “can be used in different kinds of projects 
and for several different purposes, each with its own positive, or negative, value charac-
teristics” (Sundström, 1998, p. 42). 
Techno-neutral Mortalism confers social practices focused on the VDI the meaning 
of resorting to a technological device that simulates being the deceased without actually 
being that person, simultaneously searching for a resolution to problems of personal na-
ture. As was the case with the discourse of the Ambivalence image, for the Restoration 
image practices within Techno-neutral Mortalism also connect with practices of datafica-
tion of the broader context, albeit in a different way. In this case, the data produced by 
the original individual and by the relationships he or she had is not understood as an 
extension of the original individual. Rather, subjects recognise that the data is assembled 
into the VDI as a technological artifact and it is them who are attributing significance to 
the VDI: “I would attribute it the meaning myself. And I would sort of be seeing that 
person in the system, but it would be me sort of anthropomorphising that system” (Karl 
Suotamo, personal interview). This quote suggests that the awareness of the artificiality 
of the VDI is central for synthesising meaning in Techno-neutral Mortalism: mortalist 
discourse is operating in the recognition that the dead are gone, with subjects assigning 
aspects of the personal attributes of the deceased to a technological device; meanwhile, 
technological neutralism supports mortalist discourse by directing this use of the VDI to 
help solve mental health issues or to succeed in mourning under guidance or supervision 
from a trusted person.  
The discursive practices in the Restoration image are also governed by three sets of 
logics emerging from Techno-neutral Mortalism. The first of these are the social logics 
of technological mourning. At work synchronically, social logics of technological mourn-
ing involve the subjects acknowledging the dislocation in their discursive reality caused 
by the death event and guide them towards successful mourning – that in which the sym-
bolic, material and emotional supports the deceased embodied for the subject are identi-
fied, leading the subjects to either relinquish their investment in the deceased or to incor-
porate them into their ego: “The moment when someone passes away, then they’ve passed 
away […]. I would like to remember them for who they were […]. I guess that’s what the 
robot [the VDI] is trying to do […]. And it’s not really the person, it’s just your memories 
of that person” (Thomas Hubbard, personal interview). As evidenced in this quote, signi-
fiers that refer to technological devices, such as “robot”, are discursively articulated with 
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signifiers related to death and mortality, such as “passing away”. These, in turn, also enter 
a linguistic chain with signifiers that signal the mourning process, such as “remember” 
and “memories”. The resulting discursive articulation emphasises the use of technology 
for mourning by allowing subjects to identify contrasts between their idealised version of 
the deceased from who they actually were as living beings, in all their social and psycho-
logical complexity. This is done by evoking memories of the deceased or by directing the 
VDI to perform certain behaviours that enable the symbolic and identificatory supports 
to be revealed to the subjects, in the process allowing them to disinvest themselves from 
the idealised version of the deceased they had constructed in their psyche.  
Social logics of technological mourning are supported by fantasmatic logics of death 
acceptance. These logics reject the fantasy of immortality, recognising the threat of mean-
inglessness posed by a permanent phenomenological experience. The fantasmatic narra-
tive here is less intuitively clear than in the Ambivalence image, but is appropriate for the 
mortalist discourse, as it focuses on living purposefully, with the projection into eternity 
being the obstacle to be overcome, and death bringing a sense or priority and importance 
to human agency: “Death is an integral – indeed invaluable – part of any human society 
and any human life. Death makes the world go around because it ensures nothing lasts 
forever” (Jacobsen, 2017a, p. 3). Although it may appear that fantasmatic logics of death 
acceptance might orient subjects towards death rather than towards life, their actual op-
eration forces subjects to confront the fragility of life by making them aware of the mag-
nitude of the loss they have experienced by the death of the original individual. The guid-
ance offered by the third party in these social (and discursive) practices is crucial im-
portance here, as this allows the reconfiguration of meaning in the subjects’ psyche and 
opens their internal world to the possibility of creatively integrating the loss they have 
suffered as part of their motivations in life: “I quite liked the idea you’ve said about ther-
apy, for example. It may potentially help with loss, as a way to sort out that we loved that 
person but not rely on that person [as embodied in the VDI]. But still remembering them, 
I think it is potentially a great use for something like this” (Thomas Hubbard, personal 
interview).  
The aforementioned logics are complemented by political logics of techno-instru-
mentalisation. As previously stated, different discourses on a relevant topic for social and 
political life enter into an inter-discursive struggle, with some emerging in a hegemonic 
position and others being relegated to a marginal one. Political logics of techno-instru-
mentalisation, although the label might seem redundant, highlight the fact that specific 
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technological devices, in this case the VDI, are perceived as being tools that allow its 
users to fulfil their goals: “The use of the device would be at a time when a brother has 
some difficult, economic or emotional situation, that he is suffering, that I do not know 
whether to intervene directly to help him, or go away” (Alberto García, personal inter-
view). As expressed in this quote, signifiers related to the instrumental nature of technol-
ogy, such as “use” and “device”, become linked to a specific problem of personal nature: 
in this case, that of a sibling who “is suffering”. The operation of the political logics of 
techno-instrumentalisation in the diachronic dimension allows them to institute as normal 
or desirable this perception of the technological nature of the VDI, not its social aspects. 
Therefore, subjects, whether they engage with it in the form of interaction or as an instru-
ment, do not view them as social entities. They are simulations of once living beings, the 
original individuals, and they evoke moments with them, but they remain, in their human 
interlocutor’s eyes, inanimate objects. 
The three discursive logics – social logics of technological mourning, fantasmatic 
logics of death acceptance, and political logics of techno-instrumentalisation – operate 
together as part of Techno-neutral Mortalism in the Restoration image. As evidenced by 
the narratives and statements of the interviewees, the nodal points of this discourse fore-
ground the instrumental, practical aspect of the VDI by referring to it as a “device” or 
“technology” to be “used”, thus depriving any meaning-making process of assigning per-
sonal traits to the VDI, as in the Ambivalence image. The mourning elements are also 
emphasised, in this case by referencing “memory” and “emotional problems” that relate 
to issues of mortality. The operation of the three logics is shown in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4: Discursive logics and social practices focused on the VDI – Restoration 
image. 
Figure 4 shows, via the arrows, the (discursive) social practices focused on the VDI as they are performed 
occasionally and, in some cases, with scheduled, formal frequency. Social logics of technological mourning 
operate within a synchronic dimension, orienting the subjects towards mourning and reinvestment in life. 
Fantasmatic logics of death acceptance support the social logics, with political logics of techno-instrumen-
talisation instituting and defending the practical use of the VDI for specific goals. 
 
Based on the characterisation of the discursive logics which operate within Techno-
neutral Mortalism, it is important to examine what the discourse as a whole contributes 
to mourning. Recalling that the ethics of mourning involve acquiring conscious awareness 
of the radical contingency of social life and of the dislocation experienced in the symbolic 
order (Glynos, 2014, p. 141), a discourse which favours these ethics must allow subjects 
to confront radical contingency and the dislocation caused by death. The Restoration im-
age shows that the three logics guide subjects to discover the boundaries of their fantasy 
life, a process wherein they acknowledge not only the permanent loss of someone, but 
also the part of themselves that they had invested in those others who have died. This 
process assists subjects in either detaching themselves from their identification with the 
deceased, or in integrating their valued aspects into their own selves while recognising 
the complexity of the original person: “I don’t think it [the VDI] is useful as a relative 
that passed away, because you’re only remembering how you’ve remembered them and 
not exactly how the person was” (Thomas Hubbard, personal interview). In consequence, 
subjects would realise the artificiality of the VDI but would approach it knowing that it 
could be of help: “I think that since it is an imitation of the person, the only ones who 
benefit from it are those who are still alive” (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal 
interview). Hence, at a personal level, Techno-neutral Mortalism is not only compatible 
with the ethics of mourning, but through the aforementioned social, political and fantas-
matic logics it strengthens the conditions for mourning to be successful.  
6.3.4 Myth / Metaphor: The Cartesian man’s body and soul 
In the Restoration image, the human attributes of the deceased disappear upon their 
deaths, meaning that the VDI possesses none of them. For this reason, a metaphor that 
accounted for the fate of the human attributes of a person once death occurred was needed 
and could be found within the framework of mind-body dualism. The notion that a person 
is comprised of a body and a soul can be thought of as a Christian variation of mind-body 
dualism which can be traced back to the philosophical ideas of Plato. This separation of 
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a person into a body and a soul is often found in philosophical discussions on mortality 
and the possibility of an afterlife.21 As a metaphor of personhood for the Restoration im-
age, the Cartesian man (Pecchinenda, 2017) reflects the mind-body dualism as a way to 
understand attitudes towards mortality and immortality, and offers an approach to inter-
pret the Restoration image’s perspectives on the VDI.22  
The ideas condensed in the metaphor of the Cartesian man draw attention to both the 
properties of the body and of the mind / soul. Emerging in the seventeenth century, “an 
anti-naturalistic and dualist idea of the human being was affirmed (res cogitans and res 
extensa)” (Pecchinenda, 2017, p. 143, emphasis in original). In the relationship between 
body and mind/soul, the body usually carried negative connotations, placing boundaries 
and risks on human existence and leading humankind on a path towards moral failure: 
“physicality would be recognised as the opponent, the obstacle, and the wretched com-
panion of the soul, to which were ascribed the weaknesses, the downfalls and all the most 
humiliating defeats of mankind” (Pecchinenda, 2017, p. 143). Conversely, the mind/soul 
was the humanising element, the one that gave rise to social and cultural accomplish-
ments: “humans are the only natural beings with culture, arts, language, history; that is, 
to say, thought and knowledge. So it is natural but also original, therefore irreducible to 
any other being” (Pecchinenda, 2017, p. 143). Seen from this perspective, the mind/soul 
in the Cartesian man metaphor is the component that constitutes the relational component 
of the person: it provides the foundations of personality, of worldview, of moral intuition. 
The body and mind/soul together would therefore comprise the whole of the person, that 
which ends up embedded in a social fabric but is nonetheless a distinct being. This singu-
larity of being has implications for the effects of death on a person and its place in the 
social world.  
This duality of body and mind/soul offers a picture of what could happen to the hu-
man attributes of a person once death occurred. The body was (and is) the element that 
grants human beings their lives but also their deaths, a perspective echoed by Clive Seale 
                                                     
21  For a deeper philosophical and non-religious exploration of mind-body dualism in the context of an 
analytic philosophy discussion of death and mortality, see Rosenberg’s Thinking Clearly About Death 
(1998), chapter 0 (methodological preliminaries), and chapters 1-4.  
22  I have taken some liberties in my approach to the Cartesian man, as Pecchinenda’s metaphor does not 
take a specific position on its different conceptualisations. My approach here is to adopt the vision of 
the Cartesian man metaphor most compatible with the data gathered from the interviews, which would 
be an Augustinian conception of the body and soul. Still, the metaphor of the Cartesian man is con-
sidered appropriate because of the emphasis on thought, knowledge and construction of meaning that 
recurs in the Restoration image.  
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(1998) from a sociological standpoint. In this sense, the body imposes mortal limits and 
implies vulnerabilities to physical trauma, illness and old age. After death, the body de-
composes and vanishes over long periods of time. In monistic accounts of personhood, 
this explains the fate of the human attributes after death (disappearance by decomposi-
tion), but to cover dualistic accounts, the Cartesian man metaphor also depicts a trajectory 
for the mind / soul: the mind remaining an immaterial substance that is able to think but 
is no longer perceptible in the physical world nor can it affect it, or the voyage of the soul 
to an spiritual afterlife, which in the Christian tradition would cover heaven, purgatory or 
hell. Some of the religious interviewees, like Alberto García, also adhere to mind-body 
dualism: “In a more earthly way and as far as I can understand it as a person, without 
religious connotations, for me life ends. […] But I am religious, so I would have to believe 
there is life beyond this earthly plane” (Alberto García, personal interview). What the fate 
of the body and the mind / soul expresses is that neither of those elements of a human 
being can be captured or replicated. The whole of a person disappears from the social 
world, being no longer able to influence it in any way. Therefore, the simulation of the 
mannerisms of a person in the form of the VDI can be nothing more than an artificial 
creation that is imbued with meaning by the living.  
The Cartesian man metaphor, then, becomes the structural foundation of the Resto-
ration image insofar as it validates Techno-neutral Mortalism by offering a framework 
which accounts for the total disappearance of a person after death, leading to the practical 
and instrumental approach to engaging with the VDI. Because the Cartesian man vanishes 
in its totality after death, the VDI cannot be the same entity, but a different one that re-
sembles the original. In turn, this exerts pressure in the upper layers to perform the social 
practices that involve the VDI in a way that this device is not integrated into personal 
routines, but is only used for specific purposes of dealing with personal issues or for ac-
complishing a successful mourning process, possibly as part of a therapeutic process. The 
VDI would therefore operate as an external, tangible tool that might strengthen an internal 
continuing bond. Although successful mourning would mostly be the result of work be-
tween the subjects and the third party which facilitates their interaction with the VDI, it 
is possible to see others assigning “healing” characteristics to the device itself.  
The Restoration image displays a more straightforward way in which engaging with 
a VDI can foster a pedagogy of death for subjects: the VDI is acknowledged as a separate 
entity, one that resembles the deceased but is ultimately different. By understanding the 
VDI as a technological artifact, subjects cultivate the knowledge that death is permanent, 
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and that the deceased cannot come back. For this reason, when using them for solving 
specific personal problems or for therapeutic purposes, they confront the magnitude of 
the impact of the death of the original individuals, recognising the permanent loss of the 
emotional, material and identificatory supports they used to embody. In the process, they 
come to terms with what they have lost and orient themselves to new life-sustaining ac-
tivities, leaving behind their previous fantasy life to generate new affective investments.  
6.4 Concealment: the VDI as organisational substitute of the dead 
Methodologically, the Concealment image was identified as a supporting aspect in several 
images of the future of the interviewees. This means that although there was no single 
interview which had the elements of the Concealment image as its main narrative, there 
were some references to its specific dynamics to allow this image to be constructed from 
the data. The limited number of explicit references implies that to cover its distinctive 
aspects, the empirical material has to be supported by more theoretical content than in 
previous images.  
The Concealment image of the future portrays Human-VDI interaction in even more 
instrumental terms, as applied to institutional or organisational dynamics. The continuing 
bonds, to the extent that the term can refer to instrumental relations, are ongoing but em-
phasise the formal and / or organisational features that become embodied in the VDI, such 
as obtaining from it specific knowledge that can enhance institutional operations or re-
sorting to it to affirm values and membership. The mourning process can be characterised 
by heavy struggles to accept death, although this does not necessarily imply the appear-
ance of negative affects that hinder the process. Instead, it means that members in the 
organisation cannot register the loss because internal culture rejects death and its disrup-
tions. There is little to no acknowledgement of the radical contingency of social life and 
no recognition of the dislocation caused by death. Therefore, the incentives to detach from 
normalised patterns of behaviour or goals are reduced.  
The degree of humanlike interaction presents unique features, as it may appear out-
wardly as if it were Human-VDI interaction, similar to that between human beings. How-
ever, the context and features of the VDI in the Concealment image suggest that human 
to system interaction is a more accurate description, given that the VDI would more likely 
be integrated into a complex technological system accessed by multiple people who are 
authorised to do so by institutional norms. As opposed to previous images, this does not 
require that the VDI is only in one place in any single moment. It can appear that way, or 
162 
 
it can appear simultaneously in different physical locations to fulfil organisational duties. 
The setting can be characterised as public, insofar as it occurs in a mostly public setting, 
in terms of space, time and perception by the social actors present in it. The defining 
features here is that there are a number of people who could be considered a group, it 
occurs in a time setting in which the interactants would be expected to be surrounded by 
others, and the interaction is not focused on personal matters but on formal ones related 
to institutional dynamics and decision-making processes. The reason for immortalisation 
is, at its core, an attempt to minimise disruption left by the absence of the original indi-
vidual. In that sense, it can be labelled as an instrumental reason, given that what is sought 
is to substitute the deceased’s organisational contributions. 
The narrative pattern of the Concealment image can be summarised in the following 
way: 
1) A problem concerning organisational dynamics, strategies or goals presents it-
self. The best person to help in its resolution has died at some previous point in 
time.  
2) Members of the organisation activate the VDI and engage with it.  
3) The problem or underlying issue which led to the activation of the VDI is solved, 
leading to the continuity of institutional dynamics.  
This narrative pattern alludes to a wider social context wherein the VDI is deemed 
an appropriate technological artifact for institutional contexts, implying a cultural setting 
where instrumentalisation of the human being is commonplace and accepted. Similarly, 
it can be inferred that the VDI symbolises a particular manner in which imagined com-
munities bound by contractual relations confront mortality in late modernity.23 Although 
a narrative tone cannot be comprehensively assessed for the Concealment image due to 
its secondary or background presence in the interviews, there are clues that alluded to 
curiosity about the potential of the VDI for organisations, meaning that its different ap-
plications, as well as its limits, were something that raised ethical questions in the inter-
viewees’ minds.  
                                                     
23  This is, of course, assuming there is continuity of the advanced forms of modernity in some territories 
and cultural contexts in the year 2040.  
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6.4.1 Litany: Active dead leaders  
The layer of the litany for the Concealment image would exaggerate the accomplishments 
and active presence of important figures in the public and private sector as they remain in 
the form of the VDI. The framing would focus on their ability to influence the course of 
organisational action after their deaths by immortalising themselves through the VDI. 
This way, their absence, though felt, will be mitigated by their VDI. 
The figure of the leader is important in the litany layer given its prominence and 
perceived social agency. This is why the litany emphasises decision-making processes 
and references historical figures who had a leadership position: “I do see it [the VDI] 
manifesting itself to offer advice. More than anything at the decision-making levels. Yes, 
to explain the ideas some scientists had. Even reprehensible people, like Adolf Hitler, for 
research purposes” (Alberto García, personal interview). Scientists and political figures 
like Hitler allude to the possibility (and resulting controversy) of creating a VDI for indi-
viduals in the scientific and academic community, as well as in the political sphere. This 
would carry risks even in conventional discourse, where the limits of symbolically resur-
recting someone via a technological device would likely be at the forefront of discussions. 
Even then, however, the ongoing virtual replication of individuals in organisations, some 
for their leadership roles and others for their integral part in its internal dynamics, would 
be accepted as a fact of contemporary life (in 2040), and rarely questioned.  
6.4.2 System / Social Causes: Organisational continuity despite the death of its mem-
bers 
Initially, the outward appearance of Human-VDI interaction would not seem to differ 
significantly from the social interaction dynamics described in the previous two images. 
Within the motivational processes, the VDI would have to fulfil its coded parameters, and 
the human interlocutor would want to obtain something from the deceased, the main dif-
ference here being that the gratification sought by the human interlocutor would be of 
instrumental and formal, rather than personal, value. The structuring processes would dif-
fer given that the demography and the ecology are characteristic of a public setting 
(groups or multitudes of people, spaces that are task-focused and where formal interac-
tions take place). The interactional processes would change slightly as well, with the roles 
fixed but the VDI would be coded with a non-specific, generalised other frame, meaning 
that it would not display any personal traits of the deceased that are not required for the 
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context, whereas the human interlocutor would be inclined to engage with it as a tool and 
not as if it were a person. For instance, in the context of discussing the VDI as a helpful 
aid for practical purposes while he performed other tasks, Thomas Hubbard described: 
“the thing of the digital assistant [the VDI] is something that I’d liked and it would be 
sort of beneficial I think and allow you to sort of have that free time to focus on the thing 
that you want to focus” (Thomas Hubbard, personal interview). Within an organisation, 
a VDI which operated according to the behaviour described in this quote could conceiv-
ably replace a co-worker involved in a joint project with the human interlocutor or an 
executive assistant who had died suddenly in most tasks expected from the original per-
son.  
This alludes to a significant difference that is not outwardly apparent at first: the VDI, 
as a tool that meets practical needs within a network of formal, even contractual social 
relations, loses human attributes and gains more technological ones (from a social con-
structionist perspective). This means that the way the VDI manifests in a public and or-
ganisational setting does not have to match how a person would – that is, confined to a 
specific location and time. Instead, it might appear as a digital immortal at multiple sites 
in an institutional space, performing its same role but acting uniquely according to the 
inputs it receives from its many interlocutors. In this way, its characteristics are perceived 
as those of a technological system more than those of a person: “I would probably say 
that you could choose it to be an integrated system in a communications field. So, let’s 
say that you probably have… if you are in a car, you probably have feeds running” (Karl 
Suotamo, personal interview). What would still characterise this concept as a VDI and 
not just a digital assistant or another technological device is the fact that in its behaviour 
it meets needs that would primarily only be able to be met by the deceased in the process 
of interaction within the institutional setting (or, in some cases, from within the institution 
to convey messages to external audiences). For this reason, behaviour matching that of 
the original individual, and not just performance of activities, becomes part of the means 
to successfully fulfil organisational objectives and roles.  
To briefly outline what human to system interaction would look like while the system 
retains its form as a VDI, insights from the domain of ubiquitous computing systems can 
be borrowed. In a human-centric ubiquitous computing system, three characteristics can 
be expected to be found. First, the system’s network of nodes should be able to assimilate 
information from the sensors which are being engaged with by the social actors in the 
system and by its surroundings. Second, the system needs to be able to locate the social 
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actors within it. Third, the different nodes of the system must relay information across the 
system. Additionally, as with other systems, protocols of access and use, as well as strat-
egies for effective user-system interaction, need to be in place (Koo, 2010). Assuming 
these characteristics remain valid for the time horizon of 2040, it can be expected that 
people in high decision-making positions would have, according to established institu-
tional protocols, privileged access to a VDI, and therefore can adjust settings to deploy 
or activate it in predetermined circumstances and in a case by case basis. If there are a 
number of human interlocutors that need to engage in interaction with the VDI, the system 
could track them and become activated at the nodes of the system nearest one to the in-
tended human interlocutors. But because such interactions might be intended for specific 
tasks or need to be secretive for organisational purposes, the VDI’s hardware features 
would need to detect the surroundings of its human interlocutors. 
These features of a VDI as manifesting through a system offer clues to the character-
istics of the materiality of the social practices focused on Human-VDI interaction. The 
hardware components of a VDI must be closely designed with the purposes of Human-
VDI interaction and human to system interaction in mind. This means that the software 
component cannot be just a program running within specific hardware waiting to receive 
intentional inputs from its human interlocutors, as could be possible in a limited hardware 
and software version of the VDI in previous images. Instead, software and hardware need 
to be integrated in such a way that it assimilates information of its physical surroundings. 
For instance, sensors might be placed in nodes in the system that detect information of its 
human interlocutors, such as the relationship they had with the original individual, what 
access they have to specific information the original individual would have had and what 
they can and cannot request from it. Though not explicitly, hardware and software fea-
tures resembling this description where brought up by the interviewees, as when discuss-
ing the example of a meeting in a work setting, Karl Suotamo framed the operation of the 
VDI in more systemic terms: “It would check and see, ‘Oh, your meeting is over’, and 
check your location and see that it heads away from meeting’s location, and say, ‘Hey, 
how did it go?’. It would be able to talk like that and make smart decisions based on being 
an integrated system” (Karl Suotamo, personal interview).  
The competences of the social practice theory necessary in the Concealment image 
significantly contrast with those of the previous images. For the VDI, a crucial compe-
tence as an interactant is related to its materiality: the ability to provide or deny specific 
information to its various human interlocutors based on the surroundings and its formal 
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and organisational relationship with them. This was not a feature that was at the forefront 
of the previous images, as the human interlocutors were few in number and the general-
ised frame was personal, which meant that the VDI expressed a more “private” image of 
the original person only accessible to those who knew him or her well. In the Concealment 
image, however, this competence is key for the organisational image, as there are various 
potential human interlocutors and not all of them can have access to the same data by the 
VDI. For the human interlocutors, in turn, the ability to be able to interact via the techno-
logical systems and get the VDI to operate in a way that the institutional goals are met is 
the main competence required of them. The subjects who were in a position of control 
over the VDI’s settings, meanwhile, would need to be able to manage them according to 
the desired role of the VDI in the organisation: “I mean, we already have personal assis-
tants so there would be the option of customising your personal assistant to adapt idioms 
and idiosyncrasies of a deceased person” (Karl Suotamo, personal interview). This idea 
of equating the VDI to a digital assistant with the added value of the original individual’s 
personal traits highlights the instrumental approach adopted within the institutional con-
text, where interactions are based on exchange and goal oriented.  
The meanings associated to Human-VDI interaction within the Concealment image 
represent a different take on the notion on the ancestor. In the case of the Concealment 
image, it is useful to recall how specific social actors might deploy symbols and state-
ments related to death and immortality within the boundaries of formal, rule-bound or-
ganisations. This is a way some institutions might become imagined communities (An-
derson, 1983; Seale, 1998), which promise a transcendence of death based on the previous 
and ongoing contributions (through the VDI) a person could make to the community. 
Again, this would involve a deployment of the VDI as a form of symbolic immortality 
(Lifton and Olson, 1974), in this case within an imagined community. This is best ex-
plained by how some people important in the creation or consolidation of an institution, 
as well as those who occupied a position of leadership within it, are remembered by it 
even after their deaths: “I can imagine that, yes. One event in which the founder of the 
Boy Scouts can come out and say some things, or an outstanding dead player who duels 
a living player in a tournament. It would be people who are special to the community” 
(Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal interview). As seen in this quote, the VDI 
could offer agency to the dead important to the imagined community on special com-
memorative occasions. In addition, it could allow new members of the organisation to 
meet them and possibly become more involved in the institutional dynamics.  
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This aspect of the VDI as an element which grants the possibility to the dead to be-
come a permanent part of their imagined communities points to the way the Concealment 
image confronts death by promoting Human-VDI interaction. For one, the VDI is intro-
duced as an element which minimises disruption, thus concealing the effects of the death 
of a person within the imagined community. In other words, because the VDI aims at 
matching the organisational role of the original (now deceased) individual, alterations in 
the performance of internal activities can be, to some extent, controlled and overcome. 
Particularly important members could return in the form of the VDI to boost members’ 
morale or to offer guidance for the remaining members of the community: “These key 
people, people who are irreplaceable and others in the community would like to see again, 
they could come back in this form and be there for a while in events” (Juan Ignacio Al-
cántara Montesinos, personal interview). The example given here, wherein the VDI ap-
pears under special circumstances so that others can consult it or otherwise interact with 
it, exhibits elements of VDI creation and deployment as a practice of generativity that 
facilitates the guidance of the imagined community and continuity of vision. In this case, 
the irreplaceability of the original individual imbues the VDI with particular significance, 
as the value of that person for the organisation is, to the extent possible, preserved 
throughout time and can be reached when needed. 
Whereas the active involvement of the VDI might be considered a practice of gener-
ativity that offers a specific manner of transcending death, the routinisation of Human-
VDI interaction in the Concealment is more closely related to the mourning process of 
the members of the imagined community. In contrast to the previous images, the Con-
cealment image features organisational dynamics where the original person is function-
ally replaced by the VDI in terms of its role and performance do not allow for the loss of 
that person to be registered. It is here that blocked or complicated mourning can emerge, 
as the activities carried out within an institutional setting are goal-oriented, and rarely aim 
to integrate the emotional and affective aspect of human relationships except to consoli-
date management practices. Recalling Glynos’ (2014) conditions for mourning – the first 
being the event or site that enacts a publicly shared recognition of loss, and the second 
being an appropriate context within which loss can be processed –, it seems that the Con-
cealment image cannot meet either condition insofar as it aims to integrate VDIs to eve-
ryday operations, looking for stability and in consequence limiting how loss is affectively 
and consciously acknowledged. Of course, it could be the case that shortly after the death 
of someone, some form of memorial service in his or her memory was performed, but 
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having the VDI continue in the institutional role of the original individual means that a 
feeling of absence cannot take hold in the rest of the members of the community, as a 
simulacrum of the deceased keeps engaging them for formal duties.   
6.4.3 Discourse / Worldview: Lasting contributions via Instrumental Techno-optimistic 
Post-Mortalism 
The discourse that motivates the social practices of Human-VDI interaction in the Con-
cealment image resembles the one of the Ambivalence image, with one key detail that 
converts it into a new discursive articulation. It shares with the Ambivalence image the 
thanatophobia that drives the emergence of strategies for immortality (Bauman, 1992; 
Jacobsen, 2017b) that become embodied in the VDI, while techno-optimism manifests 
itself in the affordances of technological systems that can integrate the VDI into everyday 
organisational dynamics. Hence, the Concealment image also offers a variant of Techno-
optimistic Post-Mortalism, as the fantasy of immortality offered by the VDI is strength-
ened by this device’s routinisation into work-related practices. 
The central feature that makes the discourse of the Concealment image a different 
discursive articulation from the one in the Ambivalence image is the instrumentalisation, 
and in some cases commodification, of the relational component of a person – possibly a 
digital persona left behind within the organisation – that is embodied in the VDI. This can 
be better glimpsed by what one interviewee considers an acceptable use of the VDI: “If 
they do it for knowledge purposes, recreating a person in terms of how their brain thought, 
in order to solve a problem or to transfer their knowledge, I would find it interesting and 
valid” (Alberto García, personal interview). The quote reveals that what is seen as valua-
ble for recreation are the elements of a person that can be put to practical use, such as 
knowledge or problem-solving strategies. The affective component that can be embodied 
in the VDI and the emotional reactions that can be derived from Human-VDI interaction 
in a personal relationship are not assigned importance within an institutional framework.  
Where there is an affective component involved or where emotional reactions are 
desired, the VDI would be deployed as a means to produce such effects so that organisa-
tional dynamics can continue undisrupted. The uniqueness and genuine personal traits of 
the original individual, which were coveted as features of the VDI in the Ambivalence 
image so that the human interlocutors could relive precious moments they had with their 
loved one, disappear in the Concealment image in favour of the practical, “productive” 
aspects of a person, those that can ensure smooth institutional operations. The discursive 
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articulation that emerges from this means-end rationality approach to the potential of and 
engagement with the VDI can be labelled Instrumental Techno-optimistic Post-Mortal-
ism.  
Instrumental Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism may appear in societies characteris-
tic of the advanced stages of modernity, wherein work in formal organisational structures 
constitutes a source of meaning for people. This occurs because the forms of individual-
isation and the new forms of worship to the individual enabled by digitalisation weaken 
traditional forms of achieving symbolic immortality (Bauman, 1992). Therefore, ad-
vanced modern structures, such as complex bureaucratic networks and transnational cor-
porations, devise mechanisms that offer a symbolic form if immortality to its members 
by encouraging outstanding performance in assigned work duties and leaving “lasting 
contributions” that outlive them. Teodorescu (2017) reasons that contemporary corporate 
discourse in the West fosters narcissism, rewards the breaking of limits in the pursuit of 
professional accomplishments and renders employees into infantile figures, all of which 
stress the creation of meaning through work. This discourse is assimilated by subjects 
their immersion in specific organisational cultures: “You are bombarded by people who 
want to create. And this is maybe, maybe, more individual and effective than ever before. 
Propaganda always factors into people who wittingly or unwittingly are trying to create 
a worldview inside people’s head” (Karl Suotamo, personal interview). From this per-
spective, the VDI can be understood as an immortalisation strategy based on harnessing 
an individual’s productive capacities, which are willingly left behind by the original in-
dividuals under the promise of transcending death by permanent contributing members 
of the imagined community.  
As with the previous images, the social practices of Human-VDI interaction are gov-
erned by their own sets of discursive logics emanating from Instrumental Techno-opti-
mistic Post-Mortalism. In this case, there is only one new discursive logic that can be said 
to present unique features, as the other two logics are a combination of the logics of the 
previous images. The new logic is the social logic of technological continuity, which em-
phasises the minimisation of disruption to the organisation by ensuring the permanence 
via the VDI of the deceased member. Although the extent to which the VDI could take 
the place of a member and continue performing his or her duties is uncertain, and would 
likely depend on the amount and quality of data collected from the original individual 
prior to his or her death and on the sophistication of the VDI’s material components, it is 
possible to expect the reaction by fellow members of the imagined community to integrate 
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the VDI so that organisational activities with little alterations, such as the case of a CEO 
who dies: “With this technology, for the CEO to remain part of the board of directors, 
they put the avatar” (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal interview). Given that 
the social relations in a given institution that is hierarchically structured would also be 
characterised by undercurrents of power and exclusion in the decision-making process, 
social logics of technological continuity aim to consolidate hegemonic visions of organi-
sational culture and dynamics when the opportunity for change offered by a death event 
presents itself. Therefore, social logics of technological continuity, intentionally or not, 
might exacerbate the marginalisation of competing visions and goals.  
Fantasmatic logics of immortalisation, seen in the Ambivalence image, and political 
logics of techno-instrumentalisation, present in the Restoration image, operate together 
in the Concealment image to foster the immortalisation of the original individual’s organ-
isational role and productive capacities. The fantasy of immortalisation takes the form of 
a fantasmatic narrative wherein transcendence after death can be achieved by the lasting 
impact an individual has had on the imagined community represented by the institution. 
Meanwhile, the political logic of techno-instrumentalisation is at play insofar as the VDI 
is seen only in terms of the contributions it gives to a company, government bureaucracy, 
or civil society organisation reliant on professional labour. Though there can be actions 
oriented to highlighting the VDI’s resemblance to the original individual, these would 
only appear if that increased productivity or optimised personnel performance were ex-
pected outcomes. Otherwise, the generation of affects in the members of the imagined 
community would probably be considered undesirable, as these decrease the instrumental 
and goal-oriented dynamics characteristic of a formal, rule-bound setting.  
Hence, the three logics of Instrumental Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism – social 
logics of technological continuity, fantasmatic logics of immortalisation and political 
logics of techno-instrumentalisation – imbue social practices of Human-VDI interaction 
in the Concealment image with a notion of symbolic immortality intimately tied to the 
imagined community that the institution represents. The linguistic markers in the logics 
revolve around signifiers which accentuate the instrumental objective of the VDI, such as 
“effectiveness”, “solve”, “knowledge”, and so on, with the signifier “contribution” po-
tentially becoming a nodal point. These, in turn, become articulated with the signifiers 
related to the technological nature of the VDI, like “digital assistant”, “avatar” and others. 
Though the specific signifiers can be expected to vary according to each organisational 
structure that incorporates the VDI into its dynamics, they would nonetheless stress the 
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themes of instrumental, practical value and technology. The operation of the three discur-
sive logics is shown in Figure 5.  
 
 
Figure 5: Discursive logics and social practices focused on the VDI – Concealment 
image. 
Figure 5 shows the (discursive) social practices focused on the VDI as they are routinised into organisa-
tional dynamics via the arrows. Social logics of technological continuity operate within a synchronic di-
mension, minimising disruption caused by the death event and concealing the original individual’s absence. 
Fantasmatic logics of immortalisation support the social logics by outlining transcendence within an imag-
ined community, while political logics of techno-instrumentalisation institute and defend the practical use 
of the VDI within the institution. 
 
The Concealment image offers a helpful opportunity to explore how mourning, be-
yond being a personal journey which one embarks on, is also shaped by political action 
(as understood within the framework of Post-Marxist discourse theory). As expressed in 
the System / Social causes layer, social practices focused on Human-VDI interaction in 
the Concealment image do not meet the conditions for mourning to take place, but what 
is relevant here is not only the ongoing institutional role the VDI routinely performs, but 
also the decision by the living to incorporate the VDI in this manner in organisational 
dynamics. Since the ethics of mourning entail consciously acknowledging the fantasy life 
enabled by the original individual, thus facilitating the discernment of the identificatory 
and emotional supports the real person embodied for others from the real person him or 
herself, the decision to deploy the VDI affects this process by complicating discernment 
and transferring the supports to the VDI. This results in mourning being simultaneously 
distorted by both the instrumentalisation of its members in the form of their VDIs, ex-
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cluding elements of affectivity from appearing, and by the manipulation of the fantas-
matic narratives of its members, which direct affective investment not only in the VDIs 
but in the imagined community represented by the organisation.  
This raises the question of whether loss is creatively integrated into social life or not. 
The main feature of the Concealment image regarding mourning is that loss is neither 
registered nor creatively assimilated. Glynos argues (2014, p. 146-147) that the key po-
litical question concerning mourning is whether enough space and time is granted for the 
mourning process to take place, which involves recognising how the death matters and 
the magnitude of the loss. In the Concealment image, the deployment of the VDI means 
that space is not given – the confrontation with a technological spectre of the deceased in 
organisational routines compresses the space for dealing with mortality, while the time 
might also be overlooked since ensuring continuity requires rapid action that minimises 
disruption. In consequence, the radical contingency of social relations is not acknowl-
edged, opportunities for change presented by the death of someone are dismissed in fa-
vour of the status quo, and mourning becomes complicated or devolves into pathological 
melancholia. Political action in the Concealment is revealed, therefore, in the restrictions 
placed on mourning for the sake of organisational dynamics and in the marginalisation of 
other manners for coping with death.  
6.4.4 Myth / Metaphor: A cog in the machine 
Since the VDI in the Concealment image is the result of the instrumentalisation of per-
sonhood by harnessing productive capacities and personal traits that have practical value 
for a bureaucratic apparatus, an evocative metaphor for personhood and mortality is that 
of a “cog in the machine”. Although arguably a metaphor more suitable for the early 
modern period than for the advanced stages of modernity, the cog in the machine meta-
phor represents the most salient and desired features of a person within complex organi-
sational settings.  
The cog in the machine metaphor emerges from Taylorist management theory, 
wherein the organisation of labour aims at enhancing economic efficiency and increasing 
labour productivity. Critics have pointed out that individual human qualities are ignored 
within Taylorism while mechanistic characteristics are accentuated and an impersonality 
frame is imposed upon the members of a workplace setting (Vittikh, 2015). In this sense, 
the cog in the machine metaphor transforms human beings into machines, with traces of 
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freedom, initiative and intelligence being removed to generate optimisation and effi-
ciency in organisational dynamics (Derksen, 2014).  
This equating of human beings with cogs within complex machinery – of which the 
VDI can be considered an extreme version of the metaphor – has implications for how an 
organisation as a whole faces the death of one of its members. The breaking down or 
malfunctioning of a cog, which could be understood as an equivalent of death, is solved 
by replacing it with another cog of the same dimensions which fits where the previous 
cog was. The original cog is discarded, but its place within the machine remains, waiting 
to be occupied by another cog. A person is different from a cog, in the sense that it has 
unique personality traits, behaviour and mannerisms, as well as a combination of different 
roles that he or she occupies within a network of social relationships. But in an organisa-
tional setting, if a person is reduced to its knowledge, problem-solving talents and pro-
ductive capacities, then he or she becomes similar to a cog: it contributes something to 
the whole, but is replaceable because its valued attributes can be accounted for in other 
ways. In the present, that usually occurs by hiring other candidates that have comparable 
skills. However, for specific individuals whose combination of talents, behaviour and 
personality represented an irreplaceable asset for its home institution, the VDI could work 
as a close substitute. The mortality of its members, then, would not have to stop a bureau-
cratic apparatus from operating, because the VDI would retain all the elements that were 
perceived as valuable for the organisational dynamics. The original individual, in its hu-
manity, would disappear, but a literal machine that mimicked his or her organisational 
role and generated the same value would become a permanent (and modifiable) replace-
ment. 
The cog in the machine metaphor works as the deepest layer of the Concealment 
image of the future, structuring the upper layers by emphasising the productive and prac-
tical aspects of a human being, which is equated to a piece of machinery. This view of 
the human being reinforces Instrumental Techno-optimistic Post-Mortalism, which 
stresses the value of the instrumental aspects of the VDI while encouraging its use as a 
way to transcend mortality. This discourse, in turn, offers a framework of meaning to 
social practices of Human-VDI interaction in an institutional setting, wherein its routini-
sation into everyday dynamics and/or its deployment for events that manipulate the af-
fectivity of its other members allows for continuity after a death event and minimises 
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disruption. The organisational embrace of the VDI could, in turn, manifest in the recrea-
tion of socially recognised public figures who have already died, but who are seen as 
having an interpersonal allure or are central for an organisation in conventional discourse.  
The social practices depicted in the Concealment image arguably go against a peda-
gogy of death: by emphasising continuity and the minimisation of disruption, the con-
scious acknowledgement of the effects of death in the rest of the members of a community 
is discouraged. The instrumental approach taken in relation to a VDI when it comes to 
organisational life, instead of cultivating familiarity with mortality, relegates it even more 
towards the background of social life, as the consequences of losing another member are 
less impactful when the VDI is deployed as a substitute for the “productive” or “func-
tional” value of its members. Yet, as a result of research, identifying the possibilities por-
trayed in the Concealment image can be said to foster a pedagogy of death insofar as 
strategies for using the VDI as a strategy for immortality that foregrounds the instrumen-
tal aspects of human life become visible. Therefore, preventive measures can be taken so 
that eventual social practices that diminish the familiarity with death and complicate 
mourning do not become widespread.  
6.5 Autonomy: Facing death and loss without the VDI 
The Autonomy image’s characteristics position it as a singular one among the four images 
of the future constructed from the data. Whereas the previous three images had Human-
VDI interaction at their centre, the Autonomy image has Human-VDI interaction taking 
place in its background, in the wider societal context within which the interviewees pic-
tured themselves in, but not as a specific feature of their own life in 2040. This results in 
a few challenges for outlining the social practices taking place within it. Firstly, the sub-
jects’ responses to death and loss were obtained and are featured in the description, but 
do not relate explicitly to Human-VDI interaction given their opposition to this phenom-
enon. This results in increased difficulty in describing alternative death- and mourning-
related practices while attempting to describe the interviewees’ approach to something 
that is explicitly absent from their lives: purposeful engagement with the VDI. An addi-
tional challenge surfaced in relation to linking the main theoretical elements for charac-
terising Human-VDI interaction in the Autonomy image, as the lack of material entailed 
a lack of detail to describe the phenomenon. A final difficulty revolves around obtaining 
a narrative structure based on the lack of detail and the interviews’ critiques of Human-
VDI interaction.  
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Of course, it could be argued that all these features of the Autonomy image make it 
a different kind of image, one which is about death and mourning but cannot be consid-
ered part of the main set of images featuring Human-VDI interaction. As the analytical 
categories and the Causal Layered Analysis that follows reveal, however, it is the fact that 
these death- and mourning-related social practices position themselves in relation to Hu-
man-VDI interaction and the ideological critique the image embodies towards a techno-
centric future that places the Autonomy image alongside the previous three images.  
In the Autonomy image, the continuing bonds displayed between the living and the 
dead are ongoing and personal, manifesting themselves mostly via memories or through 
objects that help users recall those memories. In this sense, they can be considered internal 
bonds. They are initiated by the bereaved, in the sense that some stimulus activates the 
bond at any given time and they act on it to think about the deceased or talk to them, even 
if no answer is expected. Mourning is often accomplished and death acceptance is 
reached, even if initial struggles to accept the loss can be present. The practices the sub-
jects engage in that foster the separation between their image of the deceased and the 
actual person orient them to invest themselves in new life experiences.  
The degree of humanlike interaction can be discussed in two ways. On the one hand, 
their interaction with a VDI, if it happens to take place, will be the VDI of a person ex-
ternal to their contact network and their engagement with it could be compared to a human 
using any other advanced social technological device. But their relationship with the de-
ceased, however, is maintained through other means, such as performing cultural events, 
watching videos or looking at photographs. The setting of the interaction with a VDI is 
random as a result of its infrequency, but the setting where the continuing bonds are ex-
perienced is a personal one, such as the home of the bereaved or the home of the deceased. 
The interviewees expressed an explicit desire to not immortalise their loved ones in the 
form of the VDI, but were open to other ideas which facilitated the memory of the dead 
to live on.  
Although a coherent narrative cannot be abstracted from the interviews, a sequence 
of events can be assumed to take place based on the descriptions the interviewees gave of 
the practices of maintaining their relationship to the dead in some way or form. This is: 
1) The original individual dies, generating a dislocation in the fantasmatic narratives 
of the subjects’ lives.  
2) The option to immortalise the dead person in the form of the VDI is presented to 
them, which they reject.  
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3) The living decide to “immortalise” or maintain their relationship to the dead in 
some form which does not involve the VDI.  
4) When encountering a VDI of another person, they would decide to avoid it, or if 
forced to use it, treat it like a technological device. Similarly, they would engage 
in criticism of practices focused on Human-VDI interaction.  
This pattern suggests that, in the social world of 2040 where the VDI is present, the 
possibility to use it in either of the three forms expressed in the previous images would 
exist. The subjects here, however, prefer to address mortality and undergo mourning in 
their own way, with references to significantly older technological means or engagement 
with nature to help them in gaining the acceptance of death and loss. The tone of the 
interviews from which this pattern was obtained indicate concern regarding the emer-
gence of practices of mourning reliant on the VDI, which they argue create dependency 
or complicate the acknowledgment of loss. In contrast, there is a more optimistic tone 
framing the interviewees’ alternatives for confronting mortality, suggesting greater con-
fidence in them than in technocentric approaches.  
6.5.1 Litany: Criticism against Human-VDI interaction and promotion of alternatives 
The Litany layer in the Autonomy image comprises the perspectives and opinions of peo-
ple for whom autonomy from advanced technological artifacts in confronting loss and go 
through mourning is important. For this reason, it can be expected that they would declare 
in public discourse how Human-VDI interaction does not maintain the dead in the world 
of the living but is just an illusion that helps the bereaved feel better. Speaking of potential 
problems related to Human-VDI interaction as a common practice, Alberto García ex-
pressed: “One is developing dependency. Another is to detract from life. Three is making 
decisions lightly. Dependency why? Dependency because those who use that device are 
not going to know how to separate the real from the imaginary” (Alberto García, personal 
interview). This quote stresses the different dimensions that constitute interaction with a 
VDI as problematic. Dependency is associated to human mental health, detracting from 
life is a moral position and making decisions lightly involves human behavioural patterns. 
Although these three aspects could indeed become problems, some people critical of Hu-
man-VDI interaction could be assumed to express these reservations about engaging with 
the VDI based more on predefined opinions and less on any careful assessments made on 
the matter, as they would largely avoid the VDI themselves and think about the phenom-
enon in the abstract. 
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Resulting from this criticism of the VDI, the promotion of alternative practices for 
facing death and go through mourning can be expected to emerge. For instance, the option 
of resorting to practicing long-held cultural rituals can be considered: “As the average 
Catholic, I think going to mass, praying and similar activities [are acceptable]” (Alberto 
García, personal interview). A different approach would involve personally remembering 
the dead without adhering to cultural or religious beliefs, as Olivia Mendoza, a young 
Uruguayan-Italian woman, mentioned: “Undoubtedly there is [an afterlife] in the sense 
of a person's memory, and there they are for remembering. I don't believe in paradise” 
(Olivia Mendoza, personal interview). The overall idea promoted in this layer is to carry 
out activities that allow people to confront mortality in a manner in which they do not 
depend on a technological simulacrum of the deceased to acknowledge the magnitude of 
the loss. The exact nature of the activities suggested would vary according to cultural 
background and personality, among other influential factors.  
6.5.2 System / Social Causes: Avoidance of the VDI and the performance of alternative 
death acceptance and mourning practices 
Human-VDI interaction is largely absent from the Autonomy image, ceding its place to 
other practices which facilitate the acknowledgement of death and its consequences. For 
this reason, the elements of social interaction by Turner (1988) cannot be said to describe 
how people approach the VDI in this image of the future, as the view of subjects in the 
Autonomy image is that it is just a technological construction. Instead, the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991; Young et al., 2009) and its emphasis on human 
control on technology might result more relevant here. In the context of discussing her 
negative opinion of the concept of the VDI, Verónica Castro, a Mexican woman in her 
sixties, stated her position on the possibility of owning one: “What do I want...? What, 
are you going to bring back a person who's been through this life? And he's gone, then let 
him go in peace! Yes?” (Verónica Castro, personal interview). The reference here to “let 
go” of someone, to detach, displays a preference for autonomy over the mourning process. 
By bringing back the relational component of someone in the form of the VDI, this de-
tachment does not occur, at least in this interviewees’ eyes. In this sense, the VDI is per-
ceived as taking control away from the living and reducing their autonomy in the con-
frontation with death and loss.  
This idea was reaffirmed later in the interview, when Verónica Castro argued: “It 
[the VDI] is very interesting for the effects it can have, but I consider it to be very much 
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like hanging on to someone” (Verónica Castro, personal interview). Interpreting state-
ments such as these from the perspective of TPB, the VDI would be in control over the 
emotional state and mourning process of its human interlocutors. In consequence, the 
perception of owning and engaging with a VDI might be that it would not foster the safety 
(in a psychological but perhaps physical as well) of its owners. It, in contrast, would put 
them at risk of complicated mourning or pathological melancholia. To avoid this, reject-
ing any use of the VDI for accepting death and loss is stressed in the system / social causes 
layer of microsocial behaviour.  
If Human-VDI interaction is dismissed as an option, what are the alternatives put 
forward by subjects who favour autonomy? The concise answer is that there are multi-
tudes of other activities which, as long as they embody the meaning of maintaining a 
relationship with the dead and do not create dependency on a technological device, are 
useful for accepting the death of someone. Some can incorporate supernatural elements 
and might involve the performance of certain mortuary rituals to care for the continuing 
bond with the deceased without being disturbing for any of the interlocutors. For instance, 
when describing how she first handled the death of her father, Verónica Castro described 
seeing his ghost resting in an armchair in her bedroom.24 Concerned over this situation, 
she asked a friend of hers for advice, which led to the following moment:  
“I armed myself with courage, and I said ‘Daddy, I am well’ – but, I 
was very frightened [by his ghost]. And I continued speaking with him, and 
then I started praying, and praying, and praying, and praying. And I do 
not know if that was something real or not, but after that, I did not see him 
again. And I was calm after that” (Verónica Castro, personal interview).  
In this account, it is worth stressing that although Verónica did not see her father’s 
ghost again, she still felt protected and watched over by him. The factual accuracy of this 
claim is not important – whether ghosts are real or not, as well as if what Verónica was 
seeing was indeed a ghostly apparition or a hallucination, a dream or a prank of some 
kind – but the social construction of meaning is. This event could be interpreted as some-
one who, experiencing unresolved grief, needs to directly confront a symbol of mortality 
(a ghost) on her own, despite intense fear of what she was going through. Material aspects 
                                                     
24  This was an actual event that happened in the interviewee’s life. However, she was narrating the event 
trying to reference how she envisioned a possible interaction with the dead in the future of 2040.   
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in the performance of this activity – a personal and frightening encounter with a repre-
sentative of death – were minimal, reduced to religious imagery (a small jewellery Cath-
olic cross she had as a necklace) and the furniture of the setting the interactants (herself 
and her father’s ghost) were in. The competences required were emotional stability and 
bravery, as well as knowledge of religious rites as represented by the prayers. The mean-
ing, which is a benevolent ghost (that of her father), is an instance of a continuing bond, 
one that is deceased-initiated but, once experienced, it becomes unilateral on the part of 
the bereaved (who is the one talking to the deceased and praying numerous times).  
In Verónica Castro’s case, the central activity (speaking to the dead and praying) that 
maintained the relationship in its initial stage took place in a single instance, although a 
transformed version of it (speaking to the dead, without the presence of ghosts) continued 
for a while. Yet, the disappearance of the ghost might imply successful mourning, in that 
the visible manifestation of her grief – her father’s ghost – disappeared once she accepted 
his absence and told him that she was well, which could be interpreted as a reassurance 
to herself that she would be able to deal with his absence. Continuing to speak to her 
father, and sensing his presence, might signal an approach of integrating the deceased into 
her new life practices. This is why, when asked once again if she would consider using 
the VDI for another loved one who might die in the future, she declared: “For what? To 
bring back the dead? No!” (Verónica Castro, personal interview). Such a remark indicates 
the acceptance of death, understanding that a loved one is permanently gone, but their 
presence and influence remains. Acknowledging this influence might take different man-
ifestations, such as talking unilaterally to the dead and thanking them for their role in the 
lives of their loved ones.  
Though the previous example featured supernatural elements in the continuing bonds 
between the living and the dead, this does not have to be the case. Mortuary rituals, in-
cluding religious rites intended to facilitate the adjustment to the death of someone are 
common across the world and would presumably continue to be carried out in the social 
world of 2040. Commenting on her perspective of Chinese Buddhist death rites, Wai Ling 
mentioned: “The majority of the population is Buddhist. So, I think death… there is a lot 
of superstition regarding death ceremonies. I mean, there are a lot, let’s say… a lot of 
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ways of saying goodbye to someone” (Wai Ling, personal interview).25 From Wai Ling’s 
perspective, adherence to religious death-related practices favour the process of mourning 
because they offer a framework for living in the face of death: “If something [like a death 
event] really happened, and I think this happens with all religions, you will be able to 
accept it and you will try to do your best [to live after the death of someone]” (Wai Ling, 
personal interview). If examined under the lens of social practice theory, the materials 
required for coming to terms with the death of someone would be those required for the 
mortuary rituals of each religion and cultural affiliation, i.e. those necessary to store the 
remains of the deceased, religious artifacts for public ceremonies, a proper space for 
mourning, and so on. The competences would again involve knowledge of the death rites, 
and willing adherence to religious or cultural frameworks. The meanings would also de-
pend on these frameworks and could encompass anything from reincarnation to the end 
of the person’s existence.  
Whereas the previous two examples explicitly referenced organised religions (Chris-
tianity, Buddhism), the confrontation with mortality and the process of mourning can also 
involve a deeply personal journey that, on occasion, conflicts with the practices of organ-
ised religion: “My family is quite Catholic. In fact, I was raised like this and made me do 
catechesis. That made me realise that I was going the other way, that I didn't fit those 
thoughts and beliefs” (Olivia Mendoza, personal interview). This quote illustrates the ten-
sion between the expectations of the social and cultural context, on the one hand, and the 
desire to assign personal meaning on death by the individual, on the other. This might 
result in a person seeking autonomy in his or her mourning journey not only from tech-
nology but also from the structural pressures being faced. This is evidenced in Olivia 
Mendoza’s response when asked why she would avoid owning a VDI: “Because death is 
very difficult, and each person processes it differently. And we all stick to something as 
people leave us. I still have little things from people who have passed, and I think yes, a 
lot of people would hold on” (Olivia Mendoza, personal interview). Here, the numerous 
possibilities to cope with a death event suggest that adopting an approach of personal 
significance is seen as desirable, as it establishes the centrality of the relationship between 
                                                     
25  This claim might be untrue. The majority of mainland Chinese people are atheists, followed by those 
who practice Confucianism, and then the Chinese Buddhists. However, within the context of the in-
terview, it is unknown if that claim is supposed to refer to mainland Chinese people or to the Chinese 
immigrants in Wai Ling’s temporary country of residence.  
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the living and the recently deceased as a way of gaining death acceptance and successfully 
accomplish mourning.  
Even in personal mourning processes such as Olivia’s, there would still be some ma-
terial elements present in the form of belongings of personal importance that reflect the 
relationship the bereaved had with the deceased: “Photos, videos and personal objects 
yes, to help keep them in memory and share it with others. And today you do that, but 
with less advanced technology. Other mechanisms [in the future] might facilitate it as 
well” (Olivia Mendoza, personal interview). The central competences, meanwhile, would 
require that the mourner is emotionally stable so that the magnitude of the loss can be 
registered fully. The meanings would be varied, but the emphasis on autonomy would 
accentuate that, whatever meaning is attributed to objects, behaviours or practices, it 
would still be the result of personal psychological and sociocultural construction, and 
nothing inherent to them.  
From this characterisation of the social practices in the Autonomy image, a recurrent 
theme can be identified. The Autonomy image’s future resembles more closely the past 
and the present, as the practices for coming to terms with death are similar in their basic 
elements to those currently carried out. Since they explicitly challenge the integration of 
advanced electronics to simulate being the deceased, subjects look for other sources of 
meaning that orient them towards life, such as previous and current practices for facing 
mortality emerging from religious or non-institutional cultural frameworks. This reading 
of a possible future is not, however, a simple continuation of current practices, but a re-
invigoration of them. Against a background where Human-VDI interaction were taking 
place, subjects who favour autonomy would visit cemeteries, watch old videos or view 
old photographs to reignite joyful memories with their deceased loved ones while consid-
ering the personal path to mourning as part of personal growth, as argued by Antoine 
Thibeault, a French adult man: “I would not interact with it [the VDI], because I think it 
is part of personal development to mourn. I think it would truncate my own development 
and that of the people around me that are still alive” (Antoine Thibeault, personal inter-
view). As expressed in this quote, subjects would stress the lack of humanity in a VDI 
and their detrimental effect on how the living come to terms with mortality. Thus, they 
would seek to attain greater autonomy from the dead’s influence without severing the 
bond completely. More likely, they would integrate them into their lives through non-
pathological melancholic identification and/or one of the pathways of symbolic immor-
tality described by Lifton and Olson (1974).  
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6.5.3 Discourse / Worldview: Natural Mortalism and death acceptance 
The decision to rely on more traditional cultural means and on one’s own inner emotional 
and cognitive skills for the acceptance of death and for mourning can be read as a critique 
of the previous image’s discourses on the desire for immortality and the role some forms 
of technology, such as advanced electronics, should play for accomplishing these objec-
tives. The Ambivalence and Concealment images displayed the pursuit of immortality in 
the form of integrating the VDI as a part of daily life, a practice which was governed by 
thanatophobic discourse and Post-Mortalism. They did so by creating a simulation of the 
deceased in the form of a social algorithmic entity which was embodied in the VDI, which 
was promoted by techno-optimism. Although the Restoration image dismissed the idea 
of immortality of a loved one being achieved through the VDI, it still emphasised the 
centrality of advanced electronic technological artifacts for reaching an acceptance of 
death and undergo mourning as part of a broader discourse of technological neutralism.  
The Autonomy image rejects thanatophobic discourses and Post-Mortalism by fram-
ing death as something that is part of the natural experience of being alive. Hence, it is 
also a form of the mortalist discourse, although in contrast to the Restoration image’s 
more neutral perspective on mortality, in the Autonomy image it is viewed in more mys-
terious terms and it is understood as a more explicitly positive force: “I think I ended up 
doing peace with the fact that I don't know, I'm never going to know what's really going 
to happen [after death]. But we do have a life limit and we have to enjoy what we have” 
(Olivia Mendoza, personal interview). This quote stresses both the fundamental phenom-
enological uncertainty that death presents for conscious and reasoning mortals like human 
beings and its role in the creation of meaning for life experiences. The fact that death is 
inevitable and inescapable also supports an optimistic message that living moments 
should be cherished and be meaningfully spent. In this version of mortalist discourse, the 
conscious mortal being (in this case, a human being) adopts a respectful position and 
recognises its limits in the presence of the phenomenon of death: “I present myself with 
all humility before this individual event that is inevitable. I am not opposing any re-
sistance to what death is as such” (Antoine Thibeault, personal interview). This approach 
to facing mortality accentuates its peaceful acceptance, one that is aware of the limitations 
of a mortal being and embraces its place within natural cycles of life and death which are 
beyond the control of any human endeavour.  
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This version of mortalist discourse is discursively articulated with a naturalistic 
stance on living and dying, which functions as a critique of the centrality of technology. 
Life and death are framed as natural events, which become distorted the moment one 
introduces technological artifacts and mechanisms in an attempt to gain control over 
them. For instance, when discussing his understanding of technology, Antoine Thibeault 
characterised it as a masculine construction, and expressed: “I think it is a way for the 
human being to seek to control life and therefore death. I think that ... it grazes arrogance 
(both Antoine and researcher laugh). To give ourselves the illusion that we can control 
our environment” (Antoine Thibeault, personal interview). This perspective can be la-
belled naturalism, insofar as it rejects a narrative of mastery over natural phenomena by 
technological means. Naturalism is also seen as respectful of the mysteries of life and 
death, respect which technology aims to dispel: “[Technology is] an idea that reflects the 
fear of the human being before life and death. I tell you, for me life and death are the 
same. And it enters the logic of positivism as well, of giving the explanation to the inex-
plicable” (Antoine Thibeault, personal interview). This quote showcases a critique over 
humankind’s reliance on technology to help it make sense of the world and confront the 
challenges in it. But as Antoine’s point of view indicates, present underneath this pursuit 
of technological dominance over nature is a sense of insecurity of the human animal in 
the world, one that is heightened by awareness of its mortality, and thus seeks to control 
it.  
The discursive articulation of mortalist discourse with naturalism can be termed Nat-
ural Mortalism. Natural Mortalism posits that life and death are not, in fact, two clearly 
distinct phenomena, but can be better understood as a continuum of natural forces: 
“[Death] goes hand in hand with life. Increasingly I cannot dissociate life and death. For 
me there are fewer and fewer borders between both ideas, which we can humanly develop. 
Death is part of normalcy. And, it is probably a stage” (Antoine Thibeault, personal in-
terview). The signifying chains in Natural Mortalism would have “nature” as its nodal 
point, with signifiers such as “normal”, “existence”, “limit” and so on modifying the dis-
cursive construction of life and death. Signifiers that emphasised its critique on the cen-
trality of technology could also be identified in this discourse, such as “unnatural”, “fear”, 
“control”, “arrogance” and others stressing the artificiality of technocentric discourses 
that aim to tame life and death.  
The social practices in the Autonomy image would be governed by its respective 
logics. Fantasmatic logics of death acceptance are shared with the Restoration image, 
184 
 
with social logics of established mourning and both political logics of techno-instrumen-
talisation and political naturalist logics constituting the specific logics of the Autonomy 
image. Social logics of established mourning refer to those that aim to maintain and/or 
bring back established cultural practices of mourning from the past and the (current, as of 
2020) present. These logics encourage mortuary rituals or personal activities that facilitate 
the mourning process but would explicitly reject Human-VDI interaction as a possible 
option: “I think this moment [of mourning] has a reason for being, yes. Because it has 
always been part of us. I think it [Human-VDI interaction] would greatly truncate our 
personal development. So, I want to grieve” (Antoine Thibeault, personal interview). As 
reflected in the quote, there is also an underlying desire for autonomy, one that is ex-
pressed in the form of greater agency in the mourning process. Human-VDI interaction, 
if viewed from the perspective of these social logics, threatens the agency that established 
mourning processes (either personal or communal) would grant to a bereaved person.  
Meanwhile, the recognition of the mourning process as meaningful and part of the 
human experience of living represent the specific approach the fantasmatic logics of death 
acceptance adopt: the obstacle is not death, but the prospect of truncated personal devel-
opment by interacting with the VDI: “I, despite having the possibility on this day [in 
2040], sincerely believe that I would not interact with it. […] I would not like to go 
through a device to be in contact that would make a dead person fake being alive” (An-
toine Thibeault, personal interview). Within Natural Mortalism, the fantasmatic narrative 
would position the acceptance of death as the ultimate goal. Consequently, finding auton-
omous ways to mourn that do not involve virtually recreating the person in the form of 
the VDI orients the bereaved towards that goal.  
The two political logics at play in the Autonomy image – political logics of techno-
instrumentalisation and political naturalist logics – aim to emphasise the technological 
characteristics of the VDI and present a critique of them while highlighting the fact that 
life and death are natural forces that should not be subject to the control of human will: 
“Death would lose its respect. I think so. And if death loses its respect, life loses it. […] 
I think that the human being would lose respect for death [by interacting with a VDI], and 
therefore, respect for life” (Antoine Thibeault, personal interview). These two political 
logics have complementary roles, with the critical stance adopted by political logics of 
techno-instrumentalisation weakening the centrality of technology for confronting mor-
tality and political naturalist logics promoting serenity and composure when facing death 
and undergoing mourning, which is undermined by Human-VDI interaction: “Having a 
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hologram of a family member [functioning as a VDI] seems to me it could generate neg-
ative effects on people's reasoning and the way they relate to life” (Olivia Mendoza, per-
sonal interview). As expressed in this quote, the Autonomy image frames the interaction 
with a VDI as something that complicates a person’s investment in life. It would direct 
their affective energy and desire away from “natural” life experiences and orient them to 
artificial ones. The consequences of this, in the view of the Autonomy image, would be 
reduced agency and limited capacity for change, which are opposite to the goal being 
pursued: equanimity when dealing with death.  
The interplay of the logics of Natural Mortalism – social logics of established mourn-
ing, fantasmatic logics of death acceptance, political logics of techno-instrumentalisation 
and political naturalist logics – is presented in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Discursive logics and social practices focused on the death acceptance and 
mourning – Autonomy image 
Figure 6 shows the (discursive) social practices that seek the acceptance of death and successful mourning, 
their performance expressed via the arrows. Social logics of established mourning operate synchronically, 
looking to bring back or maintain culturally acceptable practices of mourning (either communal or per-
sonal). Fantasmatic logics of death acceptance support the social logics by positioning the denial of death 
as the obstacle to be overcome, while political logics of techno-instrumentalisation emphasise the techno-
logical nature of the VDI and political naturalist logics urge subjects to be respectful of life and death while 
maintaining composure.  
 
Natural Mortalism is a discourse which orients the subject to discover the contours 
of his or her fantasy life and to undergo a mourning journey which reveals the radical 
contingency of social relations in a more explicit manner than the discourses in the pre-
vious images. In this sense, it can be said to foster the ethics of mourning (Glynos, 2014). 
Firstly, Natural Mortalism disrupts technocentric approaches to mourning, which despite 
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their arguable advantages, distributes the effort involved in consciously acknowledging 
the magnitude of death between the subject and the VDI. As an alternative, Natural Mor-
talism concentrates the effort on the subject and his or her network of contacts and directs 
them to the performance of events or mortuary rituals which assimilate the dislocation 
experienced in discursive reality, which includes their personal narratives of everyday 
life. By doing so, it aims to cultivate a sense of autonomy and resilience, working simul-
taneously to ensure that the bereaved act to meet the two conditions for mourning: an 
event or site where the loss is recognised and a context which enables the creative inte-
gration of loss into their personal lives.  
Natural Mortalism asks, additionally, to consider life as significantly shaped by 
death, in a natural cycle wherein the acceptance of death by those still living is necessary 
for a renewed attachment to life:  
“Given that the only certainty we have is that we're going to die, we 
have to accept it, too, because I feel that it's also healthy to let go. Which 
is obviously not easy, and you never end up forgetting a person, but in the 
sense that also clinging to it, not letting go, is like going against nature” 
(Olivia Mendoza, personal interview).  
The signifiers of “letting go” appear again to emphasise the detachment necessary 
that subjects need to undergo in order to reaffirm their investment in living. This detach-
ment, however, does not imply a severance of the bond, of the relationship with the de-
ceased. What is sought instead is the detachment from the previous “normality” of social 
relations, one in which the deceased played a central role and whose absence will be felt. 
In this sense, “letting go” conveys change after a death event, change in the discursive 
reality with a permanent void left behind by the original (now deceased) individual. The 
result of managing to “let go” can be understood as a completed mourning journey, one 
that allows nature – in the form of the cycles of life and death – to continue, instead of 
attempting to tame it with technological creations.  
Natural Mortalism also facilitates mourning by supporting subjects in acknowledging 
their position within a discourse, to verify what are its limits and to disengage from it and 
move on to another discursive construction:  
“I think it [the VDI] would generate dependencies, a new dependency, 
specifically. Because I think that the vast majority would position them-
selves or interact with their parents. […] Then it would stop this ability of 
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the human being to cut the umbilical cord, at least mentally. […] The um-
bilical cord would become longer and longer, and it would slow the growth 
capacity of individuals. And it is important to take the initiative individu-
ally, I believe, both parents and we, to cut the umbilical cord. We see it in 
the world of nature, and therefore it is part of nature, and therefore I think 
it is fundamental. The law of life, yes. And the law of death” (Antoine 
Thibeault, personal interview).  
The critique here is directed not only to technocentric perspectives, but also to Post-
Mortalism, as this latter discourse encourages the permanence of a relationship across 
time. In the case of Natural Mortalism, the reference to “cutting the umbilical cord” could 
be interpreted as the severance of the bond with previous generations. However, this act 
does not operate as a dismissal of their influence over the current generation, but rather 
as an act of autonomy over how to live. Whereas the different technocentric versions of 
Post-Mortalism can increase reliance on the past, Natural Mortalism proposes relinquish-
ing this dependency and pursuing a path of personal growth that could lead to developing 
a mature outlook and exert agential capacities on the world. Implicit in this viewpoint is 
the co-constitution of life and death, with death taking away previous generations so that 
the current and future generations can thrive. It is, in this sense, a discourse which argues 
that death is a necessary force for sustaining life and renewing it.  
Finally, it is worth highlighting that although Natural Mortalism recognises the value 
of death as part of nature, it also supports some forms of mourning that allow for the 
creative integration of loss into life. This discourse would recognise the lasting influence 
of the deceased in the world of the living through their place in once having created life 
or by being members of a network of social relations whose presence was meaningful for 
others: “I think that finally a large part of one's personality is transferred indirectly 
through the descendants. In the end, in a biological way. I think that nature itself does this 
transfer process, it happens naturally” (Antoine Thibeault, personal interview). This quote 
exhibits two strategies of symbolic immortality compatible with Natural Mortalism: bio-
logical immortality as expressed through descendants, and natural immortality in the form 
of considering oneself as part of the cycles of renewal of life. Of course, these forms of 
symbolic immortality imply death, but death is not equated to a permanent loss. What 
emerges instead is an identification with the ancestors and the acknowledgement that 
they, symbolically, remain in the world through the present generations. The transfer pro-
cess of biological and personality traits to the descendants could also be considered a 
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practice of generativity, albeit a more indirect form of it since the influence of the ances-
tors does not manifest in their recreation as VDIs, but in the life choices subsequent gen-
erations make by having as reference points the actions of preceding generations and in 
their possible physical and temperamental resemblance to them.  
6.5.4 Myth / Metaphor: A wave and its ripples in the ocean 
Whereas the Ambivalence and Restoration images were sustained by metaphors of the 
basic features of a person, and the Concealment image was founded on the notion of a 
person being a cog in a larger machine, the Autonomy image has as its foundation a met-
aphor that accentuates the theme of nature: the wave in the ocean, and the ripples it leaves 
behind. In this metaphor, the wave symbolises a person as a temporary manifestation of 
a deeper natural force – the ocean and life cycles, respectively.  
The metaphor of the wave in the ocean conveys the message of a unified whole, the 
ocean, which possesses an incredible force and is constituted by different water currents. 
The ocean has been present for millions of years, and waves emerge momentarily and 
then disappear again into the larger whole. A person can be understood in a similar way: 
it has its distinct features and behaviour, similar to a single wave, and emerges only once 
in a specific point in time throughout the expansive whole of life and death cycles. Like 
the wave that reintegrates into the ocean as part of its natural movement and dynamics, a 
person moves into death as part of these cycles. But the reintegration of the wave into the 
body of water that is the ocean does not end its influence: its ripples and force generate 
movement in the ocean space where it returned, in turn furthering the appearance of other 
waves and, in some cases, leaving its mark where it collides with solid surfaces. When a 
person dies, her singular features no longer exist, but her influence remains, as expressed 
by José Saramago in his literary work Blindness:  
“The good and the evil resulting from our words and deeds go on ap-
portioning themselves, one assumes in a reasonably uniform and balanced 
way, throughout all the days to follow, including those endless days, when 
we shall not be here to find out, to congratulate ourselves or ask for par-
don, indeed there are those who claim that this is the much talked of im-
mortality” (Saramago, 1999, p. 78).  
The above quote finds a form of symbolic immortality in the actions of human beings 
during their brief time living in the cycles of life and death. Present and future are, in 
more and less direct ways, affected by the preceding events, whose impacts will be felt in 
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bigger and smaller forms indefinitely. This highlights the central message of the wave in 
the ocean metaphor: a living being is not a single entity who comes into the world and 
disappears upon death, but is instead part of a larger, impossible-to-fully-comprehend 
whole to which it returns to when it dies.  
This manner of metaphorically understanding personhood and death also has a more 
intimate dimension, for the actions of ancestors in generations past have coalesced in the 
singularity of a person in the present: “Your relatives are there, they are focused on you. 
And what your relatives have done for thousands of years. You are the product and legacy 
of all that, right? So, I think that nature itself does it” (Antoine Thibeault, personal inter-
view). Biological and natural symbolic immortality are, as suggested by this quote, meth-
ods through which present existence arises. Interpreted as the confluence of previous 
events and people, the existence of a person cannot be separated from its spatial and tem-
poral dimensions. From this perspective, in his or her singularity, a person’s being is al-
ways part of the everlasting unfolding of events, including but not limited to the deeds of 
the ancestors, appearing as an individual entity but in reality constituting part of the cycles 
of life and death.  
This metaphor of personhood and mortality as a wave in the ocean becomes the struc-
tural foundation of the Autonomy image, as it promotes the acceptance of death as part 
of an overall cyclical movement where life is sustained by death, leading to the emergence 
of new life. This perspective drives the emergence of the Natural Mortalism discourse, 
where there is a critique on the centrality of advanced electronic technology and frames 
death as natural, facilitating mourning. In turn, this discourse exerts pressure in the upper 
layers to perform the social practices that avoid the VDI and favour established mortuary 
rituals and other more personal practices of mourning. Successful mourning would mostly 
be the result of internal work in the psyche, recognising how the deceased individual was 
a point of identification and emotional support. Eventually, in the Litany layer, this would 
take the form of criticism against excessive reliance of technology and the need to gain 
autonomy from it.  
The social practices and their deeper foundations examined in the Autonomy image 
arguably foster a pedagogy of death in a way that cultivates human agency and orients 
subjects to understand death as co-constitutive of life. Mortuary rituals have greater im-
portance here as they allow the acknowledgement of the loss within a network of social 
relations. Personal rituals that encourage working through the loss, wherein the original 
individual is remembered and the continuing bond in a non-technological way may be 
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reaffirmed, also facilitate for subjects coming to terms with the fact that any future will 
not include those who have died. As was described, forms of non-pathological melan-
cholic identification with the deceased can also give them the strength to invest them-
selves in new life-sustaining activities and find new affective investments. Awareness of 
the fundamental role that death plays in life is encouraged, as the absence of the VDI in 
the personal lives of subjects indicates that subjects are in favour of “letting go” of the 
deceased so that the cycles of life and death can continue. As a result, death is again 
naturalised and seen embedded within the experience of living.  
6.6 Conclusion: Inter-discursive struggle and hegemony in the ideal types 
The four ideal types of images of the future that showcase the way people might 
relate to a technological and social construction such as the VDI – Ambivalence, Resto-
ration, Concealment and Autonomy – differ from the images of the future commonly 
present within the field of Futures Studies in two ways. The first one is that the images 
focus on the microsocial level, that where interaction between social agents take place, 
instead of exploring the intricate relationship between systemic variables at the macroso-
cial level. This means that an imagined experience of living in the world where the VDI 
is a fixed feature and, more specifically, the subjects’ imagined confrontation with mor-
tality and loss by engaging (or not engaging) with the VDI were the focus of these images 
of the future, with other systemic variables addressed only where relevant for understand-
ing how the VDI might configure social practices focused on death and mourning.  
This is linked to the second difference, which is that the social practices of Human-
VDI interaction are not considered exclusive in the envisioned social world of 2040. Alt-
hough it is certainly possible that one of the ideal types of the images of the future de-
scribed in this chapter would be the only configuration of social practices in terms of how 
Human-VDI interaction occurs in 2040, it is also possible that all four practices occur 
simultaneously in the social world. However, these images are exclusive in the sense that 
subjects’ acknowledgement of death and their relationship to it, as well as the process of 
mourning they are involved in, cannot coexist for the same subjects. In other words, a 
subject who is using the VDI for successfully navigating his or her mourning journey 
could not equally undertake mourning practices characteristic of the Concealment or Au-
tonomy images at the same time, as these dynamics of processing a loss are in conflict 
with each other.  
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This interpretation of what the images of the future actually constitute for social prac-
tices of Human-VDI interaction raise the relevance of discussing the following questions. 
First, which approaches to confronting mortality and undergoing mourning could become 
hegemonic in the envisioned future of 2040, and which of them could become marginal? 
Second, how do the different ideal types address the ethics of mourning and therefore 
relate to the hegemonic and marginal futures? Although any answer to these questions 
cannot be but tentative and subject to change, the layered analysis and the narratives of 
the interviewees offer some indications of what the hegemonic futures could be.  
The four ideal types – Ambivalence, Restoration, Concealment and Autonomy – con-
flict over the appropriate approaches of confronting death and the loss of others. Some, 
like those driving the social practices of the Ambivalence and Concealment images, fa-
vour the routinisation of interaction activities that include the VDI as a mechanism for 
coping with the death of others, and potentially even extending oneself in virtual form 
after death. Others, like the discourse of the Restoration image, prefer establishing limits 
on the circumstances over which Human-VDI interaction would be helpful in facing is-
sues related to mortality and loss. Finally, there are discourses which outright reject the 
use of thanatechnologies for death acceptance and mourning, as in the Autonomy image. 
The different approaches to confronting mortality and facing the loss of others have 
deeper discursive foundations that structure the meaning of the social practices and are in 
conflict with one another, as their metaphors of personhood and mortality are different. 
This is illustrated in Figure 7. To consider how some images might become hegemonic, 
it is helpful to identify the dominant themes in the images of the future and how they 
structure the interviewees’ worldviews and perspectives of the future.  
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Figure 7: Conflicting discourses and metaphors constitutive of social practices in-
volving engagement with or rejection of the VDI 
The social world of 2040, at least as envisioned by most of the interviewees, is one 
where advanced electronic technologies continue evolving at an exponential pace, with 
greater integration into social dynamics given that most of the generations who came of 
age in or were born into digitalised environments would by then be in high-level positions 
that allowed them to make decisions with larger social repercussions. This, in turn, com-
plicates matters in terms of the human reliance on advanced electronic technology, with 
the majority of people normalising patterns of behaviour that would be considered futur-
istic from the perspectives of the past and the current present of 2020. The viewpoints 
most interviewees offered on technology ranged from techno-optimism to technological 
neutralism, with very few raising concerns on how, instead of using or benefitting from 
new technological developments, single persons, social groups or even whole populations 
could become subordinated to electronic systems that are embedded in the social world.26 
In this sense, technological determinism was a palpable feature in many images of the 
future. This might imply that technocentric visions are positioned to take a hegemonic 
space, not only as images of the future in the current present but also as the social imagi-
naries that drive the design and emergence of future dynamics, while naturalist visions – 
or even those that do not reject technology outright but instead encourage restraint – are 
likely to become increasingly marginalised over the years.  
Of course, technocentric visions by themselves do not necessarily imply hegemony 
for any specific ideal type. Considering social practices of Human-VDI interaction are, 
to greater or lesser extent, a feature of the social world of 2040, how prevalent they are is 
likely to depend on cultural attitudes on death and technology, as well as cultural belief 
systems over what is the best way to confront mortality and the loss of a loved one or of 
a member in a community. Political action, understood not only in an institutional sense 
but as the exercise of power, could also promote certain strategies of immortality, in this 
case the creation of the VDI as a form of Post-Mortalism, at the expense of alternative 
forms of dealing with death. Dominant discourses on the economy and sociotechnical 
                                                     
26  Although the technocentric features of the Ambivalence, Restoration and Concealment images could 
be attributed to the dynamic of the interview, the discourses of technology of the interviewees and 
their personal way of relating to technology were asked. Although more of them were hesitant on the 
idea of the VDI itself, all of them except two favoured advanced electronic technologies for everyday 
life. If discourses drive action, it can be foreseen that techno-optimistic discourses are going increase 
their dominance.  
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imaginaries (Jasanoff and Kim, 2015) are also influential in this regard. For instance, one 
of the interviewees described a video of his workplace where the physical environment is 
replete with digital technologies, and they promoted this vision as the desirable path to-
wards the future (Juan Ignacio Alcántara Montesinos, personal interview). In this way, it 
can be foreseen that practices of datafication and commodification of human beings, 
which are visible in the present in some forms of capitalist discourses, could increase the 
magnitude of their reach in social relations, in turn discursively articulating themselves 
with techno-optimism and thanatophobic discourses to generate the emergence of partic-
ular social practices where Human-VDI interaction is socially constructed as normal.  
An additional issue to consider, and this is something where insights of Critical Fu-
tures Studies (CFS) prove helpful, is how images of the future as transmitted in institu-
tional spheres can become hegemonic as they are internalised by social groups under their 
influence. Because CFS remains sensitive to issues of power asymmetries and aims to 
identify the interests underneath specific visions of the future, they can reveal how spe-
cific futures are assimilated by subjects. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to 
describe how this assimilation occurs, it is important to note that corporate interests and 
governments’ desire for increased control over their populations might frame their tech-
nocentric views as the exclusive, even “inevitable” future. This way, subjects might nat-
uralise the idea that a world where advanced electronics are the norm, an expected feature 
of their daily lives. By continuously affirming messages where human beings can be re-
duced to data, corporations, media and governments can attempt to fix some elements of 
the future in the discursive reality of subjects, thereby driving the emergence of these 
elements. In consequence, futures that could have been considered contingent upon sys-
temic pressures and social action – in this case, those related to the integration of a VDI 
into social life – might end up being proclaimed as unavoidable and determined.  
The ideal types explored in this chapter can be considered to enhance or constrain 
the ethics of mourning (Glynos, 2014), which relates to hegemonic configurations of so-
cial relations as well. The Concealment image limits any attempt at identifying the radical 
contingency of discourse and fantasy life, expecting continuity and carrying on activities 
as if a death event did not carry sufficient weight to be acknowledged in organisational 
life. The Ambivalence image possesses a duality: under some circumstances, when the 
VDI is meant as a substitute of the dead, the identificatory, emotional and material sup-
ports the living had with the original (now deceased) individual are not consciously rec-
ognised, and complicated mourning may ensue; conversely, if these supports and the 
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magnitude of the loss are addressed, then the Ambivalence image fosters the ethics of 
mourning. Both the Restoration and the Autonomy images cultivate the ethics of mourn-
ing as well, with the former using the VDI to deal with the loss of others and to guide the 
living to invest in new life projects, and the latter dismissing this form of thanatechnology 
in favour of more human-oriented approaches to confronting mortality and experiencing 
mourning. In this sense, it is the Autonomy image which situates human agency at its 
centre and advances it more than any other image, for it is subjects’ creativity, rituals and 
internal cognitive processes that allow them to accept mortality and the deaths of others.  
According to Butler (2006) and Glynos (2014), mourning has the potential to envi-
sion different alternatives of relating to one another, and for it to be successful, identifying 
and challenging structures which refuse to admit the deaths of others as important in a 
network of social relations is necessary. In this sense, the Concealment image could be 
said to pose risks for human well-being, as it overlooks the effects of death and orients 
subjects to remain invested in a fantasy, pathologically attached to people (even if it is in 
an instrumental manner) that would no longer be around. For this reason, the Conceal-
ment image is the most compatible with maintaining power asymmetries, as possibilities 
for change and orientation to new life projects are foreclosed. The Restoration and Au-
tonomy image, in contrast, orient subjects to envision new possibilities for living in the 
world after the deaths of others, and to forge new personal and social commitments in the 
absence of the dead without necessarily forgetting their influence on the living. Therefore, 
the Restoration and Autonomy images could be considered to empower subjects and help 
them reach emancipatory pathways in their personal and social lives. 
The aforementioned considerations on hegemony and mourning can reveal, on a gen-
eral level, two different forms of inter-discursive struggle taking place in the four ideal 
types. First, there is the antagonism between Post-Mortalism and Mortalism: the former 
rejects death, its permanence and the disruption it creates, and looks for ways to minimise 
the impact of death and loss on the living; the latter accepts death and views it as part of 
a natural cycle, and encourages confronting the magnitude of the loss of others in order 
to become invested in new life projects. The second struggle, related to the first, is the 
antagonism between technocentric visions and naturalist visions. Technocentric visions 
look for ways in which a specific thanatechnology, the VDI, can lead to symbolic forms 
of transcending death or concealing the impact of the deaths of others. Naturalist visions, 
in contrast, consider strategies where technology aims to achieve some form of mastery 
over death to be misguided, and aim to cultivate human agency in dealing with mortality. 
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A summary of this inter-discursive struggle is visible in Figure 8. Since societies shaped 
by the ideas, values and structures of modernity seem inclined to adopt both Post-Mortal-
ism and technocentric discourses, unless there is some growing critique that poses a chal-
lenge to these discourses, futures where both Post-Mortalism and technocentrism are 
dominant can be expected to be realised in some form of another. 
 
Figure 8: Inter-discursive struggle affecting the meaning of the social practices 
Under these considerations, a preliminary answer is that the technocentric images of 
the future – Ambivalence, Restoration and Concealment – can become hegemonic and 
eventually drive the emergence of the social practices they portray at the expense of the 
more established and naturalist practices specific to the Autonomy image. This is both a 
result of current dominant discourses and practices which view advanced electronic tech-
nology as an inherently positive force, as well as of the social context of the interviewees. 
The Concealment image reinforces the status quo and can lead to restrictive continuity. 
Though the Ambivalence (under some circumstances) and Restoration images can still 
contribute to death acceptance and successful mourning, therefore facilitating change and 
orientation towards life, they do not enhance and cultivate human agency in the same way 
the Autonomy image does.  
Recognising that the interviewees share similarities in their profiles, most of them 
being professionals in their fields and belonging to a middle-class background, it might 
be more accurate to think of these ideal types as those specific to this kind of profile. 
Additionally, the fixed nature of the social phenomena (social practices of Human-VDI 
interaction) in the images of the future might have influenced the features of the envi-
sioned social world of 2040, with several alternative images not considered as important 
from the perspective of the interviewees when thinking about their own position regarding 
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Human-VDI interaction. Despite these reservations, the central place of technology for 
human life and reliance on a specific thanatechnology for late-modern social dynamics 
hints at the possibility of increased subordination of human aspects of social experience 
– including manners of relating to mortality and loss – to technological constructions, 
with autonomy and human agency facing more obstacles as time goes on.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 Overview and assessment of research 
This thesis introduced the concept of the Virtual Deceased Individual (VDI), a thanatech-
nology situated in the digital immortality discourse that refers to those digital immortals 
that are constituted only by the relational component of the deceased and do not aim to 
recreate them in their complexity and autonomy, but only in their role they portrayed in 
the lives of the living. Additionally, it set out to conceptualise social practices of Human-
VDI interaction as they could be performed within images of the future in the time horizon 
of 2040. Then, four ideal types of these images of the future – Ambivalence, Restoration, 
Concealment and Autonomy – were constructed based on data gathered from long inter-
views with people who imagined themselves in interaction with the VDI in 2040 and the 
circumstances under which such interaction would take place. Finally, these images were 
critically examined via the Causal Layered Analysis (CLA) to reveal deeper assumptions 
that drive the emergence and generate the meaning of social practices of Human-VDI 
interaction.  
After establishing the ontological features of the images of the future for this thesis 
and asserting the relevance of the themes of death and mourning for the field of Futures 
Studies, the interdisciplinary literature review of Death Studies, Interaction Studies and 
social practice theory outlined the theoretical underpinnings of social practices of Human-
VDI interaction and led to the development of a sensitising scheme which represented a 
first step in their conceptualisation. Among the main arguments made by this interdisci-
plinary literature review is that, under some circumstances, Human-VDI interaction can 
indeed be considered social interaction, albeit in a more limited form than true social 
interaction between human beings. Similarly, the importance of death and mourning for 
social and cultural life was highlighted, thus enabling the comprehension of how practices 
of Human-VDI interaction are founded on themes of mortality even though subjects may 
not explicitly acknowledge this when performing them.  
The overview of the VDI, its place in the discourse of digital immortality and its 
technical specificities as forms of digital immortals (themselves being a subset of Virtual 
Humans) followed. By doing so, some of the technical features of the VDI were identi-
fied. Emergent forms of Human-VDI interaction were also described and illustrated in 
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the form of two cases of people who have already created a VDI as made possible by 
current digital technologies.  
A description of the methodology showed that insights from different fields, most 
notably Death Studies and Futures Studies, were considered for the data gathering and 
data analysis phases in this research. The methodology also introduced the analytical cat-
egories that offered ways to examine the narrative patterns in the empirical material to 
make meaningful contrasts among the ideal types of the images of the future that could 
be constructed based on the interview material.  
Finally, the narratives of the four ideal types (Ambivalence, Restoration, Conceal-
ment and Autonomy) were detailed, and each image was then critically explored using 
the CLA method. An overview of the main characteristics of each image as filtered 
through CLA is seen in Table 3.  
Table 3: Summary of the CLA layers of the ideal types of images of the future fo-
cused on Human-VDI interaction 
CLA | IDEAL 
TYPES 
AMBIVALENCE RESTORATION CONCEALMENT AUTONOMY 
LITANY The VDI allows 
the deceased to 
come back into 
the world of the 
living 
 
Human-VDI 
interaction as 
therapy or 
emotional 
counselling 
Active dead 
leaders 
Criticism 
against 
Human-VDI 
interaction and 
promotion of 
alternatives 
SYSTEM / 
SOCIAL 
CAUSES 
The social 
practices 
integrating 
Human-VDI 
interaction in 
everyday life in 
personal settings 
Social practices 
of supervised 
Human-VDI 
interaction for 
therapeutic 
purposes or 
solving specific 
personal 
problems 
 
Organisational 
continuity despite 
the death of its 
members 
Avoidance of 
the VDI and the 
performance of 
alternative 
death 
acceptance 
and mourning 
practices 
DISCOURSE / 
WORLDVIEW 
Personal 
Techno-
optimistic Post-
Mortalism - 
Technology to 
overcome 
mortality 
 
Techno-neutral 
Mortalism - 
Living and letting 
die by mourning 
through 
technology 
 
Lasting 
contributions via 
Instrumental 
Techno-
optimistic Post-
Mortalism 
Natural 
Mortalism and 
death 
acceptance 
MYTH / 
METAPHOR 
The 
communicating 
man’s relational 
information 
The Cartesian 
man’s body and 
soul 
 
A cog in the 
machine 
A wave and its 
ripples in the 
ocean 
 
The four ideal types and their critical examination through CLA have revealed that 
the way human beings relate to mortality and experience mourning by performing social 
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practices involving the VDI (or, in the case of the Autonomy image, as a critical response 
to the VDI) is affected both by personal perspectives on death and technology and by the 
broader sociocultural context where deeper meaning-creating forces are at play. By im-
plication, a detailed exploration of these deeper forces and their influence in the most 
visible phenomena was needed as well.  
The Ambivalence image portrays the sometimes contradictory nature of coming to 
terms with mortal existence and the loss of others, when the integration of a VDI in eve-
ryday life can serve as a simultaneous reminder of love and loss if death and its effects 
are acknowledged, or as an anchor to a previous fantasy life that subjects are unwilling to 
detach themselves from. The Restoration image narrows down the scope of the use of the 
VDI to very specific circumstances with the purpose of having a reminder of a loved one 
as encouragement to solve personal problems or to become aware of the emotional, ma-
terial and identificatory supports the original individual embodied. In the process, users 
are able to invest themselves in new life-sustaining activities. The Concealment image, 
by highlighting the “productive” and “functional” aspect of the deceased within organi-
sational life, hides the human interlocutors (and the institutional community as a whole) 
from the effects of death and appropriates the VDI as a strategy for the immortality of its 
members. This immortality, however, would only be for instrumental purposes, with the 
singularity of the individual removed. The Autonomy image would reject the VDI as a 
suitable form of symbolic immortality, fostering instead more human-oriented ap-
proaches that require a personal and a collective effort of working through the loss. As 
with the Restoration image, subjects can find new affective attachments while recognising 
that the deceased, despite their deaths, still have symbolic influence in the world of the 
living.  
These images therefore suggest that the acceptance of death, living in the face of 
death and undergoing successful mourning require that the VDI, in its integration into 
social practices, facilitates the acknowledgement of the losses derived from the fact of 
human mortal existence. If social practices of Human-VDI interaction do not encourage 
such acknowledgement, subjects might experience death denial (perhaps engendering be-
haviours of thanatophobia) and complicated mourning, therefore reproducing them in so-
cial practices and structures.   
The research project of this thesis has offered contributions to different fields, par-
ticularly for Futures Studies, by conducting research in the themes of death and mourning 
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that are underexplored in the field, and for Death Studies, by highlighting the sociotech-
nical dimension of both themes and by encouraging considerations about how human 
beings confront mortality and the loss of others. Nonetheless, it is important to emphasise 
the limitations of this research. By constructing ideal types, it becomes clear that the thesis 
cannot portray the multitudes of configurations of social practices that focus on Human-
VDI interaction in the time horizon of 2040. Instead, it is limited to finding common 
patterns in the narratives of interviewees about those futures and detailing them in the 
abstract. As addressed previously, although the profiles are diverse, perspectives from 
some regions of the world, age groups and people that do not have an academic or pro-
fessional background are missing from this research. Though this does not reduce the 
significance of the results, it is worth noting that the ideal types at the centre of this thesis 
might predominantly depict the visions of people (including the researcher) in urban set-
tings, with a certain socioeconomic status, and with their worldviews considerably shaped 
by the structures of modernity.  
7.2 Discussion of relevance 
7.2.1 Restrictive and emancipatory futures of social practices of Human-VDI interac-
tion 
The four ideal types presented in this thesis of images of the future of social practices 
focused on Human-VDI interaction – Ambivalence, Restoration, Concealment and Au-
tonomy – should be discussed in terms of what they reveal from a Critical Futures Studies 
(CFS) perspective and what they contribute to the pedagogy of death (Affifi and Christie, 
2019).  
The critical element of CFS resides both in the layered constitution of reality and in 
aspects of critique to prevailing systems and forms of social organisation. CFS aims to 
orient subjects towards emancipatory futures, introducing possibilities that allow people 
to escape constraints imposed by current structures. The ideal types in this thesis, although 
depicting social practices that might take place in the time horizon of 2040, showed in 
their diversity and contrasts futures that either embraced or rejected natural processes of 
existence, in this case the mortality of living beings. The Concealment image, in this re-
gard, could be considered a concerning extrapolation of trends in technology where peo-
ple, in their data-producing practices, become commodified and their instrumental value 
is foregrounded, with their complexity as human beings reduced to the data that can be 
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harnessed for productive purposes. By emphasising continuity and the instrumental con-
tributions of individuals to an organisation, the Concealment image displays social prac-
tices that disregard the magnitude of death in people’s lives and conceal the sense of loss 
within the network of social relations. Moreover, its commitment to continuity forecloses 
possibilities for change that are necessary in personal, social and organisational life. In 
this way, the Concealment image can be characterised as more restrictive for human well-
being, devoid of the emotional complexity inherent in human behaviour and promoting a 
view of humanity wherein their value resides in their usefulness as part of a whole, there-
fore normalising systems that commodify human life.  
The Ambivalence image is perhaps the most complex and, as its name suggests, 
acknowledges the different sides to facing death and loss in personal life. Recreating a 
dead person through digital technologies is, on the one hand, a technocentric vision that 
might encourage greater subordination of human agency to technological systems and 
artifacts, as well as a reduced recognition of the loss resulting from someone’s death. On 
the other hand, for some, it might be one way of confronting mortality directly, integrating 
a constant reminder of death into their everyday lives. The performance and meaning of 
the social practices of Human-VDI interaction in the Ambivalence image would likely be 
subject to the personal traits of the human interlocutors and the context of the death event 
of the original individual, as well as to the sociocultural pressures influencing the adop-
tion of this form of thanatechnology. Overall, this image offers a dualist perspective of 
the integration of the VDI into everyday life: it works as a simultaneous reminder of the 
love felt when the original person was alive and the pain felt by their permanent loss. To 
what extent that loss is consciously addressed by subjects or how much it only resides in 
the background of their minds will vary. Therefore, this image can also be restrictive to 
human well-being if it encourages ignoring the loss and seeing the VDI as a technological 
substitute of the original (now deceased) individual, or it can be emancipatory to the ex-
tent it urges the integration of loss into life and orients the human interlocutors towards 
engaging in life-sustaining projects and activities.  
The Restoration and Autonomy images can both be characterised as predominantly 
emancipatory, as both direct the living towards confronting mortality and undergo mourn-
ing. The Restoration image is also characterised by a reliance on advanced digital tech-
nologies, but is not dependent on them, as it uses the VDI only under supervision and in 
very specific times to enable subjects to successfully mourn their deceased loved ones, or 
to be able to deal with specific problems where the advice of the original individual would 
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be beneficial. The Autonomy image, in contrast, rejects the use of this instance of than-
atechnology, and demands greater agency for human beings in their processes of mourn-
ing. This takes the form of religious or community mortuary rituals which make the loss 
explicit for the members of the network of social relations, or of personal moments of 
recollection of fond memories with the deceased while contemplating living without 
them. Although both ideal types are emancipatory for how they enable death acceptance 
and orient subjects towards life, in a future where digital technologies are highly inte-
grated into everyday life, the Autonomy image might best represent practices that foster 
human agency when confronting death and loss.  
How do these ideal types relate to the pedagogy of loss? The Concealment ideal type 
is representative of a future where the themes of mortality and mourning are denied, 
where digital immortality and overcoming death are seen as desirable endeavours, and 
human beings become more alienated from death. The Ambivalence image could follow 
this pattern for personal life when the VDI is meant to act as a substitute of a deceased 
loved one, with the permanence of death obscured by the fact that the relational compo-
nent of the original individual is still present. However, when considering it an external 
and tangible symbol of loss that becomes a part of daily life, it can be argued that the 
Ambivalence image possesses emancipatory potential, for radical contingency is rein-
forced and the emotional, material and identificatory supports of the deceased are identi-
fied. In consequence, death becomes a familiar component of everyday life, and the living 
could continue engaging in life projects having acknowledged the permanence of the 
death of their loved ones and its implications for their future. The Restoration and Auton-
omy images foster maturity to accept death and urge subjects to become aware of their 
own thoughts on mortality and their emotions on having to live without their loved ones. 
Both images recognise death as co-constitutive of the living experience and aim at grant-
ing greater agency to the living when facing moments where mortality is a predominant 
theme.  
This research, then, has offered diverse and contrasting depictions of how death and 
mourning can be personally and socially addressed by the living. It reveals some config-
urations of social practices where the alienation from these themes is reinforced, and oth-
ers where becoming reacquainted to mortality and cultivating the maturity to accept death 
and successfully mourn the deaths of others is central. Hence, this thesis itself contributes 
to the pedagogy of death by encouraging deep and systematic thinking on the matter, 
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while the ideal types provide reference points of what death-alienating and death-embrac-
ing social practices could be like.  
7.2.2 Implications of the VDI as a fixed element in future societies 
It is important to consider, based on the critical exploration of the four images of the 
future in this thesis, what consequences the widespread acceptance of the VDI as an ele-
ment of the social world would have on a larger scale. Recalling Seale’s (1998) idea of 
the Death-constituted society, where social and cultural life is a response to combat the 
threat of meaninglessness that death could entail, having VDIs as partially autonomous 
interactants in the social world would move societies towards a further symbiosis with 
death. In personal life, the reintroduction of communication with ancestors could orient 
individuals and families to remember important lessons that their ancestors, throughout 
their lives, learned. This way, there would be a form of continuous guidance from the past 
towards a future, a practice of generativity wherein the VDIs of previous generations offer 
interactive insights that can only be learned by life-experiences. In the process, a critical 
engagement with the past could take place as well: romanticised notions of it could be 
confronted by engaging with its remnants in the form of the information stored within the 
VDIs and assessed in context.  
 By having the deceased gain an increased presence in the world as VDIs, it could 
also be speculated that a new model of death would emerge. Though the “death of the 
other” model (Ariès, 1981) would still be a force that drives the response of Post-Mortal-
ism, the VDI as a common element in social life could perhaps lead to the emergence of 
an “ambivalent death” model, where death still occurs but where the dead are still influ-
encing the unfolding of events in the social world. Such a new death model, as with all 
other models by Ariès, would entail significant changes for the social practices that hu-
man beings have performed in relation to mortality and mourning, as well as new discur-
sive and metaphoric interpretations of death and personhood. As supported by the diverse 
images of the future in this thesis, this new era of relating to death might manifest in 
different forms and drive the emergence of new social configurations according to the 
geographical and cultural context, some restrictive and some emancipatory in nature.  
Equally important about the effects of the VDI if integrated into social life is the 
recognition of the complexity of human relationships and the internal lives of human be-
ings. As was evidenced by the Ambivalence and Restoration images, people integrate 
those meaningful others into their sense of self, which they continue to attach to even 
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after those others die. If highly integrated in the personal life of a person, the VDI could 
serve as a constant, if somewhat painful, reminder that the original individuals who have 
died had very specific dreams, goals and a complex history that drove them to be what 
they were as autonomous beings, whereas the VDI only captures and reproduces their 
functionality as social agents. If careful consideration about the role of the VDI in the 
social world is encouraged from societies at large, then perhaps a more sophisticated un-
derstanding of the intricacies of human beings and their inner lives could emerge, and 
increased attention could be directed to nurturing attentive, empathetic and compassion-
ate human behaviour.  
7.3 Proposals for further research  
While exploring the futures of social practices of Human-VDI interaction has arguably 
contributed to the research into the sociology of immortality (Jacobsen, 2017a), the re-
sults, scope and limitations of this thesis also point to a number of possibilities to explore 
in future research. As mentioned previously, the diversity of the ideal types might be 
restricted to the profiles of the interviewees and to the personal theoretical positions of 
the researcher. Similar research that results from interviews with other profiles (more 
senior subjects, interviewees from Africa and other countries not represented here, people 
who have experienced significant loss earlier in life) could offer meaningful insights 
about future practices that investigate how specific thanatechnologies might shape the 
way people relate to death and mourning.  
Similarly, further research in Futures Studies that recognises the centrality of death 
and mourning is needed. This is needed for both theoretical discussions and empirical 
contributions. As argued in this thesis, death is a main meaning-creating force, and how 
different people think about death, or even their own deaths, in the future is worth explor-
ing. Critical explorations on the possible future developments of ecological mortuary rit-
uals, alienation from death in some forms of future sociotechnical configurations, and the 
way people think about personal losses in the future might yield significant insights that 
encourage discussion on how societies shaped by the structures of modernity handle death 
and facilitate or hinder mourning for its members.  
Finally, it is important to consider doing further research on what effects images of 
the future where the central themes are death and mourning have on human action in the 
present. Though this thesis only implicitly depicted what the interviewees’ perspectives 
were on thinking about death and mourning as manifested by social practices of Human-
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VDI interaction, meaningful contributions could be made by critically exploring to what 
extent thinking about death and mourning in the future grants or diminishes human 
agency and overall outlook on the future.  
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Interview questions  
Introduction – Researcher background, what the interview is about, explanation of 
standard issues regarding interviews (they are free to not answer any question they are 
uncomfortable answering, they can decide to stop the interview at any moment), how long 
it might take, remind them that it is being recorded, and remind them of sensitive issues 
about data handling, etc.  
Who is the interviewee – Could you describe yourself briefly? How old are you 
(either specific age or age-range)? What is your nationality, your educational and profes-
sional background? How would you describe your personality?  
 This is to establish the profile of the interviewee. Interest is in sex, nationality, 
age, cultural background, education, profession, and some self-perception.  
Significant life moments - Could you mention one or two significant moments in 
your life that you believe have contributed to shaping your personality, values, and way 
of thinking? How did these moments contribute to that?   
 This helps detect if they have faced significant loss previously or if the kind of 
attachment they feel towards their loved ones. How anxious they feel about loss 
in general, or risk. This could provide an explanation for how they imagine the 
future (in personal terms but also in societal terms). By talking about themselves 
and reflecting about themselves before going into more specific questions, they 
might also get into the right mindset.  
Perspectives on death – What is death for you, in your own words? How do you 
feel about the notion of death? How often do you think about your own mortality, or that 
of your loved ones? What are your beliefs in anything coming after death (afterlife, rein-
carnation, cycle repetition, etc.)? In what ways do you believe your life experiences and 
background (cultural, educational, professional) have shaped the way you think about 
death?  
 This helps explicitly link any life experiences to how they relate to death and mor-
tality. It also helps identify any influences from nationality and cultural back-
ground. It is not the same to examine death and mortality in Mexico as it is in 
Finland, for instance. But personal experiences of significant loss might also play 
a role, and two people from different nationalities who have experienced the death 
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of a loved one or another significant loss might feel similar about these issues than 
those who have not.  
Perspectives on technology – What is technology for you, in your own words? Can 
you mention some examples of what you consider technology? How attached do you feel 
to technology? Is there any technological device that you feel attachment to? Why do you 
feel attached to these devices?  How dependent are you on personal computers and mobile 
phones? Would you feel comfortable spending significant amount of time without your 
computer or mobile phone?  
 This helps get a better sense of how they use technology consciously. Intentional, 
desired use of technology with a meaningful purpose is important to understand 
how they might relate to the VDI. They might use the microwave, for instance, 
but they do not attach to it any meaning beyond warming food. But they might 
use mobile phones as a way to feel connected to significant others. If this is the 
case, something similar could be expected when imagining their interactions with 
the VDI.  
Exploring the content of the landscape images – Five landscape images are pre-
sented and then the interviewee is asked to imagine himself or herself in them, and to 
describe what they see while exploring them.  
Describing the concept of the Virtual Deceased Individual to the interviewees – 
Three images which describe the concept and what it entails are shown in sequential or-
der, along with a description provided by the researcher and told to the interviewee.  
Image 1: Imagine this is you and the other person is a significant other for you. You 
choose whom. Now imagine a point in time in which you are still alive, but that person 
who is a significant other for you has passed away. He or she is no longer with us. Picture 
yourself at this moment, what your life would look like.  Take some moments to imagine 
yourself, your life situation, the context of the world around you.  
Image 2: Now imagine there is a technological device that you can routinely interact 
with, and has some human-like qualities. For instance, it interacts in dialogue, either in 
text or by audio or video, with you. Imagine it like a digital assistant like those we have 
today, but more technologically advanced. It may be used for a variety of different pur-
poses, but the concept is the same – you interact with it in a human-like manner.  
Image 3: Now imagine this device can be used to replicate / simulate the personality 
and mannerisms, in any manner you can imagine (text, audio, video, virtual reality, aug-
mented reality, robot, etc.), to a fairly faithful degree. Let us call this the Virtual Deceased 
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Individual. The Virtual Deceased Individual would have all the necessary information 
that you associate with the original individual, and when prompted, it would answer faith-
fully and in a way that mimics the way the original individual would answer. Take some 
moments to imagine what that would look like for you.  
Questions regarding the technical capabilities of the VDI - What form would the 
Virtual Deceased Individual take? Would it appear as an instant messaging platform? 
Would it be something more detailed, for instance, a virtual reality setting? You are free 
to imagine it in any way you like. Take some time to imagine that, and how you would 
relate to it.  
 All of these are to get them to think about the concept of the VDI. They need to 
be able to imagine living in a moment in time without the presence of their loved 
one. They also need to imagine the technology and the form it would take.  
Description of the interaction and the day activities – Now, at this moment, two 
minutes to imagine a day in your life in 2040 (time horizon / this future hypothetical 
moment in time). In this day, at some point in time, you have to interact with the VDI of 
the person you have chosen, in any way or form you can imagine. You are free to imagine 
the moment of the day, the specific circumstances, the medium of communication (text, 
virtual reality, voice message, etc.) that you have imagined the VDI with. Just think about 
your activities in that day, whatever you are doing, and at some point, interacting with the 
VDI. It can be as long or as short an interaction as you like. There is no limit on this. 
Now, have you had time to think about your day? Do you have an idea of what you would 
be doing in that day, and how you would interact with the VDI? If so, please describe 
what you imagined.  
 This is where the content of the images of the future comes into play. It will tell 
describe something about their mental projections of the future in their lives, as 
well as how they imagine the technology related to the VDI would be.  
Motivations about interaction and opinions on the VDI - Thank you. Now, if you 
could put a title to the narrative of the day you just described, what would that title 
be? What is your opinion on the idea of the VDI? Why did you imagine the VDI the 
way you did? How was the VDI created, in your narrative? Did you create it yourself? 
Was it a service an internet application?  Under what circumstances would it be use-
ful? In your narrative of the future, why did you choose to use the VDI?  How much 
do you feel like it would help, in that future narrative, to come to terms with the death 
of a loved one? To what extent do you feel like the VDI allows for the deceased to be 
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present in some form, even after their passing? What problems, if any, might emerge 
as a result of the use of the VDI? Would this technology replace your loved one? What 
potential, if any, does the VDI have for transforming the way we relate to the dead? 
 These are questions related to the emotional state and the way humans’ approach 
and relate to technology. It also opens questions about how humans relate to death 
and mortality. It makes the interviewees think explicitly about a concept that may 
or may not have profound implications for microsocial and cultural practices. The 
answers related to these issues are the building blocks of the images of the future 
related to the VDI.  
Conclusion questions – How has thinking about living in a future where a loved one 
has passed away been for you? What has thinking about the VDI made you feel? What 
potential, or dangers, do you see in the use of the VDI? 
Thank you very much for your time and participation. (Standard closing procedure, 
reminding them they can request their data to be removed at any time, etc.)  
 
Appendix 2. Images describing the VDI 
Image 1: The interviewee and the death of a person in their network 
 
 
Image 2: The interviewee and a technological device with which he or she can “in-
teract” 
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Image 3: The interviewee imagining the VDI 
 
 
